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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited)
Liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL )
FUNDING, LC., a Utah limited liability )
Company,
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants,
Respondents

)

v.

)

Supreme Court No.

45517-2017

)
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company;

)
)
)

Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant,

and

)
)
)
)
)

M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho
Limited liability company

)
)
)
)

----·-----)

CLERK'S RECORD

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock.
Before HONORABLE Robert C. Naftz District Judge.
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For Appellant:
A. Bruce Larson
Richard A. Hearn
HEARN LAW PLC
P.O. Box 70
Pocatello, Idaho 83204

For Respondent:
Ron Kerl
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4229
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Date : 11812018

Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County

Time : 04 :56 PM

ROA Report
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User: OCANO

Case : CV-2016-0003588-0C Current Judge: Robert C Naftz
Monitor Finance, LC, etal. vs. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC , etal.

Monitor Finance, LC , First Capital Funding, LC vs . Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, M&S Development, LLC
Date

Code

User

101712016

LOCT

LAUREN

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Diane's Desk

Robert C Naftz

NCOC

LAUREN

New Case Filed-other Claims

Robert C Naftz

COMP

LAUREN

Complaint Filed

Robert

SMIS

LAUREN

Summons Issued

Robert C Naftz

LAUREN

Filing : AA- All initial civil case filings in District
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F
and H(1) Paid by: Cooper & Larsen, Chtd .
Receipt number: 0031772 Dated: 101712016
Amount: $221 .00 (Check) For:

Robert C Naftz

ATTR

TAMILYN

Plaintiff: Monitor Finance, LC Attorney Retained
Ron Kerl

Robert C Naftz

ATTR

TAMILYN

Plaintiff: First Capital Funding, LC Attorney
Retained Ron Kerl

Robert C Naftz

COMP

TAMILYN

Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of
Trust-by Monitor Finance and First Capital
Funder thru atty Ron Kerl

Robert C Naftz

10/20/2016

AFFD

KERI

Affidavit Of Service Of Another Summons And
Robert C Naftz
Complaint To Judicially Forclose Deed Of Trust;
served docs on M & S Developement, LLC on
10113116

10/21/2016

AFFD

KERI

Affidavit Of Service Of Summons And Complaint Robert C Naftz
To Judicially Forclose Deed Of Trust ; served
docs on Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC on 10/16/16

LAUREN

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
Robert C Naftz
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: A. Bruce
Larson Receipt number: 0034591 Dated:
1114/2016 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For:
Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, (defendant)

ANSW

KERI

Answer To Complaint And Counterclaim; atty for Robert C Naftz
dfdts

ATTR

KERI

Defendant: Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, Attorney Robert C Naftz
Retained A Bruce Larson

ATTR

KERI

Defendant: M&S Development, LLC Attorney
Retained A Bruce Larson

Robert C Naftz

ORDR

KERI

Order For Submission Of Information For
Scheduling Order Isl J Naftz 11108/16

Robert C Naftz

1112212016

KERI

Joint Submission Of Information For Scheduling
Order; Ron Kerl, atty for plaintiff

Robert C Naftz

12/1512016

TAMILYN

Amended Joint Submission of Information for
Scheduling Order

Robert C Naftz
Robert C Naftz

111412016

111812016

Judge

c Naftz

12/29/2016

ORDR

KERI

Order Setting Jury Trial ; Primary Setting
September 6-8, & 12, 2017, Secondary Setting
December 5-8, 2017 Isl J Naftz 12129116

1213012016

HRSC

KERI

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 0910612017 09 :00 Robert C Naftz
AM) Primary Setting
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Case : CV-2016-0003588-0C Current Judge: Robert C Naftz
Monitor Finance, LC, etal. vs. Wildlife Ridge Estates , LLC , etal.

Monitor Finance, LC , First Capital Funding, LC vs. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, M&S Development , LLC
Judge

Date

Code

User

12/30/2016

HRSC

KERI

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/12/2017 09 :00 Robert C Naftz
AM) Primary Setting (Day 4)

HRSC

KER I

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 12/05/2017 09 :00 Robert C Nanz
AM) Secondary Setting

HRSC

KERI

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 02/21/2017 02:00 PM)

ANSW

KERI

Monitor Finance , L.C. and First Capital Funding , Robert C Naftz
L.C .'s Answer To Counterclaim ; Ron Kerl, atty for
Monitor Finance L.C. and First Capital Funding

1/5/2017

Robert C Naftz

L.C .

MOTN

KERI

Motion For Summary Judgment By Monitor
Robert C Naftz
Finance, L.C . And First Capital Funding , L.C.;
Ron Kerl, atty for Monitor Finance L.C . and First
Capital Funding L.C .

MEMO

KERI

Memorandum In Support Of Summary Judgment Robert C Naftz
Motion Filed By Monitor Finance, L.C. And First
Capital Funding, L.C .; Ron Kerl, atty for Monitor
Finance L.C. and First Capital Funding L.C .

AFFD

KERI

Affidavit Of Ron Kerl In Support Of Summary
Robert C Naftz
Judgment Motion Filed By Monitor Finance , L.C.
And First Capital Funding , L.C. ; Ron Kerl , atty for
Monitor Finance L.C. and First Capital Funding
L.C.

NOTC

KERI

Notice Of Hearing By Monitor Finance L.C . and
First Capital Funding, L.C.; Ron Kerl, atty for
Monitor Finance L.C . and First Capital Funding
L.C .

KERI

Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge's
Robert C Naftz
Response To Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants
Monitor Finance, L.C .'s And First Capital , L.C.'s
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment; A Bruce
Larson, atty for dfdt

AFFD

KERI

Affidavit Of Richard A Hearn; A Bruce Larson ,
atty for dfdt

2/7/2017

MOTN

KERI

Motion To Amend To Add Additional Defendant , Robert C Naftz
To Wit: Pioneer Title Company; Ron Kerl , atty for
plaintiff

2/8/2017

HRSC

KERI

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/27/2017 02 :00
PM) Plaintiffs Motion to Amend to Add
Additional Defendant

2/14/2017

MEMO

KERI

Reply Memorandum In Support Of Summary
Robert C Naftz
Judgment Motion Filed By Monitor Finance , L.C .
And First Capital Funding , L.C ., Ron Kerl, atty for
Monitor Finance , L.C. And First Capital Funding ,
L.C.

1/6/2017

2/6/2017

Robert C Naftz

Robert C Naftz

Robert C Naftz

4 of 325

Date : 1/8/2018

Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County

Time: 04 :56 PM

ROA Report

Page 3 of 8

User: OCANO

Case: CV-2016-0003588-0C Current Judge: Robert C Naftz
Monitor Finance , LC , etal. vs. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, etal.

Monitor Finance , LC , First Capital Funding , LC vs. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC , M&S Development, LLC
Date

Code

User

211412017

AFFD

KERI

Second Affidavit Of Ron Kerl In Support Of
Robert C Naftz
Summary Judgment Motion Filed By Monitor
Finance, L.C. And First Capital Funding, L.C .;
Ron Kerl, atty for Monitor Finance, L.C. And First
Capital Funding, L.C.

212112017

HRVC

KERI

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
02127/2017 02:00 PM : Hearing Vacated
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend to Add Additional
Defendant

DCHH

KERI

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Robert C Naftz
scheduled on 0212112017 02:00 PM : District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Stephanie Davis
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: More than 100 pages

212212017

MEOR

KERI

Minute Entry and Order; Court heard argument
Robert C Naftz
on Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint and
add additional defendant, with no objection from
defendants, motion was granted , plaintiff atty will
prepare order and submit to the Court, hearing
scheduled on 02127117 at 2:00 p.m. to hear the
motion is vacated , Court next heard argument on
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, the
Court took the matter under advisement Isl J
Naftz 02121117

212312017

ORDR

KERI

Order Granting Leave To File Amended
Complaint; pursuant to the parties having
stipulated in open court , plaintiffs motion was
granted Isl J Naftz 02123117

Robert C Naftz

212812017

LOCT

TAMILYN

File #2 started

Robert C Naftz

TAMILYN

First Amended Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Robert C Naftz
Deed of Trust-by plaintiff thru atty Ron Kerl

31112017

Judge

Robert C Naftz

311312017

STIP

TAMILYN

Stipulation Consenting to Sale of Real Property
and Deposit of Proceeds into Trust

Robert C Naftz

312712017

MEMO

KERI

Memorandum Decision And Order; Plaintiffs
motion for partial summary judgment is granted,
all affirmative defenses listed in the defendant's
answer, as well as the defendant's counterclaim
for fraud are hereby stricken and dismissed Isl J
Naftz 03127117

Robert C Naftz

MEMO

KERI

Memorandum Decision And Order; Plaintiff's
Robert C Naftz
motion for partial summary judgment is granted ,
and the affirmative defenses and counte rclaim
filed by defendant are hereby dismissed Isl J
Naftz 03127117

312912017

APPL

TAMILYN

Application for Entry of Default Against M & S
Development, . LLC-thru atty Ron Kerl

313012017

DFLT

TAMILYN

Default-entered agains M & S Development, LLC Robert C Naftz
slNaflz 0313012017

Robert C Naftz

5 of 325

Date : 1/8/2018

Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County

Time: 04 :56 PM

ROA Report

Page 4 of 8

User: OCANO
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Judge

Date

Code

User

4/13/2017

MOTN

TAMILYN

Robert C Naftz
Motion for Summary Judgment by Monitor
Finance , L.C . and First Capital Funding , L.C.-thru
atty Ron Kerl

MEMO

TAMILYN

Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Robert C Naftz
Motion Filed by Monitor Finance, L.C . and First
Capital Funding , l.C.-by atty Ron Kerl

AFFD

TAMILYN

Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Foreclosure
Decree-by Miles Pitcher thru atty Ron Kerl

Robert C Naftz

HRSC

TAMILYN

Notice of Hearing-Hearing Scheduled (Motion
for Summary Judgment 05/15/2017 02:00
PM)-by atty Ron Kerl

Robert C Naftz

SMIS

TAMILYN

Summons Issued

Robert C Naftz

TAMILYN

Plaintiffs' Witness Disclosure-thru atty Ron Kerl

Robert C Naft z

4/19/2017
4/27/2017
4/28/2017

STIP

TAMILYN

Supplemental Stipulation Consenting to Sale of Robert C Naftz
Real Property and Deposit of Proceeds into Trust

4/30/2017

ORDR

TAMILYN

Stipulated Order Approving Stipulations
Consenting to Sale of Real Property-stipulation
and supplemental stipulation are approved
s/Naftz 04/28/2017

Robert C Naftz

5/1/2017

MOTN

TAMILYN

Motion for Reconside ration-by defendant th ru
atty Bruce Larson

Robert C Naftz

MEMO

TAMILYN

Memorandum in Opposition to plaintiff's Motion Robert C Naftz
for Summary Judgment and in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration-thru atty
Bruce Larson

NOTC

TAMILYN

Notice of Hearing-Hearing Scheduled (Motion
for Reconsideration 05/15/2017 02:00 PM)-by
atty Bruce Larson

ACKN

TAMILYN

Acknowledgment of Service-summons and first Robert C Naftz
amended complaint accepted by Jesse Hamilton

TAMILYN

Waiver of Right to Respond to Complaint and
Consent to Entry of Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure-by Jesse Hamilton thru atty Ron
Kerl

Robert C Naftz

AFFD

TAMILYN

Affidavit of Mailing-by Ron Kerl

Robert C Naftz

AFFD

TAMILYN

Third Affidavit of Ron Kerl in Support of
Summary Judgment Motion and Opposing
Motion for Reconsideration

Robert C Naftz

MEMO

TAMILYN

Memorandum Opposing Motion for
Reconsideration and Reply Memorandum in
Support of Summary Judgment Motion-by atty
Ron Kerl

Robert C Naftz

TAMILYN

Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs'
Foreclosure Decree-by Miles Pitcher

Robert C Naftz

5/4/2017

5/8/2017

Robert C Naftz
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Date

Code

User

511512017

DCHH

KERI

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Robert C Naftz
scheduled on 0511512017 02 :00 PM : District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Stephanie Davis
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated : More than 100 pages
and Motion for Reconsideration

MEOR

KERI

Minute Entry and Order; the Court heard
argument on the Defendant's motion for
reconsideration and Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, at the conclusion, the Court
took the matter under advisement Isl J Naftz
05115117

611412017

DEOP

KERI

Memorandum Decision And Order; Plaintiffs
Robert C Naftz
Motion for summary judgment was granted ,
counsel for the plaintiffs shall submit a proposed
judgment and decree of foreclosure and may
also submit a memorandum detailing the
grounds for any claimed award of litigation costs
& attorney fees Isl J Naftz 06113/17

612012017

HRVC

KERI

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
1210512017 09:00 AM : Hearing Vacated
Secondary Setting

Robert

HRVC

KERI

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
0911212017 09 :00 AM : Hearing Vacated
Primary Setting (Day 4)

Robert C Naftz

HRVC

KERI

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
0910612017 09:00 AM : Hearing Vacated
Primary Setting

Robert C Naftz

JDMT

TAMILYN

Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of
Sale slNaftz 0612012017 ; Recorded 6-26-17
Instrument No. 21708981; record book 1016

Robert C Naftz

CSTS

TAMILYN

Case Status Changed: Closed

Robert C Naftz

TAMILYN

judgment, decree of foreclosure and order of sale Robert C Naftz
instrument #21708981

OCANO

Miscellaneous Payment: For Taking
Acknowledgments, Including Seal Paid by:
Cooper & Larsen Receipt number: 0019714
Dated : 6/26/2017 Amount: $2.00 (Check)

Robert C Naftz

NICOLE

Writ of Execution in Foreclosure and Notice of
Levy issued ; sent back to counsel for Plaintiff,
Ron Kerl ; Instrument No. 21709079

Robert C Naftz

NICOLE

Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Robert C Naftz
by : First Capital Funding, LC Receipt number:
0020132 Dated : 612912017 Amount: $2 .00
(Check)

6126/2017

612712017

612912017

WRIT

Judge

Robert C Naftz

c Nanz
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User
LAUREN

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of
Robert C Naftz
Any File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid
by: Hearn Law, PLC Receipt number: 0021269
Dated: 7/11/2017 Amount: $37.00 (Check)

NICOLE

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal
to Supreme Court Paid by: Hearn Law, PLC
Receipt number: 0021291 Dated : 7/11/2017
Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Wildlife Ridge
Estates, LLC, (defendant)

Robert C Naftz

APSC

OCANO

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Robert C Naftz

NOTC

OCANO

Robert C Naftz
NOTICE OF APPEAL: Richard A. Hearn,
Attorney for Appellant Wildlife Ridge Estate, LLC

MISC

OCANO

Received check# 1161 in the amount of $100 .00 Robert C Naftz
for deposit of Clerk's Record .

TAMILYN

Respondents' Designation of Additional Record
on Appeal-by atty Ron Kerl

Robert C Naftz

7/11/2017

7/19/2017
7/21/2017

MISC

OCANO

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL: Signed
and Mailed to Counsel and SC on 7-21-17 .

Robert C Naftz

8/1/2017

NOTC

TAMILYN

Notice of sheriff's Sale in Foreclosure-by atty
Ron Kerl

Robert C Naftz

8/2/2017

AFFD

TAMILYN

Affidavit of Mailing-notice of sheriff's sale in
foreclosure-by atty Ron Kerl

Robert C Naftz

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Notice of Robert C Naftz
Appeal, No Transcripts Requested . Filed
Respondent's Designation of Additional Record
on Appeal. Idaho Supreme Court entered Order
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal as it appears not
to be from a final District Court Judgment.
*Suspended for (21) days for entry of Final
Judgment in the District Court .

8/23/2017

9/1/2017

WRRT

NICOLE

Writ of Execution in Foreclosure and Notice of
Levy Returned

9/20/2017

ORDR

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Order Dimissing
Robert C Naftz
Appeal : An Order Conditionally Dismissing
Appeal was issued by this Court on August 22,
2017 . as it appeared the JUDGMENT, DECREE
OF FORECLOSURE AND ORDER OF SALE
entered by Dist. Judge Robert C. Naftz and filed
on 6-20-17 did not comply with IRCP 54(a). This
appeal was suspended for entry of a final
judgment in the District Court. Whereas, there
having been no final judgment entered in the
District Court, pursuant to IRCP 54(a), and
Appellant having filed no Response with this
Court to the Order Conditionally Dismissing
Appeal entered by this Court on 8-22-17. It
hereby is Ordered that this appeal be, and
hereby is DISMISSED. Signed Karel A.
Lehrman, Clerk for Supreme Court on 9-18-17 .
8 of 325

Robert C Naftz

Date: 1/8/2018

Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County

Time : 04 :56 PM

ROA Report

Page 7 of 8

User: OCANO

Case : CV-2016-0003588-0C Current Judge: Robert C Naftz
Monitor Finance , LC, etal. vs. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC , etal.

Monitor Finance , LC , First Capital Funding , LC vs. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC , M&S Development, LLC
Judge

Date

Code

User

9/21/2017

HRSC

KERI

Notice of Hearing-Hearing Scheduled (Hearing
Scheduled 10/10/2017 03:00 PM) Deficiency
hearing-by atty Ron Kerl

Robert C Naftz

CSTS

KERI

Case Status Changed : Closed pending clerk
action

Robert C Naftz

MOTN

TAMILYN

Motion for Deficiency Judgment Against M&S
Development, LLC-by plaintiff thru atty Ron Kerl

Robert C Naftz

JDMT

TAMILYN

Judgment-against M&S Development, LLC in the Robert C Naftz
amount of $6,728 ,907.39 s/Naftz 10/10/2017

CSTS

TAMILYN

Case Status Changed: closed

MISC

OCANO

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT: Remittitur. Robert C Naftz
Signed and Mailed back to SC on 10-16-17

REMT

OCANO

Remittitur: The Court having entered an Order
dismissing this appeal 9-9-17 therefore, it is
hereby Ordered that the appeal herein is
DISMISSED . 10-11-17.

OCANO

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal Robert C Naftz
to Supreme Court Paid by: Hearn Law Receipt
number: 0032040 Dated : 10/23/2017 Amount :
$129.00 (Check) For: Wildlife Ridge Estates,
LLC, (defendant)

APSC

OCANO

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Robert C Naftz

NOTC

OCANO

NOTICE OF APPEAL: Richard A. Hearn,
Attorney for Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC ,
Defendant/Appellants.

Robert C Naftz

MISC

OCANO

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL: Signed
and Mailed to Counsel and Supreme Court on
10-23-17.

Robert C Naftz

TAMILYN

Respondents' Designation of Additional Record
Robert C Naftz
on Appeal-third affidavit of Ron Kerl in Support
of Summary Judgment and opposing motion for
reconsideration AND memorandum oppositing
motion for reconsideration and reply
memorandum in support of summary judgment
motion; to be included in appeal-by atty Ron Kerl

OCANO

Robert C Naftz
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Filed Notice of
Appeal with attachments. No Transcripts
Requested. Filed Respondent's Designation of
Additional Record on Appeal. Entered Order
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal as it appears it
was not filed from a final , District Court judgment
as to all parties or, a final Judgment with IRCP
54(b). Suspended for Twenty-one Days from the
Date of this Order.

10/10/2017

10/16/2017

10/19/2017

10/23/2017

10/24/2017

11/17/2017

MISC

Robert C Naftz

Robert C Naftz
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11/22/2017

11/27/2017

1/8/2018

MISC

Judge

User
OCANO

Rule 54(b) Certificate : Final Judgment upon
Robert C Naftz
which execution may issue and an appeal may
be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate
Rules : Signed Judge Naftz on 11-22-17. Emailed
Cert. copy to SC on 11-22-17.

OCANO

IDAHO SUPEME COURT; Entered Order
withdraw Coniditonal Dismissal and Reinstating
Appeal. Set Due Date - Clerk's Record only due
to Counsel on 12-25-17. Due in SC on 1-29-18.

Robert C Naftz

OCANO

CLERK'S RECORD ONLY received in Court
Records on 1-8-18.

Robert C Naftz
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the Supreme Court of the State of ldah9

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability
t:ompany,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs-CounterdefendantsRespondents,

ORDER WlTHDRA WING
COND1TIONAL DISMI ·, AL
AND REINSTATI G APPEAL

)
)
)

V.

JI

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTA1ES, LLC. an Idaho )
limited liability company,
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 45517-2017
Bannock County No. CV-2016-3588-0C

)

Defendant-CounterclaimantAppellant,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

and
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Oefondant.

An ORDER CO DITJONALL Y DISMISSING APPEAL was issued by this Court on
1

ovember 17. 2017, as the JUDGMENT entered by District Judge Robert C.

1 artz

and filed on

October I0, 2017, was not a fin al, District Court judgment as to all parties nor was it accompanied
Thereafter, a RULE 54(b) CERTIFJCAT E was entered by

by any I.R.C.P. 54(b) Certificate.

District Judge Robert C. Naftz and filed on November 22, 20 17. Therefore,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMI SSING APPEAL
shall be WITHDRAW

and proceedings in this appeal shall be REINSTATED. The due date for

filing the CLERK'S RECORD with this Court is set for January 29, 2018.
DATED this

~;~;~ourt ,

J. ~_day of November, 20 17.

-f: .

-· /11(/!ti;
· "tJ (

Counsel or Record
District Court Clerk
District llldge Robert C. Naftz

cc:

Karel A. Lehr

n. 'le

.:--c_ _

·12.,......W:
___

/

ORDER WITHDRAWING CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL AND REINSTATING APPEAL
•P

•

:~~·:.: ••

<

•

•

-::;..;:.'.:!. ''",.
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CLE if' C' r THE:: CC ' iHT

Ron Kerl, Esq. - ISB #1768
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182
Email: ron@cooper-larsen.com

"

'

ROBERT C. NAFTZ

Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C and First Capital Funding, L. C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

t~•ao1\t,·2P'&s~ OG

CASE NO.
FEE CATEGORY: AA
FEE: $221.00

COMPLAINT TO
JUDICIALLY FORECLOSE
DEED OF TRUST

Plaintiffs, for cause of suit against the above named Defendant, complains and alleges as
follows:
1.
STATUS OF PLAINTIFFS.

At all times herein mentioned Monitor Finance, L.C.

("Monitor") has been and now is a limited liability company organized under the state of Utah.
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Monitor has its place of business in Provo, Utah, and is autho1ized, among other things, to loan
money and to take notes and deeds of trust as security therefore in the State ofldaho.
At all times herein mentioned First Capital Funding, L.C. ("Capital") has been and now is
a limited liability company organized under the state of Utah. Capital has its place of business in
Provo, Utah, and is authorized, among other things, to loan money and to take notes and deeds of
trust as security therefore in the State of Idaho.
Monitor and Capital will be referred to herein collectively as the Plaintiffs.

2.
STATUS OF DEFENDANTS. The Defendant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC ("Wildlife
Ridge") is now a limited liability company organized under the laws of the state of Idaho, first
organized in on May 12, 2006. However, between August 6, 2007 and August 27, 2007, between
August 7, 2008 and October 5, 2009 and between August 5,2010 and September 18, 2015 Wildlife
Ridge was administratively dissolved as an Idaho limited liability c.;ompany and did nut legally exist.

Wildlife Ridge is the current owner of the premises herein sought to be foreclosed, having acquired
the property subject to the 1ights of the Plaintiffs.
Michael J. Millward, a married man ("Millward") and M&S Development LLC ("M&S"),
an Idaho limited liability company, are the makers of the Trust Deed Note hereinafter described, and
M&S was the grantor of the Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Secmity Agreement and Fixture
Filing herein sought to be foreclosed and owner in fee simple of the premises.
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3.

INFERIOR INTERESTS. The above named Defendants, and each of them, claim some right,
title, lien or interest in the property desc1ibed in Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust desc1ibed herein, but their
interest, if any, in and to said prope1ty is junior, subordinate, and subsequent to the right and lien of
the Plaintiffs.
4.

TRUST DEED NOTE. On the 30th day of December, 2005, Plaintiffs jointly loaned to
Millward and M&S the sum of $244,000, and as evidence of said loan Millward and M&S, made,
executed and delivered to the Plaintiffs their Trust Deed Note in w1iting, which Note was dated the
30th day of December, 2005, in the principal sum of $244,000, both principal and interest being
payable in words and figures as set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, which is a tiue and correct
copy of the Trust Deed Note dated December 30, 2005 and it is hereby incorporated herein by this
reference as if set forth in full at this place.
5.
MODIFICATION OF TRUST DEED NOTE. By an agreement dated March 3, 2008,
Millward, M&S, the Plaintiffs and Wildlife Ridge entered into a Modification of Trust Deed Note
to provide for additional sums loaned by Plaintiffs to Millward and M&S to become patt of the
unpaid principal balance of the Trust Deed Note ("Modification"). A True and correct copy of the
Modification is attached hereto as Exhibit "B," which is hereby incorporated herein by this reference
as if set forth in full at this place
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6.
BANKRUPTCY FILING OF MILLWARD. On September 10, 2012, Millward filed for
relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case No. 12-41260 pending in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an automatic stay
commenced on September 10, 2012 which prohibited Plaintiffs from taking any action to enforce
the Trust Deed Note, as amended. That automatic stay existed until Millward' s bankrnptcy case was
closed on June 23, 2016.

7.
DESCRIPTION OF REAL PROPERTY SECURITY. As security for the repayment
of the Trnst Deed Note, together with interest, costs, and attorney's fees, M&S made, executed and
delivered to Plaintiffs that ce1iain Trust Deed, Assignment ofRents, Secmity Agreement and Fixture
Filing dated December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trust") on the following desc1ibed real property situated
in Bannock County, State ofldaho, to-wit:

A Tract of land in the South Vi of the South Yl Section 31, Township 6 South, Range 3 S East, Boise
Meridian, Bannock County, Idaho, more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at lhe South quarter comer of Section 31; thence South 89°36 '40" East, 82 .68 feet; thence
North 53°44' 13" East, 88.1 feet; lhence North 26°44 ' 09" West, 320 feet; thence North 63° 15'5 I" East,
260 feet; thence North 26°44'09" West 495.62 feet, more or less, to the Southerly right of way line of
Barton Road; thence South 72°27'20" West along the Southerly right of way of Barton Road 472.74 feet;
thence continuing along the Southerly right of way line of Barton Road, South 83°18'20" West, 389.3
feet, more or less, to the Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail; thence South 26°44 '40" East along the
Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail 791.56 feet, more or less, to the South line of said Section 31; thence
South 89°44' East, 462.23 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning.

The Deed of Trnst was recorded on the 30 1h day of December, 2005 , under Recorder's
Instrument No. 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho, and contains covenants,
conditions and agreements of the mortgagor as set forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto, which is a
Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust
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hue and co1Tect copy of the Deed of Trust, and it is hereby incorporated by this reference herein as
if set fo1ih at length. The Deed of Trust has never been satisfied or discharged or the rights
thereunder reconveyed.
8.
PARTIAL RELEASES. After the recording of the Deed ofTrnst, there was released from
the Deed ofTrnst certain portions of the Property, and as of the date of this Complaint the Deed of
Trust applies only to the following desc1ibed po1iion of the Deed of Trnst prope1iy:

Lot 2, Block 3. \Vild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase L according to the plat thereof, filed as Instrument
No. 97000607, records of Bannock County, Idaho.
Lot 6, Block 3, Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 1, according to the plat thereof. filed as Instrument
No. 97000607, records ofBam1ock County, Idaho.
Lot 1, Block 2. Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof. filed as Instrument
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho.
Lot 2, Block 2, ·w ild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof filed as Instrument
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho.

Lot 4, Block 3, Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat the.reof filed as Instnunent
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County. Idaho.
Lot 5, Block 3, Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof. filed as Instrnment
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho.
Lot 7, Block 3, Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof, filed as Instrument
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho.
Lot 9, Block 3, Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof, filed as Instmrnent
No. 20728743, records of Bannock ColUlty. Idaho.
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9.
DEFAULT. Plaintiffs are the owners and holders of said Trnst Deed Note and the joint and
several beneficiaries of the Deed of Trnst.

In order to protect their interest in the Property, Plaintiffs paid attorney's fees and costs in
the amount of $4,546.19 to defend Wild Life Ridge's Quiet Title Action brought against the
Plaintiffs in Bannock County Case No. CV 14-7483. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover said fees and
costs by virtue of the attorney fees provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note and Deed ofTrnst.
General taxes were duly levied against and constituted a first lien upon the property described
in the Deed of Trust and to protect the lien of their Deed of Trust, Plaintiffs have paid taxes in the
amount of $22,136.63. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover reimbursement for the amount of the taxes
they paid on behalf of Wild Life Ridge by virtue of the provisions contained in the Deed of Trnst.
As of the

1 st day of October,

2016, there is due, owing and unpaid upon the Trust Deed Note

the sum of $6,812,821.71, together with interest thereafter accruing at the default rate of 35% per
annum until date of Judgment herein, together with costs, foreclosure expenses, attorney's fees and
expenses necessary to preserve Plaintiffs' interest in the property heretofore advanced or hereafter
accrumg.
10.
ATTORNEY'S FEES. Plaintiffs have had to employ counsel to represent it in this action
and has obligated itself to pay a reasonable fee for such services. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover
reasonable attorney fees by virtue of the attorney fee provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note
as amended and Deed of Trust herein above desc1ibed.

Plaintiffs allege that $5,000.00 is a

reasonable sum to be allowed as attorney's fees herein if this action is uncontested, plus such
Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust
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additional sums as the Court may adjudge as reasonable attorney's fees in the event of contest, tiial
or appeal.

11.
REASONABLE VALUE. The Plaintiffs, upon infonnation and belief, allege that the
reasonable value of the Deed ofTrnst Property and its appmienances is the sum of$50,000.00 per
lot, or a total of $400,000.00.
12.
NO OTHER ACTION . The Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law, and
no other proceedings at law or in equity have been commenced or are pending to collect the Trnst
Deed Note as amended or any portion thereof or to foreclose the Deed of Trnst.

All conditions

precedent to the initiation and prosecution of this action and the foreclosure of the Deed of Trnst
have been satisfied.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as follows:
1.

That Plaintiffs receive the Decree of this Court foreclosing the Deed ofTrnst so that

the amounts due Plaintiffs under the Trnst Deed Note as amended, which as of October 1, 2016
totaled $6,812,821.71, plus interest accrning thereafter, together with any additional sums advanced
by Plaintiffs or which Plaintiffs become obligated to advance for the payment of taxes or assessments
and/or attorney fees and costs during the pendency of this action, including interest on such advances
from date of advance; for the sum of $5,000.00 as attorney's fee if this action is uncontested, plus
such additional sums as the Court may adjudge as reasonable in the event of contest, trial or appeal;
for Plaintiffs' taxable costs and disbursements herein; and for interest on the entire amount of said
judgment at the maximum rate allowed by law;
Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust
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2.

That the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust described herein be adjudged a first and p1ior lien

upon the property described in the Deed of Trust superior to any right, title, claim, lien or interest
on the part of the named Defendants or persons claiming by, through or under said Defendants;
3.

That the Comi, in the Decree, establish the reasonable value of the property herein

described at $400,000.00;
4.

That the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust described herein be foreclosed and said real

property be sold in separate parcels in accordance with and in the maimer provided by law; that
Plaintiffs be pe1mitted to be a purchaser at sale; that the net proceeds of said sale be applied first
toward the payment of the costs of said sale and then towards the payment of Plaintiffs Trust Deed
Note as amended;
5.

That the Decree provide that after the sale of said property all tight, title, claim, lien

or interest of the named Defendants and eve1y person claiming by, through or under said Defendants,
in or to said property, including the tight of possession thereof from and after said sale, be forever
baned and foreclosed and that the purchaser at said sale be entitled to immediate possession of the
premises as allowed by law subject only to such statutory right of redemption as said Defendants
may have by law;
6.

That in the event the Plaintiffs become the purchasers at the sale and possession of

the premises is not smTendered to the Plaintiffs, a writ of assistance be issued directing the Sheriff
of Bannock County, Idaho, to deliver possession of the premises to the Plaintiffs;
7.

That after the conclusion of any foreclosure sale, upon proper motion of the Plaintiffs,

that a deficiency judgment be entered against M&S in the event the net proceeds of the foreclosure
sale are insufficient to fully satisfy the sums due and owing to the Plaintiffs; and
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8.

Tiiat Plaintiffs may have such other and further relief as may be just and equitable in

the premises.
DATED this°1:~dayof

STATE OF UTAH
County of Utah

C2cJt)be.r

, 2016.

)
ss
)

Miles Pitcher, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is the authorized agent of Monitor Finance, L.C., one of the Plaintiffs in the above
entitled and foregoing action; that he has read the foregoing Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed
of Trust, knows the contents thereof, and that the facts therein stated are true as be verily believes.
, 2016.

Miles~
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _J_ day of De ,o l,e ...-.

(SEAL)

, 2016.

NOTARY PU~~ for Utah
Residing at:
'fYJ!JD •• CIT
Commission Expires: ~ -l... 2.. - 2 o Ii
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STATE OF UTAH

)
ss
)

County of Utah

Derek Ollivier, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is the authorized agent of First Capital Funding, L.C., one of the Plaintiffs in the

above entitled and foregoing action; that he has read the foregoing Complaint to Judicially Foreclose
Deed of Trust, knows the contents thereof, and that the facts therein stated are tme as he verily
believes.

rJ

DATED this~_

day of

CJ v 'to~• .r

, 2016.

t:d~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _J_ day of OC-70 ~ -

, 2016.

NOTARY PUBLIC for Utah

(SEAL)

Residing at: ~ 1-mv., V.
Commission Expires:
2l.-

?.

Z()I

!

Complaint to Judiclnlly Foreclose Deed of Trust
Page -10

21 of 325

(

TRUST DEED NOTE

Dated: December 30, 2005

$244,000.00

I. Promise to Pay. For value received, Michael J. Millward, a married man, and M & S
Development, LLC, a Idaho Limited Liability Company (hereinafter individually referred to as
"Mak.er" and collectively referred to as "Makers") each promise to pay to the order of Monitor
Finance, L.C., a Utah limited liability company as to an undivided 50% interest and First Capital
Funding, L.C., a Utah limited liability company as to an undivided 50% interest ("Holder(s)"), at
3191 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604, or at such other place as Holder may from time to
time designate, in lawful money of the United States of America, the principal sum of TWO
HUNDRED FORTY FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($244,000.00), or so much of that sum
as may be advanced under this Trust Deed Note by the Holder, together with any other advances
made pursuant to this Trust Deed Note (collectively the "Principal Indebtedness"), plus interest
as computed below along with any other cost, fee or expenditure contemplated herein (the "Total
Indebtedness"). All of the terms and conditions of that certain Trust Deed, of even date which
secures this obligation are hereby incorporated and made a part of this Trust Deed Note.
2. Tenn. The term of this Trust Deed Note shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. This
Trust Deed Note shall fully mature on June 28, 2006 (the "Maturity Date").

3. Interest. The outstanding balance of the Principal Indebtedness shall bear interest
from December 30, 2005 until fully paid at a fixed interest rate of fifteen percent (15%) per
annum. Interest shall accrue daily on the outstanding balance of the Principal Indebtedness both
before and after judgment, and shall be calculated on the basis of a 360-day year. Interest is
compounded on a 360-day year simple interest basis by applying the ratio for the annual interest
rate over a year of 360 days (365/360), multiplied by the outstanding principal balance,
multiplied by the actual number of days the principal balance is outstanding.
4. Payments. Monthly interest payments will be made by Makers beginning February 1,
2006 and the first of the month thereafter. This Trust Deed Note calls for a balloon payment to
become due and payable on the Maturity Date. On the Maturity Date the Total Indebtedness
shall be due and payable in full. Checks will constitute payment only when collected. If any
installment or interest payment is not made within five (5) calendar days of the due date, a late
penalty equal to twenty percent (20%) of any such installment or interest payment owed
hereunder shall automatically be assessed. If any balloon payment is not made within five (5)
calendar days of the due date, a late penalty equal to ten percent (10%) of any such balloon
payment owed hereunder shall automatically be assessed. There shall be no grace period and no
further notice shall be required. In the event that a payment date falls on a weekend, or public
holiday, payment shall be due and payable the following business day.
5. Origination and Document Fees. As part of this transaction, Makers agree to pay to
Holder the amount of $12,200.00 as an origination fee (the "Origination Fee"). Said Origination
Fee shall be due and paid by the Makers on December 30, 2005. Makers also agree to pay all of
the costs incurred in documenting, recording and closing this transaction (the "Documentation
EXHIBIT
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Fee"). Makers agree that both the Origination Fee and Documentation Fee may be subtracted
directly from the principal amount at closing.
6. Holder's Expenditures. Makers agree to pay on demand any expenditures made by
Holder in accordance with the Trust Deed and this Trust Deed Note, including, but not limited
to, the payment of taxes, insurance premiums, costs of maintenance and preservation of the
collateral, common expense and other assessments relating to the collateral, and attorney fees
and costs incurred in connection with any matter pertaining hereto or to the security pledged to
secure the Principal Indebtedness or any portion thereof (collectively the "Holder
Expenditures"). At the election of Holder, all Holder Expenditures may be added to the unpaid
balance of this Trust Deed Note and become a part of and on a parity with the Principal
Indebtedness secured by the Trust Deed and shall accrue interest at such rate as may be
computed from time to time in the manner prescribed in this Trust Deed Note.
7. Prepayment. Makers shall have the right, from time to time and at any time, to prepay
all, or any part, of this Trust Deed Note at any time or times prior to the Maturity Date of this
note without payment of any premium or penalty. Prepaid Interest will be pro rated if this Note is
paid off early.
8. Default. Makers will be in default if any of the following happens: (a) Makers fail to
make any payment when due; (b) any Maker breaks any promise Maker has made to Holder, or
any Maker fails to comply with or to perform when due any other term, obligation, covenant, or
condition contained in this Trust Deed Note or any agreement related to this Trust Deed Note; (c)
any Maker defaults under any loan, extension of credit security agreement, purchase or sales
agreement, or any other in favor of any other creditor or person that may materially affect any
Maker's property or any Maker's ability to repay this Trust Deed Note or perform Makers'
obligations under this Trust Deed Note or any of the Related Documents; (d) any representation
or statement made or furnished to Holder by any Maker or on any Maker's behalf is false or
misleading in any material respect either now or at the time made or furnished; (e) any Maker
dissolves (regardless of whether election to continue is made), any member withdraws from any
Maker, any member dies, or any of the members of any Maker becomes insolvent, a receiver is
appointed for any part of any Maker's property, any Maker makes an assignment for the benefit
of creditors, or any proceeding is commenced either by any Maker or against any Maker under
any bankruptcy or insolvency laws; (f) any creditor tries to take any of any Maker's property on
or in which Holder has a lien or security interest; (g) a material adverse change occurs in any
Maker's financial condition, or Holder believes the prospect of payment or performance of the
Indebtedness is impaired; (h) Holder in good faith deems itself insecure.
9. Default Interest Rate. Notwithstanding anything above to the contrary, if default
occurs in the payment of any principal, interest, fee or cost, when due, or if any Event of Default
occurs hereunder, time being of the essence hereof, if said default remains uncured for five (5)
calendar days, thereafter, all outstanding Principal Indebtedness shall bear interest at a default
rate of thirty-five percent (35%) until paid, both before and after judgment. If this Trust Deed
Note becomes in default or payment is accelerated, Makers agree to pay to the Holder of the
Trust Deed Note all collections costs, including reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses
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incurred both before and after judgment, including any bankruptcy proceeding or appeal, in
addition to all other sums due under this Trust Deed Note.
10. Application of Payments. Any and all payments by any Maker under this Trust Deed
Note shall be applied as follows: first, to the repayment of any Holder Expenditures advanced by
Holder under this Trust Deed Note; second, to the payment of any late charges; third, to the
payment of accrued interest on the Principal Indebtedness; and fourth, to the payment of the
Principal Indebtedness.
11. Extension. The time for any payment required under this Trust Deed Note may be
extended from time to time at the sole discretion of the Holder. Makers agree to pay to Holder
an extension fee in the sum of ten percent (10%) of the Total Indebtedness then outstanding
under this Trust Deed Note (the "Extension Fee"). The Extension Fee shall be paid to Monitor
Finance, L.C./First Capital Funding, L.C., at 3191 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604. In
addition to the Extension Fee, Makers further agree to pay any and all documentation and
recording costs incurred in the preparation of said extension. Both the Extension Fee and the
extension documentation costs shall be due and payable at the time the extension is executed.
Acceptance by Holder of any additional security or guarantees for the performance of the terms
and provisions contained in this Trust Deed Note shall not in any way affect the liability of an
individual Maker.
12. Governing Law. This Trust Deed Note has been delivered to Holder in the State of
Utah. Ifthere is a lawsuit, Makers agree upon Holder's request to submit to the jurisdiction of
the courts of Utah County, the State of Utah. This Trust Deed Note shall be governed by and
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
13. Joint and Several Liability. In the event this Trust Deed Note is executed, endorsed,
guaranteed or assumed by more than one person, corporation, or any other entity, all of the
parties shall be jointly and severally liable and do hereby waive presentment, demand, protest
and notice of non-payment and of protest. Furthermore, each of the parties hereto agrees that
his, her or its obligation shall continue in full force and effect notwithstanding the death,
bankruptcy (or commencement thereof), dissolution or release of any other party and
notwithstanding the taking or release of other or additional security and notwithstanding any
waiver, amendment or modification (including, but not limited to, extensions of time or
performance) by the holder of this Trust Deed Note as to the obligations under this Trust Deed
Note or under any other Loan Document of any of the other parties, with or without notice.
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, each of the parties to this Trust Deed Note agree
that a separate action or actions may be brought against him, her or it, whether or not such action
is brought against any of the other parties to this Trust Deed Note.
14. Interest Limitation. All agreements between the parties to this Trust Deed Note and
the Holder of this Trust Deed Note are hereby expressly limited so that in no contingency or
event whatsoever, whether by reason of deferment or advancement of the proceeds of the loan
evidenced by this Trust Deed Note, acceleration of maturity of the Loan, or otherwise shall the
amount paid or agreed to be paid to Holder for the use, forbearance or detention of the money to
be loaned under this Trust Deed Note exceed the maximum interest rate permissible under
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applicable law. If, from any circumstance whatsoever, fulfillment of any provision of this Trust
Deed Note or of any other agreement between the parties to this Trust Deed Note and the Holder,
at the time perfonnance of such provision shall be due, shall involve transcending the limit of
validity prescribed by law, then, ipso facto, the obligation to be fulfilled shall be reduced to the
limit of such validity. In the event that any payment is received by the Holder of this Trust Deed
Note which would otherwise be deemed to by a payment of interest in excess of the maximum
allowed by law, such payment shall be deemed to have been paid on account of principal at the
time of receipt. This provision shall never be superseded or waived and shall control every other
provision of the Trust Deed Note and all agreements between the paiiies and the holder of this
Trust Deed Note.

15. General Provisions. Both Holder and Maker acknowledge and agree that any and all
monies provided by Holder to Maker pursuant to the terms hereof are for a business purpose.
Holder may delay or forego enforcing any of its 1ights or remedies under this Trust Deed Note
without losing them. Upon any change in the tem1s of this Trust Deed Note, and unless
otherwise expressly stated in writing, no paiiy who sign this Trust Deed Note, whether as maker,
guarantor, accommodation maker or endorser, shall be released from liability. All such parties
agree that Holder may renew or extend (repeatedly and for any length of time) this loan, or
release any party or guarantor or collateral; or impair, fail to realize upon or perfect Holder's
security interest in the collateral; and take any other action deemed necessary by Holder without
the consent of or notice to anyone. All such parties also agree that Holder may modify this Trust
Deed Note without the consent of or notice to anyone other than the party with whom the
modification is made.
DATED thls

~ day of Dotm./pjft.

, 2005.

MAKERS:

Michael J. Millw

M & S Developm

, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company

By: - - - - - - - - -

Its: - - - - - - - - - -
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.·. 'if~ct1Ilcittibn·or'Ti·ctst·rie~d·Note .... .
On Dec~mber 30, 2005, Michael Millward and M&S Development, executed a
Note and Trust Deed in favor of Monitor Finance, L.G. and First Capital Funding, L.C. in
the amount of $244,000.00, The Trnst Deed was i·ecorded as Entry No .. 20528398 in the
records of the Bannock County, Idaho, Recorder. ·

The pa1iies hereby modify said Trust Deed Note as follows:
• The Note will be expanded to include Ithe following draws:
q
o
o
o
o

8/14/07

$75,000.00

9/4/07
9/19/07
10/25/07
·3/1/08

$25,000.00
$7,400.00
$100,000.00
$10,000.00

The pru.iies acknowledge that the same terms and conditions of the original Note and ·
Trust Deed will apply to the amended amount .?Jld terms.

Monitor Fi ce, L,C:
By: Miles C. Pitcher
Its: ~1au~ging Member

')
,/~ul. -~>"~.--C.__
...,--.),~

·.

"

L.91'St Capital Funding, L.C.
By: Derek Ollivier
Its: Member

·==-...

Acknowledged by:

~
Wildlife Ridge states LLC
By:
Its:

(}(t~

.!tJ~

J
~~
11 /)

J/, .. ~
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TRUST DEED, ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS,
SECURITY AGREEMENT AND
FIXTURE FILING
This Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing (the "Trnst
Deed") is made and executed this 30th day of December, 2005 (the "Closing Date"), by M&S
Development, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company ( "Trnstor") whose address is 1801 N.
STE c, POCATELLO, ID 83204
, and Pioneer Title Company as Trnstee ("Trustee"), in
favor of Monitor Finance, L.C. as to an undivided 50% interest whose address is 3191 North
Canyon Road, Provo, UT 84604, and First Capital Funding, L.C. as to an undivided 50%
interest whose address is 3191 No11h Canyon Road, Provo, UT 84604 ("Beneficiary").

Beneficiary has loaned monies to Trustor and the transaction is memorialized by that
certain Promissory Note dated December 30, 2005 executed by Trustor in favor of Beneficiary in
the amount of Two Hundred Forty Four Thousand Dollars ($244,000.00) (the ''Note").
See attached "Exhibit A"

In exchange for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and legal sufficiency of
which are hereby aclmowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:
ARTICLE I GRANT AND CONVEYANCE
1.1

General Grant. Trustor hereby assigns, grants, bargains, sells, conveys, wanants,
and transfers to Trustee in trust, for the Benefit of Beneficiary, with power of sale,
and right of entry and possession, the following described property (the "Real
Property"):
1.1.1 Real Property. All right, title, interest and estate of Truster, now
owned or hereafter acquired, in and to the real property located in
Bannock County, State of Idaho (the "Real Property'') as more particularly
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this
reference.
1.1.2 Buildings, Improvements and Interests. All right, title, interest and
estate of Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to: (a) All
buildings, improvements, works, structures, facilities and fixtures,
including any future additions to, and improvements and betterments now
or hereafter constructed upon, and all renewals and replacements of, any
of the foregoing, which are now or hereafter shall be constructed or
affixed or constructively affixed to the Property, or to any portion of the
Real Property (the "Improvements"). (b) All easements, licenses, streets,
ways, alleys, roads, passages, rights-of-way, minerals, oil, gas and other
hydrocarbon substances, development rights, air rights, water, water
EXHIBIT
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courses, water rights, and water stock (whether now owned or hereafter
acquired by Trustor and whether arising by virtue of land ownership,
contract or otherwise), of any kind and nature, relating to or in any way
appurtenant or appertaining to the Real Property or to any portion of the
Real Property.
1.1.3 Tenements. Hereditaments. AH right, title, interest and estate of
Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to all of the tenements,
hereditaments, rights, privileges, and appurtenances belonging, relating, or
in any way appertaining to any of the Real Property or the Improvements,
or any portion of the Real Property or the Improvements, or which shall
hereafter in any way belong, relate, or in any way appertain thereto,
whether now owned or hereafter acquired, and the reversion and
reversions, remainder and remainders, and estates, rights, titles, interests
possessions claims, and demands of every natures whatsoever, at law or in
equity, which Trustor may have or may hereafter acquire in and to the
Real Property, the Improvements, or any portion thereof.
1.1.4 Leases, Rents. Issues. Etc. All right, title, interest and estate of
Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to all leases and
subleases of all or any portion of the Real Property or the Improvements
now or hereafter existing or entered into, and all lease agreements and
documents evidencing the same, including without limitation, any tenant
leases for all or a portion of the Real Property; and all right, title and
interest of Trustor thereunder, including without limitation, all rents, subrents, room rents and other amounts received for use of any portion of the
Real Property, including the Improvements, and any and all room rental
agreements and arrangements now owned or hereafter acquired, and all
proceeds from such room rents, issues, royalties, security deposits, income
and profits of and from the Real Property, the Improvements, or any
portion thereof.
1.2
Security Interest. Trustor hereby assigns and grants to Beneficiary a
security interest in the following described property (collectively the
"Personalty"), whether now or hereafter existing, and in which Trustor now has or
hereafter obtains any right, title, estate or interest, together with all additions and
accessions thereto and all rents and·proceeds thereof:
1.2. l Tangible Personal Property. All right, title, interest, and estate of
Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to: (a) All furniture,
fixtures and equipment and inventory as equipment inventory are defined
in the Uniform Commercial Code, wherever located, and all related right,
title and interest ofTrustor, now owned or hereafter acquired or created,
all proceeds and products of the foregoing and all additions and accessions
to, replacements of. insurance or condemnation proceeds of. and
documents covering any of the foregoing, all leases of any of the
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foregoing, and all rents, revenues, issues, profits and proceeds arising from
the sale, lease, license, encumbrance collection, or any other temporary or
permanent disposition of any of the foregoing or any interest therein.
1.2.2 Awards. All right, title, interest and estate of Trustor, now owned
or hereafter acquired, in and to: (a) All awards made for the taking by
eminent domain or by any proceeding or purchase in lieu thereof of the
Real Property or Personalty or any portion of the Real Property or
Pesonalty, the Improvements or any portion of the Improvements, or of
any other Improvements now or hereafter situate thereon or any estate or
easement in the Property (including any awards for change of grade of
streets); (b) All insurance policies and all proceeds or insurance paid on
account of any partial or total destruction of the Improvements or any
portion thereof; (c) All causes of action and recoveries for any loss or
diminution in the value of the Real Property or Personalty or the
Improvements; and (d) All proceeds of each of the foregoing.
1.2.3 General Intangibles. All general intangibles of Trustor, presently
existing or hereafter arising, including general intangibles as defined in the
Uniform Commercial Code, choses in action, proceeds, contracts,
distributions, dividends, refunds, security depos_its, judgments, insurance
claims, any right to payment of any nature, intellectual property rights or
licenses, any other rights or assets oftrustor customarily or for accounting
purposes classified as general intangibles, and all documentation and
supporting information related to any of the foregoing all rents, profits and
issues thereof, and all proceeds thereof.
Security Agreement. This Trust Deed constitutes a Secmity
1.3
Agreement with respect to the Personalty, and Beneficiary shall have all the rights
and remedies of a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code of Utah as
well as all other rights and remedies available at law or in equity. Trustor and
Beneficiary acknowledge their mutual intent that all security interests
contemplated herein are given as a contemporaneous exchange for new value to
Trustor, regardless of when advances to Trustor are actually made or when the
Trust Estate is acquired.
1.4. Fixture Filing. This Trust Deed is intended to be a fixture filing
under Utah Code Annotated; Section 70A-9-402. The addresses of the Secured
Party (Beneficiary) and the debtor (Trustor) from which information may be
obtained concerning this security interest granted hereunder are set forth in
Section 12.1 herein. This Trust Deed is to be recorded in the real estate records
in the County Recorder's office of the county in which the Real Property is
located. Trustor is the record owner of the Real Property.
Trust Estate. The Real Property, the Improvements and the
1.5
Personalty are sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Trust Estate".
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ARTICLE II OBLIGATION SECURED
2.1
Obligations. This Trust Deed is given for the purpose of securing
the following obligations (collectively the "Obligations") of Truster:
2.1.1 Note. The payment and perfonnance of each and every
agreement and obligation under the Note, including without limitation, the
payment of principal and interest under the Note.
2.1.2 Other Loan Documents. The payment and perfonnance of
each and every agreement and obligation cifTrustor under this Trust Deed,
the Note, and any other Loan Document.
2.1.3 Advances by Trustee or Beneficiary. The payment of all
sums expended and advanced by Trustee or Beneficiary pursuant to the
tem1s of this Trust Deed, together with interest thereon as provided in this
Trust Deed.
2.1.4 Extensions, Etc. The payment and perfonnance of any
extensions of, renewals of, modifications of, or additional advances under
the Note, or any of the obligations evidenced by the Note, regardless of
the extent of or the subject matter of any such extension, renewal,
modification or additional advance.
2.1.5 Other Obligations. The payment and performance of any
other note or obligation reciting that it is secured by this Trust Deed.
Trustor expressly aclmowledges its mutual intent with Beneficiary that the
security interest created by this Trust Deed secure any and all present and
future debts, obligations, and liabilities of Trustor to Beneficiary without
any limitation whatsoever.
ARTICLE III REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
3.1
follows:

Property. Trustor represents and wanants to Beneficiary as

3.1.1 Fee Title. Trustor is the owner of fee simple marketable
title in and to the Real Property.
J.1.2 Defense of Title. Trustor shall defend title to the Real
Property and the Improvements against all claims and demands
whatsoever.
3.1.3 Hazardous Material. No Hazardous Materials have been
stored, or improperly used, disposed of, discarded, dumped, or abandoned
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by any person or entity on, in or under the Real Property or the
Improvements in violation of any Environmental Laws. Truster has
complied with all applicable federal, state and local laws, rules, ordinances
and regulations relating to the storage, transportation, and disposal of
Hazardous Materials on, in or under the Real Property or the
Improvements.
3.2
as follows:

Personalty. Truster further represents and warrants to Beneficiary

3.2.1 Owner of Personalty. Truster is the owner, or upon
acquisition thereof, will be the owner of the Personalty.
3.2.2 Location of Personalty. The Personalty will be located in
the State of Utah, will not be removed from that state without the prior
written consent of Beneficiary.
ARTICLE IV MAINTENANCE OF TRUST ESTATE
4.1
Maintenance. Truster shall do each of the following: (a) maintain
the Trust Estate at all times in good condition and repair; (b) not commit any
waste of the Trust Estate, or remove, damage, demolish, or structurally alter any
of the Improvements; (c) complete promptly and in good and workmanlike
manner any Improvement on the Real Property; (d) except to the extent that
insurance proceeds are applied by Beneficiary to the satisfaction of the
Obligations in accordance with Article V, restore promptly and in good and
workmanlike manner any of the Improvements or any portion thereof, which may
for any reason be damaged or destroyed; (e) comply at all times with all laws,
ordinances, regulations, covenants, and restrictions in any manner affecting the
Trust Estate; (f) not commit or permit any act upon the Trust Estate in violation of
law; and (g) do all acts which by reason of the character or use of the Trust Estate
may be reasonably necessary to maintain and care for the same, the specific
enumeration herein not excluding the general.
ARTICLE V INSURANCE

5.1
Insurance. Trustor shall secure and maintain in force on the Trust
Estate commercial general liability insurance. All such insurance policies must
cover all risks required to be covered by Beneficiary, comply with any
requirements set forth in the Sales Agreement and be approved by Beneficiary as
to amount, form, terms, deductibles and insurer. All such policies of insurance
shall name Beneficiary as an additional insured or loss payee, as appropriate. All
such insurance policies shall contain a provision that such policies will not be
cancelled or amended, which term shall include any reduction in the scope or
limits of coverage, without at least thirty (30) days prior w1itten notice to
Beneficiary.
·
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5.2
Notice of Casualty. In the event of loss or damage to the Trust
Estate, or any portion of the Trust Estate, Trustor shall immediately give notice
thereof to Beneficiary.

5.3
Proceeds of Insurance. All proceeds of insurance on the Trnst
Estate, and all causes of action, claims, compensation, awards and recoveries for
any damage, condemnation or taking of all or any part of the Trust Estate, or for
any damage or injury to it or for any loss or diminution in the value of the Trnst
Estate, are hereby assigned to and shall be paid to Beneficiary, except as
otherwise provided in the Sales Agreement. Beneficiary may participate in any
suits or proceedings relating to any such proceeds, causes of action, claims,
compensation, awards or recoveries.
5.4
Disposition of Policies on Foreclosure. In the event Beneficiary
exercises the power of sale or foreclosure provisions of this Trust Deed or makes
any other transfer of title or assignment of the Trust Estate in extinguishment in
whole or in part of the Obligations, all right, title and interest of Truster in and to
the policies of insurance required by Section 5.1 shall inure to the benefit of and
pass to the transferee of the interests conveyed under this Trust Deed or to the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale, as the case may be.
ARTICLE VI INDEMNIFICATION AND OFF-SET
6.1
Indemnification. Trustor hereby indemnifies and holds
Beneficiary haimless in accordance with the following:
6.1.1 General Indemnification. Trustor shall indemnify and hold
Beneficiary harmless from any and all losses, damages, claims, causes of
action, suits, debts, obligations, or liabilities which arise from or relate to,
the Note, this Trust Deed, but excluding any such claims based upon
breach or default by Beneficiary or gross negligence or wilful misconduct
of Beneficiary. If Beneficiary commences an action against Truster to
enforce any of the terms, covenants or conditions of this Trust Deed or
because of the breach by Truster of any of the terms, covenants, or
conditions, or for the recovery of any sum secured -hereby, Truster shall
pay to Beneficiary reasonable attorneys fees and costs actually incurred by
Beneficiary. The right to such attorneys fees and costs shall be deemed to
have accrued on the commencement of such action, and shall be
enforceable whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment. If
Truster breaches any term, covenant or condition of this Trust Deed,
Beneficiary may employ an attorney or attorneys to protect Beneficiary's
rights hereunder and in the event of such employment following any
breach of Truster, Truster shall pay Beneficiary reasonable attorneys fees
and costs actually incurred by Beneficiary, whether or not action is
actually commenced against Truster by reason of such material breach.
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6.1.2 Mechanics Liens. If Beneficiary or the Real Property is
held liable or could be held liable for, or is subject to any losses, damages,
costs, charges or expenses, directly or indirectly on account of any claims
for work, labor, or material furnished in connection with or arising from
the construction of any building, fixture and improvements, then Trustor
shall indemnify, defend and hold Beneficiary harmless from all liability or
expense arising therefrom including reasonable attorneys fees and costs.
6.1.3 Hazardous Materials. Trustor hereby agrees to indemnify,
hold harmless and defend (by counsel of Beneficiary's choice)
Beneficiary, its directors, officers, employees, agent, successors and
assigns from and against any and all claims, losses, damages, liabilities,
fines, penalties, charges, administrative and judicial proceedings and
orders, judgments, remedial action requirements, enforcement actions of
any kind, and all costs and expenses incurred in connection therewith
(including but not limited to attorneys' fees and expenses), arising directly
or indirectly, in whole or in part, out of (a) the presence on or under the
Real Property of any Hazardous Materials, or any releases or discharges of
any Hazardous Materials on, under or off the Real Property, or (b) any
activity carried on or undertaken on or off the Real Property, whether prior
to or during the term of the Note, and whether by Trustor or any
predecessor in title or any employees, agents, contractors or
subcontractors of Trustor or any predecessor in title, or any third persons
at any time occupying or present on the Real Property, in co1U1ection with
the handling, treatment, removal, storage, decontamination, clean-up,
transport or disposal of any Hazardous Materials at any time located or
present on or under the Real Property. The foregoing indemnity shall
further apply to any residual contamination on or under the Real Property,
or affecting any natural resources, and to any contamination of any
property or natural resources arising in connection with the generation,
use, handling, storage, transport or disposal of any such Hazardous
Materials, and irrespective of whether any of such activities were or will
be undertaken in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, codes and
ordinances. Trustor hereby acknowledges and agrees that,
notwithstanding any other provision of this Trust Deed or any of the other
Purchase Documents to the contrary, the obligations ofTrustor under this
Section 6.1.3 shall be unlimited personal obligations of Truster and shall
survive any foreclosure under this Trust Deed, any transfer in lieu thereof,
and any satisfaction of the obligations of Trustor in connection with the
Note. Trustor acknowledges that Beneficiary's appraisal of the Real
Property is such that Beneficiary would not extend the Note but for the
personal liability undertaken by Trustor for the obligations under this
Section 6.1.4.
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6.2
Off-Set. All sums payable by Trustor under the Note and this
Trust Deed shall be paid without notices, demand, counterclaim, set-off,
deduction or defense and without abatement, suspension, deferment, diminution
or reduction. The Obligations and liabilities of Truster hereunder shall in no way
be released, discharged or otherwise affected (except as expressly provided
herein) by reason of: (a) any damage to or destruction of, or any condemnation or
similar taking of the Trust Estate or any part thereof; (b) any destruction or
prevention of or interference with any use of the Trust Estate or any part thereof;
(c) any title defect or encumbrance or any eviction from the Trust Estate or any
part thereof by title paramount or otherwise; (d) any bankruptcy, insolvency,
reorganization, composition, adjustment, dissolution, liquidation or other like
proceeding relating to Beneficiary, or any action taken with respect to this Trust
Deed by any trustee or any action taken with respect to this Trust Deed by any
trustee or receiver of Beneficiary, or by any court, in any such proceeding; (e)
any claim which Truster has or might have against Beneficiary; (f) the occurrence
of an Event of Default or any default or failure on the part of Beneficiary to
perform or comply with any of the terms, covenants or conditions of this Trust
Deed or of any other agreement with Truster; or (g) any other occurrence
whatsoever, whether similar or dissimilar to the foregoing.
ARTICLE VII TAXES AND IMPOSITIONS
7.1
Payment of Taxes and Impositions. Trustor shall pay, prior to
delinquency, all real property taxes and assessments, general and special, and all
other taxes, assessments and other governmental, municipal, or other charges or
impositions of any kind or nature whatsoever (including without limitation,
charges and assessments on water or water stocks used on or with the Real
Property and levies or charges resulting from covenants, conditions and
restrictions affecting the Trust Estate) which are assessed or imposed upon the
Trust Estate, or become due and payable, and which create, may create, or appear
to create, a lien upon the Trust Estate or any portion of the Trust Estate, or upon
any equipment or other facility used in the construction, operation or maintenance
of the Trust Estate (all of which taxes, assessments and other governmental
charges of like nature are referred to as the "Impositions"); provided, however,
that if, by law, any such Imposition is payable, or may at the election of the
taxpayer be paid in installments, Trustor may pay the same together with any
accrued interest on the unpaid balance of such Imposition in installments as the
same become due and before any fine, penalty, interest or cost may be added
thereto for the nonpayment of any such installment and interest.
7.2
Evidence of Payment. Unless such Imposition is paid directly by
Beneficiary pursuant to Section 8.3, Truster shall furnish Beneficiary, within
thirty (30) days after the date upon which such Imposition is due and payable by
Truster, official receipts of the appropriate taxing authority, or other proof
satisfactory to Beneficiary, evidencing the payment thereof.
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7.3
Right to Contest. Trustor shall have the right before any
delinquency occurs to contest or object to the amount or validity of any
hnposition by appropriate legal proceedings, but such contest shall not be deemed
or construed in any way as relieving, modifying or extending Trustor's covenant
to pay any such Imposition at the time and in the manner provided in Section 7. l
unless Trustor has given prior written notice to Beneficiary ofTrustor's intent to
so contest or object to an Imposition, and unless, at Beneficiary's option, (a)
Trustor shall demonstrate to Beneficiary's satisfaction that the legal proceedings
shall conclusively operate to prevent the sale of the Trust Estate, or any part
thereof, to satisfy such Imposition prior to final determination of such
proceedings; or (b) Trustor shall furnish a good and sufficient undertaking and
sureties as may be required or permitted by law to accomplish a stay of such
proceedings.
ARTICLE VIII ADDITIONAL COVENANTS
8.1
Payment of Utilities. Trustor shall pay when due all utility charges
incurred by Trustor for the benefit of the Trust Estate or which may become a
charge or lien against the Trust Estate for gas, electricity, water or sewer services
furnished to the Trust Estate and all assessments or charges of a similar nature,
whether public or private, affecting the Trust Estate or any portion thereof,
whether or not such assessments or charges are liens thereon.
8.2
Reserves for Taxes and Insurance. In furtherance of Article V and
Article VII of this Trust Deed and anything to the contrary herein
· notwithstanding, if any Event of Default shall occur and be continuing, and at
Beneficiary's written request, Trustor shall deposit with Beneficiary in a noninterest bearing account, on the first day of each month, until the Note is paid in
full, an amount equal to one-twelfth of the annual Impositions, as defined in
Article VII, as reasonably estimated by Beneficiary to pay the installment of
hnpositions next due on the Trust Estate, and one-twelfth of the estimated annual
aggregate insurance premiums on all policies of insurance required in Article V.
In such event, Trustor shall cause all bills, statements or other documents relating
to the Impositions and insurance premiums to
sent to Beneficiary. Providing
Trustor has deposited sufficient funds with Beneficiary pursuant to this Section
8.2, Beneficiary shall pay such amounts as may be due thereunder out of the funds
so deposited with Beneficiary. If at any time and for any reason the funds
deposited with Beneficiary are or will be insufficient to pay such amounts as may
then or subsequently be due, Beneficiary shall notify Trustor and Trustor shall
immediately deposit an amount equal to such deficiency with Beneficiary.
Nothing contained herein shall cause Beneficiary to be deemed a trustee of such
funds deposited with Beneficiary pursuant to this Section 8.2. Beneficiary shall
not be obligated to pay any interest on any sums held b y Beneficiary pending
disbursement or application hereunder, and Beneficiary may impound or reserve
for future payment of Impositions and insurance premiums such portion of such
payments as Beneficiary may, in Beneficiary's absolute discretion, deem proper,
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applying the balance on the principal of or interest on the Obligations secured
hereby. Should Truster fail to deposit with Beneficiary (exclusive of that portion
of the payments which has been applied by Beneficiary on the principal of or
interest on the Note) sums sufficient to fully pay such Impositions and insurance
premiums at least thirty (30) days before delinquency thereof, Beneficiary, at
Beneficiary's election, but without any obligation to do so, may advance any
amounts required to make up the deficiency, which advances, if any, shall be
secured by this Trust Deed and shall bear interest and be repayable to Beneficiary
in the manner specified in Section 8.4 of this Trust Deed.
8.3
Performance in Trustor's Stead. Should Trust~r fail to make any
payment or to do any act as provided in this Trust Deed, then Beneficiary or
Trustee, but without any obligation to do so, and without notice to or demand
upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: (a)
make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may deem
necessary to protect the security hereof (Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized
to enter upon the Trust Estate for such purposes); commence, appear in and
defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the
rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; or (b) pay, purchase, contest, or
compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either
appears to be superior to the lien of this Trust Deed; and in exercising any such
powers, incur any liability, or expend such reasonable amounts as Beneficiary
may deem necessary therefor, including costs of evidence of title, employment of
attorneys, and payment of reasonable attorney fees and costs. All such amounts
expended by either or both Trustee or Beneficiary shall, at the election of
Beneficiary, be added to the principal indebtedness secured by this Trust Deed
and shall accrue interest in accordance with the terms of the Note. Truster hereby
waives and releases all claims or causes of action which may hereafter arise in
favor ofTrustor against Beneficiary by reason of any action taken by Beneficiary
pursuant to any power or authority granted in this Section 8.3, except for
Beneficiary's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.
8.4
Repayment of Advances. Trustor shall immediately repay to
Beneficiary sums, with interest thereon as provided in the Note, which at any time
may be paid or advanced by Beneficiary for the payment of insurance premiums,
Impositions, title searches, title reports or abstracts, and any other advances made
by Beneficiary which are reasonably necessary or desirable to maintain this Trust
Deed as a prior, valid, and subsisting lien upon ;the Trust Estate, to preserve and
protect Beneficiary's interest in this Trust Deed, or to preserve, repair, or maintain
the Trust Estate. All such advances shall be wholly optional on the part of
Beneficiary, and Trustor's obligation to repay the same, with interest, to
Beneficiary shall be secured by the lien of this Trust Deed.
8.5
No Removal of Fixtures. Trustor shall not, during the existence of
this Trust Deed and without the written consent of Beneficiary, remove from the
Real Property or the Improvements, any fixture, structure, or other improvement
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at any time affixed or constructively affixed to the Real Property or the
Improvements or any portion thereof, or any Personalty, except in the ordinary
course of Trustor's business.
8.6
Further Assurance. Trustor sha1l execute and deliver to
Beneficiary such further instrwnents, including without limitation Uniform
Conunercial Code Financing Statements and Continuation Statements, and do
such further acts as may be necessary or as may be reasonably required by
Beneficiary to ca1Ty out more effectively the purposes of this Trnst Deed and to
subject to the lien, security interest and mortgage created or intended to be created
hereby any property, rights, or interests covered or intended to be covered by this
Trust Deed. Trnstor authorizes (to the extent such authorization is valid under
applicable law) Beneficiary to execute and file, without Truster's signature, such
Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statements and Continuation Statements as
Beneficiary may deem necessary in order to perfect, or continue the perfection of
the security interests created by this Trust Deed.
8. 7
Attornment. Truster shall assign to Beneficiary, as additional
security for Truster's performance of the Obligations, any and all existing or
future lease agreements entered into by Trnstor, as landlord, which pertain to the
Property or the Improvements, or any portion thereof, and a1l such leases shall
contain a covenant on the part of the tenant thereunder, enforceable by
Beneficiary, obligating such tenant upon request of Beneficiary, to attom to and
become a tenant of Beneficiary, or any purchaser form Trustee or through
foreclosure of this Trust Deed, for the unexpired term, and subject to the te1ms
and conditions of such future lease agreements. The assignments of lease shall be
in form and content satisfactory to Beneficiary.
8.8
No Further Encumbrances. As an express condition of Beneficiary
making the loan secured by this Trust Deed, Truster shall not further encumber,
pledge, mortgage, hypothecate, place any lien, charge or claim upon, or otherwise
give as security the Trust Estate or nay interest therein, not cause or allow by
operation of law the encumbrance of the Trust Estate or any interest therein
without the written consent of Beneficiary even though such encumbrance may be
junior to the encumbrance created by this Trust Deed. Encumbrance of the Trust
Estate contrary to the provisions of this Section 8.9 without the express written
consent of Beneficiary, shall constitute an Event of Default and at Beneficiary's
option, Beneficiary may declare the entire balance of principal and interest
immediately due and payable, whether the same be created by Trustor or an
unaffiliated third party asserting a judgment lien, mechanic's or materialmen's
lien or any other type of encumbrance or title defect.
8.9
Due on Sale. Other than (a) a transfer by devise, descent or by
operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant; (b) a transfer of Personalty in the
ordinary course ofTrustor's business; or (c) the grant of any leasehold interest of
three (3) years or less not containing an option to purchase, Truster shall not sell,
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convey or otherwise transfer the Trust Estate or any part thereof or interest
therein, without the prior written consent of Beneficiary. If the Trust Estate, or
any part thereof, or any interest therein, is sold, conveyed or otherwise transferred
without the prior written consent of Beneficiary, or ifTrustor be divested of title
to the Trust Estate, or any part thereof or involuntarily, then the full p1incipal
indebtedness of the Note and the other Obligations, at the option of Beneficiary
and without demand or notice, shall immediately become due and payable. It is
expressly acknowledged and agreed that any transfei; of more than twenty-five
percent (25%) of the capital stock, partnership or member interests ofTrnstor, as
the case may be, shall constitute a transfer of the entire Trust Estate within the
meaning of this Section 8.9.
8.10 Evidence of Title. Trustor shall deliver to, pay for and maintain
with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is pain in full, such
evidence oftitle as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or policies
of title insurance and any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements or
endorsements thereto.
8.11 Additional Collateral. If, at any time, the value of all of the Trust
Estate, based on an appraisal acceptable to Beneficiary, is not sufficient to
establish a ratio between the total amount of the Obligations then due and owing
and the value of all of the Trust Estate equal to or less than one hundred percent
(100%), Trustor shall provide Beneficiary with such additional collateral as is
necessary so that the total value of all collateral securing Trustor's perfonnance of
the Obligations is sufficient to establish a ratio between the total amount of the
Obligations due and owing and the value of all such collateral of no more than
one hundred percent (100%).
8.12 Compliance With Laws. Trustor shall company with all laws,
ordinances, regulations, easement agreements, covenants, conditions, and
restrictions (including laws relating to hazardous wastes and/or protection of the
envirorunent, or species of plants or animals protected by federal, state, local or
other law) affecting the Trust Estate. Trustor shall not cause, permit nor suffer
any violation of any of the foregoing and shall pay all response costs, fees, or
charges of any kind in connection therewith and defend, indemnify, and hold
harmless Beneficiary with respect thereto.
8.13 Financial Statements. Trustor shall keep adequate books and
records of account of the Trust Estate and its own financial affairs sufficient to
permit the preparation of financial statements therefrom in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles. Beneficiary shall have the right to
examine, copy and audit Trustor's records and books of account at all reasonable
times. Trustor shall furnish to Beneficiary copies of its financial statements and
other financial information satisfactory to Beneficiary at the time and in the
manner provided in the Loan Agreement.
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8.14 Inspections. Beneficiary, and its agents, representatives and
employees, are authorized, but not obligated, to enter at any reasonable time upon
the Real Property for the purpose of inspecting the same, and for the purpose of
performing any of the acts it or Trustor is authorized to perfo1m under the terms
of this Trust Deed or any other Loan Document.
8.15 No Merger. If the Trust Estate is under any lease or any portion
thereof which constitutes a part of the Trust Estate shall at any time become
vested in one owner, this Trust Deed and the lien created hereby shall not be
destroyed or terminated by application of the doctrine of merger and, in such
event, Beneficiary shall continue to have and enjoy all of the rights and privileges
of Beneficiary as to the separate estates. In addition, upon the foreclosure of the
lien created by This Trust Deed on the Trust Estate pursuant to the provisions of
this Trust Deed, any leases or subleases then existing and created by Truster shall
not be destroyed or terminated by application of the law of merger or as a matter
of law or as a result of such foreclosme unless Beneficiary or any purchaser at
any such foreclosure sale shall so elect. No act by or on behalf of Beneficiary or
any such ptrrchaser shall constitute a termination of any lease or sublease unless
Beneficiary or such purchaser shall give written notice thereof to such tenant or
subtenant.
ARTICLE IX CONDEMNATION AWARDS
9.1
If the Trust Estate or any portion thereof should be taken or
damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation proceeding,
Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or
relief therefor, and shall be entitled at Beneficiary's option to commence, appear
in, and prosecute in Beneficiary's own name any action or proceeding, and to
make any compromise or settlement, in c01mection with such taking. Truster
shall promptly give notice to Beneficiary of any condemnation proceeding or any
taking for public improvement. All such compensation, awards, damages, causes
of action, proceeds, or other payments are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, which
may; after deducting therefrom all costs and expenses (regardless of the particular nature thereof and whether incurred with or without suit or before or after
judgment), including reasonable attorney fees, incurred by Beneficiary in
connection with such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action, proceeds,
or other payments, release any and all moneys so received by Beneficiary or apply
the same, or any portion thereof, on any of the Obligations (whether or not then
due) secured by this Trust Deed. Beneficiary shall have no obligation to apply
proceeds of condemnation to restore or repair damage to the Trust Estate
regardless of whether such taking has a significant adverse impact on the
operation of the remaining po1tion of the Trust Estate. Trustor shall execute and
deliver to Beneficiary such further assignments of such compensation, awards,
damages, causes of action, proceeds, or other payments as Beneficiary may from
time to time require.
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ARTICLE X ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES, RENTS AND INCOME
10.1 Assigrunent. Trustor hereby absolutely assigns to Trustee all right,
title and interest ofTrustor in and to all leases now existing or hereafter entered
into by Trustor and demising the whole or any part of the Trust Estate, and does
hereby further assign any and all rents, subrents, room rents and other amounts
received for the use of any rooms in the Trust Estate, including the Improvements,
and any and all room rental agreements and arrangements now owned or hereafter
acquired, and all proceeds from such room rents, covering the Trust Estate or any
portion thereof, now or hereafter existing or entered into, together with issues,
royalties, income, profits and security deposits of and from the Trust Estate. Until
the occurrence of an Event of Default, Trustor may, under a temporary revocable
license granted hereby, collect and use all such rents, subrents, room rents, issues,
royalties, income, and profits which become payable prior to default. Upon the
occurrence of an Event or Default, Truster's license to collect and use any of such
proceeds shall immediately cease without further action by or on behalf of any
party, and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without taking possession of
the Trust Estate, and either in person, by agent, or through a court-appointed
receiver (Trustor hereby consents to the appointment of Beneficiary or
Beneficiary's designee as such receiver), to sue for or otherwise collect all such
rents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties, income, and profits, including those
past due and unpaid. Any swns so collected, after the deduction of all costs and
expenses of operation and collection (regardless of the particular nature thereof .
and whether incurred with or without suit or before or after judgment), including
reasonable attorney fees, shall be applied toward the payment of the Obligations.

Such right of collection and use of such proceeds by Beneficiary shall obtain both
before and after the exercise of the power of sale provisions of this Trust Deed,
the foreclosure of this Trust Deed and throughout any period of redemption. The
rights granted under this Section 10.1 shall in no way be dependent upon and shall
apply without regard to whether alJ or a portion of the Trust Estate is in danger of
being lost, removed, or materially injured, or whether the Trust Estate or any
other security is adequate to discharge the obligations secured by this Trust Deed.
Beneficiary's failure or discontinuance at any time to collect any of such proceeds
shall not in any manner affect the right, power, and authority of Beneficiary
thereafter to collect the same. Neither any provision contained herein, nor the
Beneficiary's exercise of Beneficiary's right to collect such proceeds, shall be, or
be construed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease, sublease,
option, or other interest in the Trust Estate, or an assumption of liability under, or
a subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to, any tenancy, lease,
sublease, option, or other interest in the Trust Estate. All tenants, lessees,
sub lessees and other persons which have any obligation to make any payment to
Trustor in connection with the Trust Estate or any portion thereof are hereby
authorized and directed to pay rents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties,
income, and profits payable t\by them with respect to the Trust Estate, or any part
thereof, directly to Beneficiary on the demand of Beneficiary. Beneficiary's
receipt of such rents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties, income, and profits
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shall be a good and sufficient discharge of the obligation of the tenant lessee,
sub lessee, or other person concerned to make the payment connected with the
amount so received by the Trustee.
10.2 Application of Payments. If at any time during the tenn of this
Trust Deed Beneficiary receives or obtains a payment, installment, or sum which
is less than the entire amount then due under the Note secured by this Trust Deed
and under all other instruments finther evidencing or securing the Obligations,
then Beneficiary shall, except as provided otherwise in the Note and
notwithstanding any instructions which may be given by Trustor, have the right to
apply such payment, installment, or sum, or any part thereof, to such of the items
or obligations then due from Trustor or to Beneficiary as Beneficiary may in
Beneficiary's sole discretion detennine.
10.3 No Waiver of Rights by Collection of Proceeds. The entering
upon and taking possession of the Trust Estate or any portion of the Trust Estate
or the collection of rents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties, income, profits,
proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any
taking or damaging of the Trust Estate, or the application or release thereof as
aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any Event of Default or notice of default
hereunder, shall not invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice of default, and
shall not operate to postpone or suspend the obligation to make, or have the effect
of altering the size of any scheduled installments provided for in any of the
Obligations secured by this Trust Deed.
10.4 Indemnification. Trustor shall indemnify, pay, protect, defend and
hold Beneficiary harmless from and against all claims, demands, judgments,
liabilities, actions, costs, and fees (including reasonable attorney fees) arising
from or related to receipt by Beneficiary of the rents, subrents, room rents, issues,
royalties, income and profit from the Trust Estate or any portion of the Trust
Estate, except those liabilities arising from Beneficiary's own gross negligence
and wilful misconduct.
ARTICLE XI EVENTS OF DEFAULT AND REMEDIES
11.1 Events of Default. Fifteen (15) days after written notice from
Beneficiary to Trustor for monetary defaults and thirty (30) days after written
notice from Beneficiary to Trustor for non-monetary defaults, if such defaults are
not cured within such fifteen (15) day or thirty (30) day periods, respectively,
each of the following shall constitute an event of default under this Trust Deed (an
"Event of Default"):
11.1 .1 Failure to Make Payment. If Trustor shall fail to make any
payment due and payable under the terms of the Note or this Trust Deed.
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11.1.2 Non-Monetary Default. Except as provided otherwise in
Section 11.1.1, failure to observe and perform any of the tenns, covenants,
or conditions to be observed or performed in the Note or this Trust Deed.
11.1.3 False Warranty. Any material representation or wan-anty
of the Trustor contained in the Note or this Trust Deed.
11.1.4 Insolvency, Etc. If (a) Trustor commences any case,
proceeding, or other action seeking reorganization, arrangement,
adjustment, liquidation, dissolution, or composition of Trust or or Trustor' s
debts under any law relating to bankruptcy, reorganization, or relief of
debtors, or seeking appointment of a receiver, trustee, custodian, or other
similar official for Tmstor of for all or any substantial part of Trustor' s
property; (b) any guarantor of the Note commences any case, proceeding,
or other action seeking reorganization, arrangement, adjustment,
liquidation, dissolution, or composition of such guarantor or such
guarantor's debts under any law relating to bankruptcy, reorganization, or
relief of debtors, or seeking appointment of a receiver, trustee, custodian,
or other similar official for such guarantor or for any substantial part of
such guarantor's property; or (c) any such case, proceeding, or other
action is commenced against either Trustor or any guarantor of the Note.
11.1.5 Failure to Pay Debts. Trustor fails to pay Trustor' s debts as
they become due, admits in writing Trustor's inability to pay Trustor's
debts, or makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors.
11.1.6 Failure to Perform Other Obligations. A default by Trustor
under the terms of any other promissory note, deed of trust, security
agreement, undertaking or arrangement between Trustor and Beneficiary
now existing or entered into hereafter.
11.2 Acceleration; Notice. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon the
occurrence of any Event of Default under this Trust Deed and following the
expiration of any cure period provided for herein, at Beneficiary's option and in
addition to any other remedy Beneficiary may have under the Note, Beneficiary
may declare all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable and elect to
have the Trust Estate sold in the manner provided herein. In the event
Beneficiary elects to sell the Trust Estate, Beneficiary may execute or cause
Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause the Trust
Estate to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such
notice for record in the office of the County Recorder of the County wherein the
Trust Estate is located. Beneficiary shall also deposit with Trustee the Note and
all documents evidencing expenditures secured by this Tmst Deed.
11.3 Exercise of Power of Sale. Upon receipt of such notice from
Beneficiary, Trustee shall cause to be recorded, published and delivered to
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Trustor and each Guarantor such Notice of Default and Election to Sell as then
required by Chapter 57 of the Utah Code Annotated. Trustee shall, without
demand on Trustor, after lapse of such time as may be required by law and after
recordation of such Notice of Default and Election to Sell first give notice of the
time and place of such sale, in the manner provided by the laws of the State of
Utah for the sale of real property under execution, and may from time to time
postpone such sale by such advertisement as it may deem reasonable, or withollt
further advertisement, by proclamation made to the persons assembled at the time
and place previously appointed and advertised for such sale, and on the day of
sale so advertised, or to which such sale may have been postponed, Trustee may
sell the Real Property so advertised, at public auction, at the time and place
specified in the notice, either in the county in which the Real Property, or any part
thereof, to be sold, is situated, or at the principal office of Trustee located in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, in its discretion, to the highest cash bidder. Trustee
shall execute and deliver to the purchaser a Trustee's Deed conveying the Real
Property so sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The
recitals in the Trustee's Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of
the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale.
Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (a) the costs and
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of
Trustee's and attorney's fees and costs; (b) cost of any evidence of title procured
in connection with such sale; (c) all sums expended under the terms hereof in
conjunction with any default provision hereunder, not then repaid, with accrued
interest at the rate then provided for in the Note; (d) all sums then secured by this
Trust Deed, including interest and principal on the Note; and (e) the remainder, if
any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or Trustee, in Trustee's
discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the
County wherein the Trust Estate is located.
11.4 Surrender of Possession. Trustor shall surrender possession of the
Trust Estate to the purchaser immediately after the sale of the Trust Estate as
provided in Section 11.3 above, in the event such possession has not previously
been surrendered by Trustor.
11.5 UCC Remedies. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in
Sections 11.3 and 11.4 of this Trust Deed, Beneficiary, with regard to all the
Personalty, shall have the right to exercise, from time to time, any and all rights
and remedies available to Beneficiary, as a secured party under the Uniform
Commercial Code of Utah, and any and all rights and remedies available to
Beneficiary under any other applicable law. Upon written demand from
Beneficiary, Trustor shall, at Trustor's expense, assemble the Personalty and
make them available to Beneficiary at a reasonably convenient place designated
by Beneficiary. Beneficiary shall have the right to enter upon any premises
where the Personalty or records pertaining to Personalty may be and take
possession of the Personalty and records relating to the Personalty. Beneficiary
may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the Personalty and, after
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deducting the reasonable costs and out of pocket expenses incurred by
Beneficiary, including, without limitation, (a) reasonable attorneys fees and legal
expenses, (b) transportation and storage costs, (c) advertising of sale of the
Personalty, (d) sale commissions, (e) sales tax, (f) costs for improving or repairing
the Personalty, and (g) costs for preservation and protection of the Personalty,
apply the remainder to pay, or to hold as a reserve against, the Obligations.
The rights and remedies of Beneficiary upon the occurrence of one or
more Events of Default (whether such rights and remedies are conferred by
statute, by rule oflaw, by this Trust Deed, the Loan Agreement or otherwise) may
be exercised by Beneficiary, either alternatively, concurrently, or consecutively in
any order. The exercise of Beneficiary or Trustee at the express direction of
Beneficiary of any one or more of such rights and remedies shall not be construed
to be an election of remedies nor waiver of any other rights and remedies
Beneficiary might have unless, and limited to the extent that, Beneficiary shall
elect or so waive by an instrument in w1iting delivered to Trustee. Without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, to the extent that this Trust Deed covers
both the Real Property and the Personalty, Beneficiary may, in the sole discretion
of Beneficiary, either alternatively, concmTently or consecutively in any order:
a.

Proceed as to the Real Prope1iy, Improvements and the Personalty
in accordance with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in respect to
real property.

b.

Proceed as to the Real Property and Improvements in accordance
with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in respect to real property
and proceed as to the Personalty in accordance with Beneficiary's
rights and remedies in respect to the personal property.

Beneficiary may, in the sole discretion of Beneficiary, appoint Trustee as
the agent of Beneficiary for the purpose of disposition of the Personalty in
accordance with the Utah Uniform Commercial Code - Secured Transactions.

If Beneficiary should elect to proceed as to the Real Property,
Improvements and the Personalty in accordance with Beneficiary's rights and
remedies in respect to real property:
c.

All the Personalty may be sold, in the manner and at the time and
place provided in this Trust Deed, in one lot, or in separate lots
consisting of any combination or combinations of the Real
Property, Improvements and Personalty, as the Beneficiary may
elect, in the sole discretion of Beneficiary.

d.

Truster acknowledges and agrees that a disposition of the
Personalty in accordance with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in
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respect to real property, as hereinabove provided, is a
commercially reasonable disposition of the Personalty.
If Beneficiary should elect to proceed as to the Personalty in accordance
with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in respect to personal property,
Beneficiary shall have all the rights and remedies conferred on a secured party by
the Unifonn Conunercial Code as adopted by the State of Utah.
11.6 Foreclosure as a Mortgage. If an Event of Default occurs
hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to foreclose this Trust Deed in the
manner provided by law for the foreclosure ofmo1tgages on real property and
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses
incident thereto, including reasonable attorneys fees and costs in such amounts as
shall be fixed by the court.
11.7 Receiver. If an Event of Default occurs, Beneficiary, as a matter
ofright and without regard to the interest of Trustor therein, shall have the light
upon notice to Trustor to apply to any court having jurisdiction to appoint a
receiver or receivers of the Trust Estate and Trustor hereby irrevocably consents
to such appointment. Any such receiver or receivers shall have all the usual
powers and duties of a receiver and shall continue as such and exercise all such
powers until completion of the sale of the Trust Estate or the foreclosure
proceeding, unless the receivership is sooner terminated.
11.8 No Remedy Exclusive. No remedy confened upon or reserved to
Beneficiary under this Trust Deed shall be exclusive of any other available
remedy or remedies, but each and every such remedy shall be cumulative and
shall be in addition to every other remedy given under this Trust Deed or any
other Loan Document, or now or hereafter existing at law or in equity or by
statute. No delay or failure to exercise any right or power accruing upon any
Event of Default shall impair any such right or power or shall be construed to be a
waiver thereof, but any such right and power may be exercised from time to time
and as often as may be deemed expedient.

11.9 Rights upon Default. In making the Note, Beneficiary has relied
upon the rights available to Beneficiary under this Trust Deed upon the
occurrence of an Event of Default, including, but not limited to, the rights to
accelerate the payment of any and all amounts secured by this Trust Deed, to sell
the Real Property encumbered by this Trust Deed pursuant to the power of sale
granted hereunder, the right to foreclose this Trust Deed as a mortgage, and the
right to have a receiver appointed. In addition to any other damages that might be
recoverable by Beneficiary under the terms of this Trust Deed, Trustor shall be
liable for any damages incurred by Beneficiary because Beneficiary is, for any
reason, denied the opportunity to exercise Beneficiary's lights upon the
occurrence of an Event of Default, including, but not limited to, such damages as
are occasioned by depreciation of the Trust Estate, loss of use of the Trust Estate
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by Beneficiary, and all oppmtunity costs incurred through the loss of use of any
funds as would have been received by Beneficiary tlrrough exercise of the power
of sale or foreclosure, or the appointment of a receiver.
ARTICLE XII GENERAL PROVISIONS
12.1 Notices. All noti'ces shall be in writing and shall be deemed to
have been sufficiently given or served when personally delivered, deposited in the
United States mail, by registered or certified mail, or deposited with a reputable
overnight mail carrier which provides delivery of such mail to be traced,
addressed as follows:
Beneficiary:

Monitor Finance, L.C. /
First Capital Funding, L. C.
3191 North Canyon Road
Provo, UT 84604

With copies to :

John G. Mulliner
363 North University, Suite 103
P.O. Box 1045
Provo, UT 84603

Trustee:

Truster:

With copies to:

Such addresses may be changed by notice to the other party given in the
same manner provided in this Section.
12.2 Severability. If any provision of this Trust Deed shall be held or
deemed to be or shall, in fact, be illegal, inoperative, or unenforceable, the same
shall not affect any other provision or provisions contained in the Trust Deed or
render the same invalid, inoperative, or unenforceable to any extent whatsoever.
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12.3 Amendments, Changes, and Modifications. This Trust Deed may
not be amended, changed, modified, altered, or terminated without the written
consent of Beneficiary.

12.4 Governing Law. This Trust Deed shall be governed exclusively by
and construed in accordance with the applicable laws of the State of Utah.
12.5 hlterpretation. Whenever the context shall include the singular, the
whole shall include any pati thereof, and the gender shall include both other
genders. The section headings contained in this Trust Deed are for purposes of
reference only and shall not limit, expand, or othe1wise affect the construction of
any provisions hereof.

12.6 Binding Effect. This Trust Deed shall be binding upon Truster and
Trustor's successors and assigns. This Trust Deed shall inure to the benefit of
Beneficiary, and Beneficiary's successors and assigns, and the holders of any of
the Obligations secured hereby.
12.7 Waivers. Beneficiary's failure at any time or times hereafter to
require strict performance by Trustor of any of undertakings, agreements, or
covenants contained in this Trust Deed shall not waive, affect, or diminish any
right of Beneficiary hereunder to demand strict compliance and performance
therewith. Al1y waiver by Beneficiary of any Event of Default under this Trust
Deed shall not waive or affect any other Event of Default hereunder, whether such
Event of Default is prior or subsequent thereto and whether of the same or a
different type. None of the undertakings, agreements, or covenants of Trustor
under this Trust Deed, shall be deemed to have been waived by Beneficiary,
unless such waiver is evidenced by an instrument in writing signed by an officer
of Beneficiary and directed to Trustor specifying such waiver.

12.8 Successor Trustee. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at
any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of the county
wherein the Real Property is located, a substitution of trustee. From the time the
substitution is filed for record, the new Trustee shall succeed to all the powers,
duties, authority and title of Trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made in the
maruier provided by law.
12.9 Heirs. Successors. Etc .• Definitions. This Trust Deed shall apply
to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees,
devisees, administrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of
Truster hereunder, if more than one party, are joint and several as between them.
The term "Beneficiary'' shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee,
of the Note secured hereby. h1 this Trust Deed, whenever the context so requires,
the masculine gender includes both the feminine and neuter, and the singular
number includes the plural.
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12.10 Acceptance of Trust. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust
Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by
law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of any pending sale under
any other deed of trust or any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary,
or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee.
12.11 Attorneys' Fees. Trustor agrees to reimburse Beneficiary for any
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs actually incurred by Beneficiary with respect
to any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, or other action involving Trustor or
any guarantor as a debtor.
Trnstor additionally agrees to pay all reasonable costs and out of pocket
expenses, including, without limitation, (a) reasonable attorneys fees and legal
expenses, (b) transportation and storage costs, (c) advertising of sale of the Trnst
Estate, (d) sale conunissions, (e) sales tax, (f) costs for improving or repairing the
Trust Estate, and (g) costs for preservation and protection of the Trnst Estate,
incurred by Beneficiary in obtaining possession of Trust Estate, storage and
preparation for sale, sale or other disposition, and otherwise incwTed in
foreclosing upon the Trust Estate. Any and all such costs and out of pocket
expenses shall be payable by Trustor upon demand, together with interest thereon
from the date of the advance until repaid, both before and after judgment, at the
rate provided in the Note.
Regardless of any breach or default, Trustor agrees to pay all expenses,
including reasonable attorneys fees and legal expenses incurred by Beneficiary in
any bankruptcy proceedings of any type involving Trnstor, the Trust Estate, or
this Trnst Deed, including, without limitation, expenses incurred in modifying or
lifting the automatic stay, determining adequate protection, use of cash collateral,
or relating to any plan of reorganization.
12.12 Request for Notice. Trustor requests that a copy of any Notice of
Default and of any Notice of Sale hereunder be mailed to Trustor at the address
for Trustor specified in Section 12.1.
12.13 Limitation on Damages. Beneficiary and its officers, directors,
employees, representatives, agents, and attorneys, shall not be liable to Trustor or
any Guarantor for consequential damages arising from or relating to any breach of
contract, tort, or other wrong in connection with or relating to this Trust Deed or
the Trust Estate.
12.14 Preferential Transfers. If the incurring of any debt by Truster or
the payment of any money or transfer of property to Beneficiary by or on behalf
of Trustor or any Guarantor should for any reason subsequently be detennined to
be "voidable" or "avoidable" in whole or in part within the meaning of any state
or federal law (collectively "voidable transfers"), including, without limitation,
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fraudulent conveyances or preferential transfers under the United States
Bankruptcy Code or any other federal or state law, and Beneficiary is required to
repay or restore any voidable transfers or the amount or any portion thereof, or
upon the advice of Beneficiary's counsel in advised to do so, then, as to any such
amount or property repaid or restored, including all reasonable costs, expenses,
and attorneys fees of Beneficiary related thereto, the liability ofTrnstor and
Guarantor, and each of them, and this Trust Deed, shall automatically be revived,
reinstated and restored and shall exist as though the voidable transfers had never
been made.

12.15 Survival. All agreements, representations, warranties and
covenants made by Trustor shall survive the execution and delivery of this Trust
Deed, the filing and consummation of any bankruptcy proceedings, and shall
continue in effect so long as any obligation to Beneficiary contemplated by this
Trnst Deed is outstanding and unpaid, notwithstanding any termination of this
Trust Deed. -All agreements, representations, warrarities and covenants in this
Trnst Deed shall run with the land, shall bind the party ma.king the same and its
heirs and successors, and shall be to the benefit of and be enforceable by each
par1y for whom made and their respective heirs, successors and assigns.
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Exhibit A

GAfJNO~K COUNTY 10,'\HO

A Tract of land in the South Yi of the South Yi Section 31, Township 6 South, Range 35 East, Boise
·
Meridian, Bannock County, Idaho, more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at the South quarter comer of Section 31; thence South- 89°36'40'' East, 82.68 feet; thence
North 53°44' 13" East, 88.1 feet; thence North 26°44 '09" West, 320 feet; thence North 63°15 '51" East,
260 feet; thence North 26°44 '09" West 495.62 feet, more or less, to the Southerly right of way line of
Barton Road; thence South 72°27'20" West along the Southerly right of way of Barton Road 472.74 feet;
thence continuing along the Southerly right of way line of Barton Road, South 83°18'20" West, 389.3
feet, more or less, to the Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail; thence South 26°44'40" East along the
Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail 791.56 fee.t, more or less, to the South line of said Section 31; thence
South 89°44' East, 462.23 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning.
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A. Brnce Larson (ISB#: 2093)
HEARN & WOOD LLP
P.O. Box 70
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone: (208) 497 -0405
Fax: (208) 932-4380
Email: bruce@hwlawpro.com
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Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,

Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND
COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs,
V

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; M&S
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Defendants.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, and
Idaho limited liability company,
Counterclaimant,
V

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,
Counterdefendants.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC (hereafter "Wildlife Ridge") responds to Plaintiffs'
Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust ("the Complaint") as follows:
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FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and should
therefore be dismissed.

SECOND DEFENSE
Defendants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiffs' Complaint not specifically
admitted herein.

THIRD DEFENSE
The Plaintiffs have failed to join all necessary and indispensable parties to this action.

ANSWER
1.

Wildlife Ridge denies all of the allegations of the complaint not specifically

admitted in this Answer.

2.

Wildlife Ridge admits only that First Capital Funding, L.C. is a limited liability

company that is apparently organized under the laws of the state of Utah, Wildlife Ridge denies
all other allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the Complaint.
3.

Wildlife Ridge, answering the allegations contained m paragraph 2 of the

Complaint, admits only that it is a limited liability company, in good standing under the laws of
the state of Idaho and to those facts shown of public record. Wildlife Ridge admits only that
Millward and M&S appear in the documents relied upon by Plaintiffs as makers of the document
purported to be a note and that defendant M&S is shown as the "Trustor" on a document purported
to be a Trust Deed among other things. Wildlife Ridge specifically denies that either Millward or
M&S are owners or were ever owners in fee simple of the premises.

4.

Wildlife Ridge denies those allegations of paragraph 3 of the Complaint as the same

relate to Wildlife Ridge.
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5.

Wildlife Ridge denies the allegations of paragraph 4 of the Complaint.

6.

Wildlife Ridge denies the allegations of paragraph 5 of the Complaint.

7.

Wildlife Ridge admits that Millward filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the

Bankruptcy Code, as Case No. 12-41260 and that the filing commenced an automatic stay but
denies the balance of the allegations contained in the second sentence of paragraph 6 of the
Complaint. Wildlife Ridge admits the Millward bank.Iuptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016.
8.

Wildlife Ridge admits that a document purporting to be a "Trust Deed" was

recorded on the 30th day of December, 2005, as Recorder's Instrument No. 20528398 in the
records of Bannock County, Idaho and denies the balance of the allegations contained in paragraph
7 of the Complaint.
9.

Wildlife Ridge denies that any Deed of Trust or Trust Deed applies to any real

property that it owns and denies all other allegations contained in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 , and 12
of the Complaint.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
10.

The relief sought in the Complaint is barred by applicable statutes of limitations

including by not limited to Idaho Code §§45-1515 and 5-214A.
11.

The relief sought in the Complaint is baned by Iaches.

12.

The relief sought in the Complaint is ba1Ted by the doctrine of Collateral Estoppel.

13.

The relief sought in the Complaint is barred by the docttines of res judicata, claim

and/or issue preclusion.
14.

The relief sought in the Complaint is baned by the doctrines of unclean hands.

15.

The interest of Wildlife Ridge is p1ior to and superior to the interest of any of the

Plaintiffs.
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16.

The security interest claimed by the Plaintiff is invalid and void.

17.

The "Modification" referred to in Paragraph 5 of the complaint is void and

unenforceable.
18.

The "Modification" referred to in Paragraph 5 of the complaint caused the priority

of the Trust Deed to become inferior to the 1ight, title and interest of the Wildlife Ridge.
17.

Plaintiffs did not act reasonably to protect itself or to mitigate any damages which

it may have sustained, which damages are denied, and are barred from recovering on its Complaint
to the extent of such failure to mitigate.
18.

Perfonnance of one or more contractual obligations alleged in the Complaint was

excused due to, among other things, Plaintiffs' own breach of its wa1nnties, representations,
and/or other obligations to Defendant, and consequently Plaintiffs are barred from recovery on any
claim for relief contained in the Complaint.
19.

If any monetary sums are recoverable by Plaintiff, which liability Wildlife Ridge

expressly denies, such sums must be offset by the amount in which Wildlife Ridge was damaged
by Plaintiffs and the Defendant. M&S , including but not limited to all damages, costs, penalties,
interest, and other sums incurred by the Defendant M&S due to the failure of said Defendant to
timely pay any and all invoices, bills, accounts or other business expenses, its failure to indemnify
Wildlife Ridge against resulting claims, causes of action, liabilities, and damages and all other
damages incurred by Defendant relating to the subject matter of the Complaint or otherwise, or
alleged in the Complaint filed in this action by Defendant.
20.

If any monetary sums are recoverable by Plaintiff, which liability Wildlife Ridge

expressly denies, Defendant M&S, should indemnify and hold Wildlife Ridge harmless from all
such monetary sums and from the foreclosure of any lien, deed of trust, mortgage or other
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encumbrance including but not limited to all damages, costs, penalties, interest, and other sums
incurred by the Defendant M&S relating to the subject matter of the Complaint or otherwise, or
alleged in the Complaint filed in this action by said Defendant.
21.

The obligations sought to be enforced by Plaintiffs in this action are unenforceable

and void by reason of violation of public policy and, as a result, Plaintiff may recover nothing
thereon.
22.

The obligations sought to be enforced by Plaintiff are unconscionable and are

unenforceable and void by reason of unconscionability. By reason of said unconscionability, and
the unconscionable nature of activities related to attempted foreclosure or collection thereof,
Plaintiffs should not recover on their Complaint.
23.

One or more of the Plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest and are without

authority to act or bring an action to foreclose a mortgage in the state of Idaho.
24.

The interest claimed by the Plaintiffs in the real property owned by Wildlife Ridge,

if any such interest exists, was obtained by the fraudulent and collusive conduct of the Plaintiffs
and, Defendant M&S and their respective agents and employees, in particular:
a). Dming August 2004, the Michael Williams (who is now the sole owner of
Wildlife Ridge) began negotiating with J. P Lasley's and Jean Lasley's
("Lasley's"), as trustees of the J.P and Jean Lasley's Living Trust, for the purchase
of the real property ("Property") which is the subject matter of this action with the
intent of developing the Property. Following those negotiations Michael Williams
and the Lasley's executed a purchase and sale agreement for the Property.
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b). Michael Williams and his partner Henry Proctor subsequently learned that they
could not obtain lender financing to purchase the Property and decided to obtain
additional capital investors.
c). Sometime during September 2005 Michael Williams spoke with Defendant
Millward, (who Wildlife Ridge now believes was acting jointly with the Plaintiffs
and Plaintiffs' ptincipals as a part of an ongoing business), about financing the
development project in exchange for a percentage of the profits.

Defendant

Millward represented that he and his business associates would handle the financing
with their money to purchase of the Property if Michael Williams was able to obtain
preliminary plat approval for the Property. Michael Williams relied on the
representations of Defendant Millward including his representation that said
defendant and the Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' principals would be bound by the
Agreement.
d). During October 25, 2005, the preliminary plat was approved. All costs of
obtaining the preliminary plat were paid by Michael Williams. Defendant Millward
on behalf of Plaintiffs represented that they would agree to provide the needed
financing to purchase the Property for a percentage of the profits.
e. On December 29, 2005 Millward and Michael Williams mem01ialized their
agreement ("Agreement"). The Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." The
Agreement provides among other things that: (i) M&S would pay $230,000 to
purchase the Property from the Lasley's and would be entitled to 55% of the
property; (ii) thereafter each party would pay $25,000 to buy-out Henry Proctor's
interest; (iii) M&S would then own 62.5% of the Property and Michael Williams
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would own the remaining 37.5% of the Property.(iv) M&S would form a limited
liability company for the development project; (v) the Prope1ty would be held by
the newly organized LLC, the Defendant M&S and Michael Williams would be
managers of the LLC; (vi) in consideration of the mutual covenants outlined in the
Agreement Michael Williams assigned his interest in the purchase and sale
agreement to M&S.
f). Contrary to the representations made to Michael Williams and contrary to the
terms of the Agreement, Defendant M&S recorded a deed conveying the real
property solely to M&S on December 30, 2006 in Bannock County as Instrument
No. 20528397. A true and correct copy is attached as Exhibit "B".
g). Defendant M&S and Plaintiffs immediately encumbered all of the Prope1iy with
the Trust Deed which is the subject matter of this action.
h). Thereafter Defendant M&S and Plaintiffs actively concealed the trne nature of
the investment, loan balances, interest and accounts, said Defendants and Plaintiffs
knew that the statements about the transaction were false, material and they
intended that the representations would be acted upon in a reasonable manner,
(i)

Michael Williams, Wildlife Ridge's predecessor in interest was ignorant of

the falsity of the Plaintiff's statements; relied on the truth of the representations;
had the right to rely upon the trnth of the representations; and

U)

Wildlife Ridge has been injured in and amount to be shown at the trial of

this matter as a consequence of Defendants Millward, M&S and the Plaintiff's
representations and conduct.
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WHEREFORE the Wildlife Ridge having fully responded to the Complaint request that this Comi
enter Judgment in favor of the Wildlife Ridge as follows:

1.

Dismissing the Complaint with prejudice with the Plaintiffs taking nothing thereby.

2.

Awarding the Wildlife Ridge its costs necessarily incmTed in this action together

with reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Code including but not
limited to §§12-120, 12-121, and Rule 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

That this Court denies the Plaintiffs request for equitable relief of foreclosure in

any form.
4.

For such other and further relief as this Court dete1mines to be just.
COUNTERCLAIM

Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC ("Wildlife Ridge") alleges and complains of
the Counterdefendants as follows:
1.

Wildlife Ridge is an Idaho limited liability company, in good standing with its

principal place of business located at 4915 Apache Ave., Pocatello, ID 83204.
2.

Counterdefendant Monitor Financed L.C. ("Monitor") claims to be a Utah limited

liability company, the Counterdefendant First Capital Funding, L.C., claims to be a Utah limited
liability company.
3.

During August 2004, the Michael Williams (who is now the sole owner and a

predecessor in interest of Wildlife Ridge) began negotiating with J. P Lasley's and Jean Lasley's
("Lasley's"), as tmstees of the J.P and Jean Lasley's Living Trnst, for the purchase of the real
property ("Property") which is the subject matter of this action with the intent of developing the
Property. Following those negotiations Michael Williams and the Lasley's executed a purchase
and sale agreement for the Property.
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4.

Michael Williams and his partner Henry Proctor subsequently learned that they

could not obtain lender financing to purchase the Prope1ty and decided to obtain additional capital
investors.
5.

Sometime dming September 2005 Michael Williams spoke with Defendant

Millward, (who Wildlife Ridge now believes was acting jointly with the Counter Defendants and
Counter Defendants' principals as a part of an ongoing business), about financing the development
project in exchange for a percentage of the profits. Defendant Millward represented that he and
his business associates would handle the financing with their money to purchase of the Property if
Michael Williams was able to obtain preliminary plat approval for the Prope1ty. Michael Williams
relied on the representations of Defendant Millward including his representation that said
defendant and the Counter Defendants and Counter Defendants' ptincipals would be bound by the
Agreement.
6.

During October 25, 2005 the preliminary plat was approved. All costs of obtaining

the preliminary plat were paid by Michael Williams. Defendant Millward on behalf of Counter
Defendants represented that they would agree to provide the needed financing to purchase the
Property for a percentage of the profits.

7.

On December 29, 2005 Millward and Michael Williams memorialized their

agreement ("Agreement"). The Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." The Agreement
provides among other things that: (i) M&S would pay $230,000 to purchase the Property from the
Lasley's and would be entitled to 55% of the property; (ii) thereafter each party would pay $25,000
to buy-out Henry Proctor's interest; (iii) M&S would then own 62.5% of the Prope1ty and Michael
Williams would own the remaining 37.5% of the Prope1ty; (iv) M&S would form a limited
liability company for the development project; (v) the Prope1iy would be held by the newly
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organized LLC, the Defendant M&S and Michael Williams would be managers of the LLC; (vi)
in consideration of the mutual covenants outlined in the Agreement Michael Williams assigned
his interest in the purchase and sale agreement to M&S.
8.

Contrary to the representations made to Michael Williams and contrary to the terms

of the Agreement, Defendant M&S recorded a deed conveying the real property solely to M&S on
December 30, 2005 in Bannock County as Instrument No. 20528397. A true and co1Tect copy is
attached as Exhibit "B".
9.

Defendant M&S and Counter Defendants immediately encumbered all of the

Prope1ty with the Trust Deed which is the subject matter of this action.

FRAUD
10.

Wildlife Ridge repleads paragraphs 1 through 9.

11.

Thereafter Defendant M&S and Plaintiffs actively concealed the true nature of the

investment, loan balances, interest and accounts. The said Defendant and Plaintiffs knew that the
statements about the transaction were false. The statements were material and they intended that
the representations would be acted upon in a reasonable manner by Wildlife Ridge.

12.

Wildlife Ridge's predecessor in interest was ignorant of the falsity of the Plaintiffs

statements; relied on the truth of the representations; had the right to rely upon the truth of the
representations; and
13.

Wildlife Ridge has been injured in an amount to be shown at the trial of this matter

as a consequence of Defendant M&S and the Plaintiffs representations and conduct.
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DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
14.

Wildlife Ridge repleads paragraphs 1 through 13.

15.

Wildlife Ridge desires a judicial detennination the Trust Deed sought to be

foreclosed in this matter is unenforceable due the conduct of the Counterdefendants

16.

A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the

circumstances in order that Counterclaimants may ascertain the validity and enforceability of the
Trust Deed and Note which form the basis of the Counterdefendants' claims.

17.

On December 30, 2005 and continuing to the present the Counterdefendants have

wrongfully encumbered the Prope1ty owned by Wildlife Ridge.

18.

Counterdefendants have actively concealed the true nature of their transaction with

M&S and misrepresented the same.

19.

Counterdefendants attempted to modify the transactions claimed Note at a time

when M&S was administratively dissolved therefore the modification is void and unenforceable.
20.

As a result of Counterdefendants acts, Wildlife Ridge has and will sustain great and

ilTeparable injury, in that the Counterdefendants' conduct interferes with the sale of developed lots
owned by Wildlife Ridge and wrongfully encumbered by Counterdefendants.
21.

Wildlife Ridge cannot be fully compensated in damages, and is without an

adequate remedy at law because the exact amount of damage Wildlife Ridge will sustain is difficult
to detem1ine and there in no other adequate remedy at law to recover the damages.
22.

As a further result of defendant's acts, Wildlife Ridge has sustained money

damages in an amount to be proven at the time of trial. If this court allows these acts to continue,
Wildlife Ridge will be further damaged in an amount to proven at trial.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIM
Page 11

61 of 325

ATTORNEY'S FEES
23.

The Wildlife Ridge is entitled to the award of attorney's fees in accordance with

the provisions of Idaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-121, provisions of Rule 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
Wildlife Ridge demands trial by jury and all issues that are triable by a jury in this action.
WHEREFORE the Counterclaimants pray judgment against the Counterdefendant as
follows:

1.

That the Court determine that an actual controversy has arisen and now exists

between the Counterclaimants and Counterdefendants concerning their respective 1ights and
duties;
2.

That the Trnst Deed is void and unenforceable and that the Counterdefendants are

enjoined from the foreclosure of the said trust deed.
3.

That the Note and the modification of the Note are void and invalid.

4.

For actual damages to be proven at the time of trial.

5.

For an award of costs necessarily incuned herein together with an award of

reasonable attorney's fees in accordance with the provisions of Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121;
and
6.

For such fmther relief as the Comt deems just in the premises.
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DATED this_ day ofNovember, 2016.
HEARN & WOOD LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1..( ~ay of November, 2016, I served a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Ron Kerl
COOPER & LARSEN, Chartered
151 North Third Avenue, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145

[~
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

[K

U.S . Mail - Postage Prepaid
Hand Delive1y
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: 208-235-1182
Email: ron@cooper-larsen.com

~-L---====--_
A. BRUCE LARSON
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO , COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE, LC, ETAL.

I

Plaintiff,
vs .
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, ETAL. ,

Case No:CV-2016-0003588-0C
ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF
INFORMATION FOR
SCHEDULING ORDER

Defendant.
A Complaint was filed in this matter on the

?1h day of October, 2016.

The

Defendant has now appeared and/or answered and the case is at issue.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16, that the parties, through their
counsel (or the parties themselves if self-represented), confer and submit to the Court,
within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order, a joint statement containing the
following information:
(1)

Whether any service is still needed upon any unserved parties.

(2)

Whether motions to add new parties or otherwise amend the pleadings are

contemplated.
(3)

Whether the parties currently contemplate or anticipate any pre-trial motions.

(4)

Whether the case presents any unusual time requirements for trial
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preparation.
(5)

The agreed amount of time required for trial.

(6)

Whether the case presents any unusual times requirements for discovery.

(7)

Whether any party requests court-ordered mediation.

(8)

Three stipulated trial dates, one no less than six (6) months and no more

than nine (9) months from the date of this Order, and a second no less than nine (9)
months and no more than twelve (12) months from the date of this Order, and a third no
less than twelve (12) months and no more than fifteen (15) months from the date of this
Order. These trial dates cannot be during the first full week of any month.
(9) Whether there are other matters conducive to determination of the action that
the parties agree should be brought to the attention of the Court prior to entering a
Scheduling Order.
The parties shall agree as to which party shall make the joint submission but, if they
cannot agree, Plaintiff shall be responsible to make the submission.
Upon receipt of this joint submission the Court will issue an Order setting the matter
for trial with appropriate dates for discovery, disclosure of witness, etc.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the parties do not file the stipulation required
herein, within the fourteen (14) days set forth, the Court will set this matter for trial on a
date available to the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the submissions requested in the order are
deemed by the Court to constitute the scheduling conference required by IRCP 16(a).
However, if either party wishes a more formal scheduling conference please contact the
Court's clerk and one will be scheduled.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that unless the Court receives written notification to
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the contrary, all documents sent by the Court to counsel will be delivered electronically.
Counsel is hereby instructed to provide the Court with an email address they wish to have
documents delivered to.

Counsel will also have the continuing obligation to notify the

Court upon any change to the email address submitted .

NOTICE:

ELECTRONIC FILING IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IS NOT

YET AVAILABLE. PLEASE CONTINUE TO PHYSICALLY FILE DOCUMENTS UNTIL
FURTHER NOTICE.
DATED this

_15__ day of November, 2016.

~c.0~

ROBERT C NAFTZ
. District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Q'i

I HEREBY CERT IFY that on the
day of November, 2016 I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated .

Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen
Po Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
ron@coo12er-larsen .com

A. Bruce Larsen
Hearn & Wood LLP
Po Box 70
Pocatello, ID 83204
bruce@hwlawpro.com

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Deliver

[ZI E-Mail

0Fax:

D U.S. Mail
[ZI E-Mail
D Hand Deliver
D Fax:
Robert Poleki
Clerk of the Court
l . -

. .

By:__.V_A/_AJ_
y f"'->~"'-1~--'l~_
!Q_Mj_ _ __
Deputy Clerk \./
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IN TH E DISTRICT COURT OF TH E SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE , LC , ETAL.

I

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No:CV-2016-0003588-0C

ORDER SETTING JURY TRIAL

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC , ETAL.,
Defendant.
(1)

TRIAL DATE(S). This matter is set for JURY TRIAL on (A) PRIMARY

TRIAL SETTING:

SEPTEMBER 6-8, 12, 2017 and (B) ALTERNATIVE TRIAL

SETTING: DECEMBER 5-8, 2017 AT THE HOUR OF 9:00 A.M., in Courtroom 309,
Bannock County Courthouse, Pocatello, Idaho. A continuance of the trial date shall occur
only upon written Motion or Stipulated Motion to the Court which clearly states the reasons
for the requested continuance and which includes an acknowledgment and agreement

signed by each party that certifies that the Motion to Continue has been discussed with
and agreed to by each party. All deadlines listed below shall apply to the trial setting listed
in line (A) above. An Order continuing the trial date will not alter the deadlines set forth in
this Order, except for good cause shown .
(2)

PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(b), in lieu of a pre-trial

Case No.: CV-2016-0003588-0C
ORDER SETTING JURY TRIAL
Page 1 of 7

70 of 325

conference, trial counsel for the parties (or the parties if they are self-represented) are
ORDERED to meet and/or confer for the purpose of preparing a joint Pre-Trial
Memorandum, which shall be submitted to the Court at least 14 days prior to Trial, and
shall include:
(A) A statement that all exhibits to be offered at trial have been provided to all
other parties and attaching an Exhibit List of all exhibits to be offered at trial by
both parties. The Exhibit List shall indicate: 1) by whom the exhibit is being
offered, 2) a brief description of the exhibit, 3) whether the parties have
stipulated to its admission, and if not, 4) the legal grounds for any objection. If
any exhibit includes a summary of other documents, such as medical expense
records, to be offered pursuant to I. R.E. 1006, the summary shall be attached to
the Stipulation.
(B) A statement whether depositions or any discovery responses will be offered
in lieu of live testimony, and a list of what will actually be offered, the manner in
which such evidence will be presented, and the legal grounds for any objection
to any such offer.
(C) A list of the names and addresses of all witnesses which each party intends
to call to testify at trial, including anticipated rebuttal or impeachment witnesses.
Expert witnesses shall be identified as such . The Stipulation should also
identify whether any witness' testimony will be objected to in its entirety and the
legal grounds therefore.
(D) A brief non-argumentative summary of the factual nature of the case . The
purpose of the summary is to provide an overview of the case for the jury and is
to be included in pre-proof instructions to the jury, unless found inappropriate by
the Court.
·
(E) A statement that counsel have, in good faith , discussed settlement
unsuccessfully and/or completed mediation unsuccessfully, if mediation was
ordered by the Court.
(F) A statement that all pre-trial discovery procedures under I.R.C.P. 26 to 37
have been complied with and all discovery responses supplemented as
required by the rules to reflect facts known to the date of the Stipulation.
(G) A statement of all issues of fact and law which remain to be litigated, listing
which party has the burden of proof as to each issue.
(H) A list of any stipulated admissions of fact, which will avoid unnecessary
proof.
.
(I) A list of any orders requested by the parties which will expedite the trial.
(J) A statement as to whether counsel require more than 30 minutes per party
for voir dire or opening statement and , if so, an explanation of the reason more
time is needed.
Case No. : CV-2016-0003588-0C
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These submissions will be deemed by the Court to constitute the final pre-trial
conference required by IRCP 16(b). However, if either party wishes a more formal pretrial conference the same should be requested in writing at least 60 days prior to trial
and one will be scheduled.
(3)

MOTIONS TO ADD NEW PARTIES OR AMEND PLEADINGS shall be filed

no later than 60 days after the date of this Order.
(4)

DISCOVERY must be served and completely responded to at least 60 days

prior to trial. This includes supplementation of discovery responses required by I.R.C.P.
26(e) , unless good cause is shown for late supplementation. Discovery requests must be
responded to in a timely way as required by the I.R.C.P. The deadlines contained in this
Order cannot be used as a basis or reason for failing to timely respond to or supplement
properly served discovery, including requests for disclosure of witnesses and/or trial
exhibits. Discovery disputes will not be heard by the Court without the written certification
required by I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2).
(5)

WITNESS DISCLOSURE. Except as previously disclosed in responses to

discovery requests, Plaintiff shall disclose all fact and expert witnesses no later than 140
days before trial. Defendants shall disclose their fact -and expert witnesses no later than
110 days before trial. Rebuttal witnesses shall be disclosed no later than 80 days before
trial. Expert witnesses shall be disclosed in the manner and with the specificity required by
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).

Any objection to the I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) expert witness

disclosure must be filed within 45 days of the disclosure or is deemed waived. Witnesses
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not disclosed in responses to discovery and/or as required herein will be excluded at trial,
unless allowed by the Court in the interest of justice.
(6)

MOTIONS. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS, and responses thereto, shall comply

in all respects with I.R.C.P. 56 and be filed no later than 90 days before trial.

ALL

OTHER MOTIONS, including any Motion in Limine, shall be filed and heard by the Court
no later than 30 days before trial. The original of all Motions and supporting submissions
shall be filed with the clerk of the court. However, one (1) duplicate Judge's Copy of all

Motions, and any opposition thereto, together with supporting memorandum,
affidavits

and

documents,

shall

be

E-MAILED

to

the

deputy

clerk

at

kpovey@bannockcounty.us. All other pleadings, notices, etc., should be filed with the
Clerk without copies to the Court's chambers.
(7)

STIPULATED MODIFICATIONS.

The parties may stipulate to the

modification of the discovery, witness disclosure and motion deadlines stated herein only
upon submission of a stipulation to the Court and a Court Order modifying the deadlines.
No order modifying deadlines will be granted if it would result in a delay in the trial date,
without a formal motion to vacate the trial , and good cause shown.
(8)

TRIAL BRIEFS. Trial briefs are encouraged but not required. If submitted,

trial briefs should address substantive factual, legal and/or evidentiary issues the parties
believe are likely to arise during the trial, with appropriate citation to authority. Any trial
brief should be exchanged between the parties and submitted to the clerk of the court, and
a duplicate Judge's Copy shall be submitted to the Court's chambers in Bannock County,
no later than 10 days prior to trial.
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(9)

PRE-MARKED EXHIBITS, AND AN EXH IBIT LIST IN THE FORM

ATTACHED HERETO, shall be exchanged between the parties and filed with the Court no
later than 10 days prior to trial. Unless otherwise ordered , Plaintiff shall identify exhibits
beginning with the number "1" and the Defendant shall identify exhibits beginning with the
letter "A."
(10)

JURY INSTRUCTIONS.

Proposed jury instructions and verdict forms

requested by any party shall be prepared in conformity with I.R.C.P. 51 (a), except that
they shall be filed with the Court and exchanged between the parties at least 7 days prior
to trial. Except for good cause shown , proposed jury instructions should conform to the
pattern Idaho Jury Instructions (IDJI) approved by the Idaho Supreme Court. In addition to
submitting written proposed instructions that comply with Rule 51 (a), the parties shall also
submit both a clean version and a version with cited authority by e-mail to the Court's
Clerk, in Word format, at least 7 days prior to trial. Certain "stock" instructions need not be
submitted . These will typically include IDJI 1.00, 1.01, 1.03, 1.03.1, 1.05, 1.09, 1.11 ,
1.13/1 .13.1, 1.15.1, 1.17, 1.20.1, and 1.24.1. It is requested that the parties agree on the
basic instruction giving the jury a short, plain statement of the claims, per IDJI 1.07.
(11)

MEDIATION. Mediation is highly recommended . Any formal mediation

must occur at least 60 days before the trial date. If the_parties cannot agree on a mediator
upon motion by either party, the Court will appoint a mediator.
(12)
for this trial.

TRIAL PROCEDURES. A total of FOUR (4) trial days have been reserved
If the parties believe that more trial days will be required, the parties are

ORDERED to notify the Court of this request no less than 60 days prior to trial. On the
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first day of trial , counsel shall report to the Court's chambers at 8:30 a.m. for a brief status
conference. Unless otherwise ordered, or as modified during trial as necessary, trial days
will begin at 9:00 a.m . and close at or about 5:00 p.m., with a one hour break for lunch.
(13)

HEARINGS OR CONFERENCES WITH THE COURT.

All meetings,

conferences, and/or hearings with the Court shall be scheduled in advance with the
Court's Clerk by calling 208-236-7252 . No hearing shall be noticed without contacting
the Clerk.

(14)

ALTERNATE JUDGES.

Notice is hereby given , pursuant to I.R.C.P.

40(d)(1 )(G) , that an alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case,
if the current presiding judge is unavailable. The list of potential alternate judges is: 1)
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn ; 2) Honorable David C. Nye; 3) Honorable Mitchell W . Brown;
4) Honorable Jon Shindurling ; 5) Honorable William H. Woodland; 6) Honorable Richard T.
St. Clair. If the I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1) disqualification has not previously been exercised , failure
to disqualify, without cause, any one of these alternate judges within ten (10) days of the
date of this Order shall constitute a waiver of such right.

' r
DATED this

o,·-1

() (:. _·:)[\''. • ,.:,.,

I

~J (' i (,

day of January,.201-7.

k&-_J& C _ rl ~

,_

ROBERT C NAFTZ
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

, i 17

D1~1'Ull~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~
day ot.Jarlya,rr,z,84+, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated.

Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen
PO Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

D U.S. Mail

A Bruce Larson
155 S 2nd Ave
Pocatello, ID 83201

D U.S. Mail

~ E-Mail:

D Hand Deliver
0Fax:

~ E-Mail:

D Hand Deliver
D Fax:

Robert Poleki
Clerk of the Court

By:_\_..._Hfid___..'
·~~O\ILJ\,.........___
~ Deputy Clerk

~
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Ron Kerl , Esq. - ISB # 1768
COOPER & LARSEN , CHARTERED
151 orth Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235- 1182
Email:

r .- • ..
(~:;·

L.,_ ....

w~?- r .. ,. _

£·

t __ •
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~ ·

'' \...

. '

Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TH E
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C. , a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING L.C. , a
Utah limited liability company,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

VS.

)

WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

Defendants.

)

WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liabi lity company;

)
)

CASE NO. CV-2016-3588-0C

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C.
and
FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING,
L.C. 's ANSWER TO
COUNTERCLAIM

)

Counter-claimant,
vs .
MONITOR FfNANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Counter-defendant,

)

___________________ )
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COMES OW the Plaintiff: and Counter-defendan ts Monitor Fi nance, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company ("Monitor") and First Capital Fundi ng, LC., a Utah limited liability company
("First Capital"), and in answer to the Counter-claim filed aga inst them by the Defendant and
Counter-c laimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC ("Wildlife Ridge"), admits, denies and alleges the
following:
1.

Monitor and First Capital re-allege the facts and claims set forth in thier Complaint

on file in this case as if set forth herein at length.
2.

Monitor and First Capital admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 1., and 2. of

Wildlife Ridge's Counter-cla im.
3.

Monitor and First Cap ital have insufficient knowledge of the allegations contai ned

in paragraphs 3., 4., 5., 6., 7., and 8. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim , and therefore deny the same.
4.

Monitor and Fir t Cap ital, in answer to paragraph 9. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-

claim, admit that on the 301h day of December, 2005, they jointly loaned to Michael Millward and
M&S Development, LLC the sum of$244,000, and as evidence of said loan, Michael Millward and
M&S Development, LLC made, executed and delivered to the Plaintiffs their Trust Deed Note dated
the 3011, day of December, 2005, in the principal sum of$244,000 as set forth in Exhibit "A" attached
to the Complaint on file herein, and it is hereby incorporated herein by this reference as if set forth
in full at thi s place.
Further, as security for the repayment of the Trust Deed Note, together with interest, costs,
and attorney's fees, M&S made, executed and delivered to Plaintiffs that certain Trust Deed,
Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated December 30, 2005 ("Deed of
Trust") on the Bannock County Real Property therein described. The Deed of Trust was recorded
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on the 30111 day of December, 2005, under Recorder's Instrument No. 20528398 in the records of
Bannock County Idaho and is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Complaint on file herein. It is hereby
incorporated herein by this reference as if set forth in full at this place (the "Monitor and First Capital
Deed of Trust").
5.

In answer to paragraph 10. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim, Monitor and First

Capital restate their answers to paragraphs 1. through 9. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim.
6.

Monitor and Fir t Capita l deny the allegations set out in paragraphs 11. , 12., and 13.

of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim.
7.

In answer to paragraph 14. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim, Monitor and First

Capital restate their answers to paragraphs 1. through 13. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim.
8.

In answer to paragraphs 15. and 16. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim, Monitor and

First Capita l admit that Wildlife Ridge is seeking the relief described therein, but denies that it is
entitled to any such relief.
9.

Monitor and First Capital deny the allegations set out in paragraphs 17 ., 18., 19 ., 20.,

21., 22., and 23. of Wildlife Ridge's Counter-claim.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Counter-claim of Wildlife Ridge fails to state a claim against Monitor and First Capital
upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Counter-claim of Wildlife Ridge is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations
including, but not limited to, Idaho Code§§ 5-201, 5-216, 5-218, and 5-224.
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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Counter-claim of Wi ldlife Ridge is barred by the applicable doctrines of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, issue preclusion,j udicial estoppel, claim preclusion and waiver by reason of the
following :
On December 3, 20 14, Wildlife Ridge commenced an action against Monitor and First
Capital in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County
of Bannock as Case No. CV 2014-4783 OC (the "First Action").
In the First Action Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands

described in the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, free and clear of the Monitor and First
Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the Court that the sums due Monitor and First
Capital, which were or may have been secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Tmst, had
been satisfied.
On March 12, 2015, Wildlife Ridge amended its complaint in the First Action and continued
to seek a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Monitor and First Capital Deed
of Trust, free and clear of the Monitor and First Capita l Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from
the Court that the sums due Monitor and First Capital, which were or may have been secured by the
Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, had been satisfied.
On March 26, 2015, Monitor and First Capital filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint
of Wildlife Ridge denying Wildlife Ridge's right to any of the relief sought in its Amended
Complaint.
On June 14, 2016, the First Action was dismissed by a Judgment of the Court, with prejudice,
with each party to bear their own attorney fees and costs of suit (the "Dismissal of the First Action").
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Under the applicable doctrines ofres judicata, co ll atera l estoppel, and claim preclusion , the
Dismissal of the First Action not onl y defeated the claims set out in the First Action, but also served
to bar the future litigation of ev~ry matter which might and shou ld have been litigated in the First
Action , including the claims set out in Wildlife Ridge 's Counter-claim filed herein.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Monitor and First Capital reserve the right to assert further and additional affirmat ive
defenses.
ATTORNEY FEE REQUEST

Monitor and First Capital have had to employ counsel to defend the Counter-claim and have
obligated themselves to pay a reasonable fee for such services. Monitor and First Capital are
entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees and their costs of suit against Wildlife Ridge
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ I 2- 120, 12- I 21, and 12- 123 , and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.
WHEREFORE, having answered the Counter-claim of Wildlife Ridge, and having raised
good and valid defenses thereto, Monitor and First Capital pray that judgment be entered in their
favor dismissing the Counter-claim, with prejudice, and awarding Monitor and First Capital their
reasonab le attorney fees and their costs of suit against Wildlife Ridge pursuant to Idaho Code
§§ 12- 120, 12- 121, and 12-123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dated this 7da y of January, 2017.

COOPER&
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ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
("'····

I HEREBY CERTIFY on th-. .

J

day of January, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of

the foregoing document as fo llows:
A. Bruce Larson
Hearn & Wood LLP
155 S. 2"t1 Ave.
Pocatello, ID 8320 I

Chamber Copy:
Hon. Robert C. Naftz
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201

[x] U.S . Mail , postage prepaid

[
[
[
[

] Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
] Facsimile - 208-932- 1083
] Email to: bruce@hwlawpro.com

~Kj U.S. Mail , postage prepaid

[)(] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-547-2147
[ ]Email to :
nicoled@bannockcounty.us

Ron Kerl, of the firm
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH E SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANC E, LC, ETAL

I

Plaintiff,
VS,

Case No:CV-2016-0003588-0C
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, ETAL ,
Defendant.
THE PARTIES came before the Court on the 21st day of February, 2017 for motion
for summary judgment. Ron Kerl appeared in person on behalf of the Plaintiff. A. Bruce
Larson and Rick Hearn appeared in person on behalf of the Defendant. Stephanie Davis
was the Court Reporter.
At the outset, Mr. Kerl informed the Court that he had filed a motion to amend the
complaint and that hearing is set on Monday, February 27, 2017. He had requested that
the Court set that hearing separate from today's hearing due to not having enough time to
give proper notice to Defense counsel. However if the Court would prefer to hear the
motion and there was no objection from the Defense, that motion could be heard as well.
Mr. Larson had no objection to the motion, therefore said motion was GRANTED. Mr. Kerl
will prepare the order and submit it to the Court.
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..
NOW TH EREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs MOTION to
amend the complaint that is scheduled to commence on Monday, February 27, 2017 at
the hour of 2:00 p.m . is hereby VACATED.
The Court next heard argument on the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. At
the conclusion of argument, the Court took the matter under advisement.
DATED this

r

~{

day of February, 2017.

Ro&~-C. \~=G8'

ROBERT C NAFTZ
District Judge

~
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CERTI FICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22---day of February, 2017, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated.

Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen
PO Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

D

A. Bruce Larson
155 S. 2nd Ave
Pocatello, ID 83201

D

U.S. Mail
E-Mail: ron@cooper-larsen.com
D Hand Deliver
0 Fax:
~

U.S. Mail
~ E-Mail: bruce@hwlawpro.com
D Hand Deliver
0 Fax:

Robert Poleki
CLERK OF THE COURT
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Ron Kerl, Esq. - ISB #1768
COOPER & LARSEN , CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182
Email: ·o·_"i ,, <X ,~~:r- l:w,,'11.u,11
1

Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE, LC., a Utah limited liabi lity
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO . CV-2016-3588-0C

)

Defendants.

)
)
)

WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company;
Counter-claimant,
vs.
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C ., a
Utah limited liabi lity company,
Counter-defendant,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORD ER GRANTING LEA VE
TO FILE AMENDED
COMPLAINT

_ ____________ )
Order Granting Leave To Fil e Amende d Comp lain t
Pg . I
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THE COURT, having reviewed the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Comp lai nt to add a new
defendant, and the parties having stipulated in open court that the Motion may be granted,
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that the Plaintiffs are hereby granted leave to file
the Amended Complain t in the form attached to their Motion dated February 7, 2017 .

Dated thistlJ. day ofFebniary, 2017.

[ ')

_

(\

.

1~-C. 1 v~
Robert C. Naftz, District Judge

~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l HEREBY CERTIFY on the' 0day of February, 2017, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document as follows:
A. Bruce Larson
Hearn & Wood LLP
155 S. 2"d Ave.
Pocatello, ID 8320 1

Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen, Chtd.
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205

[x) U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ) Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083
[ ] Email to: bruce@hwlawpro.com
[x) U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delive1y
[ ) Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083
[ ) Email to: ron@cooper-larsen.com

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

~Tul

By: - --1.--,.,~ D-e~~"""'u
-y- ~----
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Ron Kerl, Esq. - lSB # 1768
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
15 I North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182
Email : ron(d conper-larsen . ·om
(

Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FlNANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPlT AL FUNDING, LC., a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
WILDLIFE RlDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; and PIONEER
TITLE COMPANY, a corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV - 2016-3588-0C

FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT TO
JUDICIALLY FORECLOSE
DEED OF TRUST

)

Defendants.

)
)
/r

Plaintiffs, for cause of suit against the above named Defendant, complains and alleges as
follows :

Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust
Page - 1

88 of 325

I.

STATUS OF PLAINTIFFS.

At all times herein mentioned Monitor Finance, L.C.

("Monitor") has been and now is a limited liability company organized under the state of Utah.
Monitor has its place of business in Provo, Utah, and is authorized, among other things, to loan
money and to take notes and deeds of trust as security therefore in the State of Idaho.
At all times herein mentioned First Capital Funding, L.C. ("Capital") has been and now is
a limited liability company organized under the state of Utah. Capital has its place of business in
Provo, Utah, and is authorized, among other things, to loan money and to take notes and deeds of
trust as security therefore in the State of Idaho.
Monitor and Capital will be referred to herein collectively as the Plaintiffs.
2.

STATUS OF DEFENDANTS. The Defendant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC ("Wildlife
Ridge") is now a limited liability company organized under the laws of the state of Idaho, first
organized in on May 12, 2006. However, between August 6, 2007 and August 27, 2007, between
August 7, 2008 and October 5, 2009 and between August 5, 2010 and September 18, 2015 Wildlife
Ridge was administratively dissolved as an Idaho limited liability company and did not legally exist.
Wildlife Ridge is the current owner of the premises herein sought to be foreclosed, having acquired
the property subject to the rights of the Plaintiffs.
Michael J. Mi llward, a married man ("Millward") and M&S Development LLC ("M&S"),
an Idaho limited li ability company, are the makers of the Trust Deed Note hereinafter described, and
M&S was the grantor of the Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture
Filing herein sought to be foreclosed and owner in fee simple of the premises.
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Defendant Pioneer Title Company is the Trustee named in the Trust Deed, Assignment of
Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated December 30, 2005, herein sought to be
foreclosed.
3.

INFERIOR INTERESTS. The above named Defendants, and each of them, claim some
right, title, lien or interest in the property described in Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust described herein, but
their interest, if any, in and to said property is junior, subordinate, and subsequent to the right and
lien of the Plaintiffs.
4.

TRUST DEED NOTE. On the 301" day of December, 2005, Plaintiffs jointly loaned to
Millward and M&S the sum of$244,000, and as evidence of said loan Millward and M&S, made,
executed and delivered to the Plaintiffs their Trust Deed Note in writing, which Note was dated the
30 1" day of December, 2005, in the principal sum of $244,000, both principal and interest being
payable in words and figures as set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, which is a true and correct
copy of the Trust Deed Note dated December 30, 2005 and it is hereby incorporated herein by this
reference as if set forth in full at this place.
5.
MODIFICATION OF TRUST DEED NOTE. By an agreement dated March 3, 2008,
Millward, M&S, the Plaintiffs and Wildlife Ridge entered into a Modification of Trust Deed Note
to provide for additional sums loaned by Plaintiffs to Millward and M&S to become part of the
unpaid principal balance of the Trust Deed Note ("Modification"). A True and correct copy of the
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Modification is attached hereto as Exhibit "B," which is hereby incorporated herein by this reference
as if set forth in full at this place
6.

BANKRUPTCY FILING OF MILLWARD. On September 10, 2012, Millward filed for
relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case No. 12-4 1260 pending in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an automatic stay
commenced on September 10, 2012 which prohibited Plaintiffs from taking any action to enforce
the Trust Deed Note, as amended. That automatic stay existed until Millward's bankruptcy case was
closed on June 23, 2016.
7.

DESCRIPTION OF REAL PROPERTY SECURITY. As security for the repayment
of the Trust Deed Note, together with interest, costs, and attorney's fees, M&S made, executed and
delivered to Plaintiffs that certain TrnstDeed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture
Filing dated December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trust") on the following described real property situated
in Bannock County, State of Idaho, to-wit:
A Tract of land in the South Y2 of the South Y2 Section 31, Township 6 South, Range 35 East, Boise
Meridian, Bannock County, Idaho, more particularly described as follows:

Beginning at the South quarter comer of Section 31; thence South 89°36'40" East, 82.68 feet; thence
North 53°44'13" East. 88.1 feet; thence North 26°44'09" West, 320 feet; thence North 63°15'5 l '' East,
260 feet; thence North 26°44'09" West 495.62 feet, more or less, to the Southerly dght of way line of
Barton Road; thence South 72°27 '20" West along the Southerly tight of way of Barton Road 472. 74 feet;
thence continuing aJongthe Southerly right of way line of Barton Road, South 83°18 '20" West, 389.3
feet, more or less, to the Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail; thence South 26°44 '40" East along the
Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail 791.56 feet, more or less, to the South line of said Section 31; thence
South 89°44 • East, 462.23 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning.
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The Deed of Trust was recorded on the 301h day of December, 2005, under Recorder's
Instrument No. 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho, and contains covenants,
conditions and agreements of the mortgagor as set forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto, which is a
true and correct copy of the Deed of Trust, and it is hereby incorporated by this reference herein as
if set forth at length. The Deed of Trust has never been satisfied or discharged or the rights
thereunder reconveyed .
8.

PARTIAL RELEASES. After the recording of the Deed ofTmst, there was released from
the Deed of Trust certain portions of the Property, and as of the date of this Complaint the Deed of
Trust applies only to the following described portion of the Deed of Trust property:
Lot 2, Block 3, Wi]d Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 1, according to the plat thereof, filed as Instrument
No. 97000607, records of Bannock Cmmty, Idaho.
Lot 6, Block 3, Wi]d Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 1, according to
No. 97000607, record'l of Bannock Cornuy, Idaho.

the plat thereof, filed as Instrument

Lot 1, Block 2, Wi]d Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof, filed as Instrnment
• No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho.
Lot 2, Block 2, Wild Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to
No. 20728743, re-cords of Bannock Cmmty, Idaho.

the plat thereof, filed as Instrument

Lot 4, Block 3, Wi]d Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to
No. 20728743, records ofBnnnockCounty, Idaho.

rhe plat thereof, fl.Jed as Instrument

Lot 5, Block 3, Wi]d Horse Ridge Subdivisiou Phase 2, accordiug to the plat thereof, filed as Instnunent
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho.
Lot 7, Block 3, Wi]d Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof, filed as Instrument
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho.

Lot 9, Block 3, WiJd Horse Ridge Subdivision Phase 2, according to the plat thereof, filed
No. 20728743, records of Bannock County, Idaho.

l:lS

Instrument
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9.
DEFAULT. Plaintiffs are the owners and holders of said Trust Deed Note and the joint and

several beneficiaries of the Deed of Trust.
In order to protect their interest in the Property, Plaintiffs paid attorney's fees and costs in
the amount of $4,546.19 to defend Wild Life Ridge's Quiet Title Action brought against the
Plaintiffs in Bannock County Case No. CV 14-7483. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover said fees and
costs by virtue of the attorney fees provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note and Deed of Trust.
General taxes were duly levied against and constituted a first lien upon the property
described in the Deed of Trust and to protect the lien of their Deed of Trust, Plaintiffs have paid
taxes in the amount of$22, 136.63. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover reimbursement for the amount
of the taxes they paid on behalfofWild Life Ridge by virtue of the provisions contained in the Deed
of Trust.
As of the I '' day of October, 2016, there is due, owing and unpaid upon the Trust Deed Note
the sum of $6,812,821.71, together with interest thereafter accruing at the default rate of 35% per
annum until date of Judgment herein, together with costs, foreclosure expenses, attorney's fees and
expenses necessary to preserve Plaintiffs' interest in the property heretofore advanced or hereafter
accrumg.

IO.
ATTORNEY'S FEES. Plaintiffs have had to employ counsel to represent it in this action
and has ob li gated itself to pay a reasonable fee for such services. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover
reasonable attorney fees by virtue of the attorney fee provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note
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as amended and Deed of Trust herein above described. Plaintiffs allege that $5,000.00 is a
reasonable sum to be allowed as attorney's fees herein if this action is uncontested, plus such
additiona l sums as the Court may adjudge as reasonable attorney 's fees in the event of contest, trial
or appeal.
11.

REASONABLE VALUE. The Plaintiffs, upon information and belief, all ege that the
reasonable value of the Deed of Trust Property and its appurtenances is the sum of $50,000.00 per
lot, or a total of $400,000.00.
12.
NO OTHER ACTION. The Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law, and
no other proceedings at law or in equ ity have been commenced or are pending to collect the Trust
Deed Note as amended or any portion thereof or to fo reclose the Deed of Trust. All conditions
precedent to the initiation and prosecution of this action and the forec losure of the Deed of Trust
have been satisfied.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as fo ll ows:
I.

That Plaintiffs receive the Decree of this Court foreclosing the Deed of Trust so that

the amounts due Plaintiffs under the Trust Deed Note as amended, which as of October I, 2016
totaled $6,812,82 1.7 1, plus interest accruing thereafter, together with any additional sums advanced
by Plaintiffs or which Plaintiffs become ob ligated to advance for the payment of taxes or
assessments and/or attorney fees and costs during the pend ency of this action, including interest on
such advances from date of advance; for the sum of $5,000.00 as attorney's fee if this action is
uncontested, plus such additional sums as the Court may adjudge as reasonab le in the event of
Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust
Page - 7

94 of 325

contest, trial or appeal; for Plaintiffs' taxable costs and disbursements herein; and for interest on the
entire amount of said judgment at the maximum rate allowed by law;
2.

That the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust described herein be adjudged a first and prior lien

upon the property described in the Deed of Trust superior to any right, title, claim, lien or interest
on the part of the named Defendants or persons claiming by, through or under said Defendants;
3.

That the Court, in the Decree, establish the reasonable value of the property herein

described at $400,000.00;
4.

That the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust described herein be foreclosed and said real

property be sold in separate parcels in accordance with and in the manner provided by law; that
Plaintiffs be permitted to be a purchaser at sale; that the net proceeds of said sale be applied first
toward the payment of the costs of said sale and then towards the payment of Plaintiffs Trust Deed
Note as amended;
5.

That the Decree provide that after the sale of said property all right, title, claim, lien

or interest of the named Defendants and every person claiming by, through or under said
Defendants, in or to said property, including the right of possession thereof from and after said sale,
be forever barred and foreclosed and that the purchaser at said sale be entitled to immediate
possession of the premises as allowed by law subject only to such statutory right of redemption as
said Defendants may have by law;
6.

That in the event the Plaintiffs become the purchasers at the sale and possession of

the premises is not sun-endered to the Plaintiffs, a writ of assistance be issued directing the Sheriff
of Bannock County, Idaho, to deliver possession of the premises to the Plaintiffs;
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7.

That after the conclusion of any forec losure sa le, upon proper motion of the Plaintiffs,

that a deficiency judgment be entered aga inst M&S in the event the net proceeds of the foreclosure
sa le are insufficient to fully satisfy the sums due and owing to the Plaintiffs; and
8.

That Plaintiffs may have such other and further reli ef as may be just and equitabl e

in the premises.
DA TED th is Ist day of March, 20 17.

COOPER & LARSEN, CHTD
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY on the Is i day of March, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document as follows:
A. Bruce Larson

[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

Hearn & Wood LLP
155 S. 2"d Ave.
Pocatello, ID 8320 I

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile - 208-932-1083
Email to: bruce@hwlawpro.com

COOPER & LARSEN, CHTD
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TRUST DEED NOTE
Dated: December 30, 2005

$244,000.00

I. Promise to Pay. For value received, Michael J. Millward, a married man, and M & S
Development, LLC, a Idaho Limited Liability Company (hereinafter individually referred to as
"Maker" and collectively referred to as "Makers") each promise to pay to the order of Monitor
Finance, L.C., a Utah limited liability company as to an undivided 50% interest an~ First Capital
Funding, L.C., a Utah limited liability company as to an undivided 50% interest ("Holder(s)"), at
3191 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604, or at such other place as Holder may from time to
time designate, in lawful money of the United States of America, the principal sum of TWO
HUNDRED FORTY FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($244,000.00), or so much of that sum
as may be advanced under this Trust Deed Note by the Holder, together with any other advances
made pursuant to this Trust Deed Note (collectively the "Principal Indebtedness"), plus interest
as computed below along with any other cost, fee or expenditure contemplated herein (the "Total
Indebtedness"). All of the terms and conditions of that certain Trust Deed, of even date which
secures this obligation are hereby incorporated and made a part of this Trust Deed Note.
2. Term. The term of this Trust Deed Note shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. This
Trust Deed Note shall fully mature on June 28, 2006 (the "Maturity Date").
3. Interest. The outstanding balance of the Principal Indebtedness shall bear interest
from December 30, 2005 until fully paid at a fixed interest rate of fifteen percent (15%) per
annum. Interest shall accrue daily on the outstanding balance of the Principal Indebtedness both
before and after judgment, and shall be calculated on the basis of a 360-day year. Interest is
compounded on a 360-day year simple interest basis by applying the ratio for the annual interest
rate over a year of 360 days (365/360), multiplied by the outstanding principal balance,
multiplied by the actual number of days the principal balance is outstanding.
4. Payments. Monthly interest payments will be made by Makers beginning February 1,
2006 and the first of the month thereafter. This Trust Deed Note calls for a balloon payment to
become due and payable on the Maturity Date. On the Maturity Date the Total Indebtedness
shall be due and payable in full. Checks will constitute payment only when collected. If any
installment or interest payment is not made within five (5) calendar days of the due date, a late
penalty equal to twenty percent (20%) of any such installment or interest payment owed
hereunder shall automatically be assessed. If any balloon payment is not made within five (5)
calendar days of the due date, a late penalty equal to ten percent (10%) of any such balloon
payment owed hereunder shall automatically be assessed. There shall be no grace period and no
further notice shall be required. In the event that a payment date falls on a weekend, or public
holiday, payment shall be due and payable the following business day.
5. Origination and Document Fees. As part of this transaction, Makers agree to pay to
Holder the amount of $12,200.00 as an origination fee (the "Origination Fee"). Said Origination
Fee shall be due and paid by the Makers on December 30, 2005. Makers also agree to pay all of
the costs incurred in documenting, recording and closing this transaction (the "Documentation
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Fee"). Makers agree that both the Origination Fee and Documentation Fee may be subtracted
directly from the principal amount at closing.
6. Holder's Expenditures. Makers agree to pay on demand any expenditures made by
Holder in accordance with the Trust Deed and this Trust Deed Note, including, but not limited
to, the payment of taxes, insurance premiums, costs of maintenance and preservation of the
collateral, common expense and other assessments relating to the collateral, and attorney fees
and costs incurred in connection with any matter pertaining hereto or to the security pledged to
secure the Principal Indebtedness or any portion thereof (collectively the "Holder
Expenditures"). At the election of Holder, all Holder Expenditures may be added to the unpaid
balance of this Trust Deed Note and become a part of and on a parity with the Principal
Indebtedness secured by the Trust Deed and shall accrue interest at such rate as may be
computed from time to time in the manner prescribed in this Trust Deed Note.
7. Prepayment. Makers shall have the right, from time to time and at any time, to prepay
all, or any part, of this Trust Deed Note at any time or times prior to the Maturity Date of this
note without payment of any premium or penalty. Prepaid Interest will be pro rated if this Note is
paid off early.
8. Default. Makers will be in default if any of the following happens: (a) Makers fail to
make any payment when due; (b) any Maker breaks any promise Maker has made to Holder, or
any Maker fails to comply with or to perform when due any other term, obligation, covenant, or
condition contained in this Trust Deed Note or any agreement related to this Trust Deed Note; (c)
any Maker defaults under any loan, extension of credit security agreement, purchase or sales
agreement, or any other in favor of any other creditor or person that may materially affect any
Maker's property or any Maker's ability to repay this Trust Deed Note or perform Makers'
obligations under this Trust Deed Note or any of the Related Documents; (d) any representation
or statement made or furnished to Holder by any Maker or on any Maker's behalf is false or
misleading in any material respect either now or at the time made or furnished; (e) any Maker
dissolves (regardless of whether election to continue is made), any member withdraws from any
Maker, any member dies, or any of the members of any Mak.er becomes insolvent, a receiver is
appointed for any part of any Maker's property, any Maker makes an assignment for the benefit
of creditors, or any proceeding is commenced either by any Maker or against any Maker under
any bankruptcy or insolvency laws; (f) any creditor tries to take any of any Maker's property on
or in which Holder has a lien or security interest; (g) a material adverse change occurs in any
Maker's financial condition, or Holder believes the prospect of payment or performance of the
Indebtedness is impaired; (h) Holder in good faith deems itself insecure.
9. Default Interest Rate. Notwithstanding anything above to the contrary, if default
occurs in the payment of any principal, interest, fee or cost, when due, or if any Event of Default
occurs hereunder, time being of the essence hereof, if said default remains uncured for five (5)
calendar days, thereafter, all outstanding Principal Indebtedness shall bear interest at a default
rate of thirty-five percent (35%) until paid, both before and after judgment. If this Trust Deed
Note becomes in default or payment is accelerated, Makers agree to pay to the Holder of the
Trust Deed Note all collections costs, including reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses
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incurred both before and after judgment, including any bankruptcy proceeding or appeal, in
addition to all other sums due under this Trust Deed Note.
10. Application of Payments. Any and all payments by any Maker under this Trust Deed
Note shall be applied as follows: first, to the repayment of any Holder Expenditures advanced by
Holder under this Trust Deed Note; second, to the payment of any late charges; third, to the
payment of accrued interest on the Principal Indebtedness; and fourth, to the payment ofthe
Principal Indebtedness.
11. Extension. The time for any payment required under this Trust Deed Note may be
extended from time to time at the sole discretion of the Holder. Makers agree to pay to Holder
an extension fee in the sum of ten percent (10%) of the Total Indebtedness then outstanding
under this Trust Deed Note (the "Extension Fee"). The Extension Fee shall be paid to Monitor
Finance, L.C./First Capital Funding, L.C., at 3191 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604. In
addition to the Extension Fee, Makers further agree to pay any and all documentation and
recording costs incurred in the preparation of said extension. Both the Extension Fee and the
extension documentation costs shall be due and payable at the time the extension is executed.
Acceptance by Holder of any additional security or guarantees for the performance of the terms
and provisions contained in this Trust Deed Note shall not in any way affect the liability of an
individual Maker.
12. Governing Law. This Trust Deed Note has been delivered to Holder in the State of
Utah. If there is a lawsuit, Makers agree upon Holder's request to submit to the jurisdiction of
the courts of Utah County, the State of Utah. This Trust Deed Note shall be governed by and
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.

13. Joint and Several Liability. In the event this Trust Deed Note is executed, endorsed,
guaranteed or assumed by more than one person, corporation, or any other entity, all of the
parties shall be jointly and severally liable and do hereby waive presentment, demand, protest
and notice of non-payment and of protest. Furthermore, each of the parties hereto agrees that
his, her or its obligation shall continue in full force and effect notwithstanding the death,
bankruptcy (or commencement thereof), dissolution or release of any other party and
notwithstanding the taking or release of other or additional security and notwithstanding any
waiver, amendment or modification (including, but not limited to, extensions of time or
perfonnance) by the holder of this Trust Deed Note as to the obligations under this Trust Deed
Note or under any other Loan Document of any of the other parties, with or without notice.
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, each of the parties to this Trust Deed Note agree
that a separate action or actions may be brought against him, her or it, whether or not such action
is brought against any of the other parties to this Trust Deed Note.
14. Interest Limitation. All agreements between the parties to this Trust Deed Note and
the Holder of this Trust Deed Note are hereby expressly limited so that in no contingency or
event whatsoever, whether by reason of deferment or advancement of the proceeds of the loan
evidenced by this Trust Deed Note, acceleration of maturity of the Loan, or otherwise shall the
amount paid or agreed to be paid to Holder for the use, forbearance or detention of the money to
be loaned under this Trust Deed Note exceed the maximum interest rate pe1missible under
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applicable Jaw. If, from any circumstance whatsoever, fulfillment of any provision of this Trust
Deed Note or of any other agreement between the parties to this Trnst Deed Note and the Holder,
at the time perfonnance of such provision shall be due, shall involve transcending the limit of
validity prescribed by law, then, ipso facto, the obligation to be fulfilled shall be reduced to the
limit of such validity. In the event that any payment is received by the Holder of this Trust Deed
Note which would otherwise be deemed to by a payment of interest in excess of the maximum
allowed by law, such payment shall be deemed to have been paid on account of principal at the
time of receipt. This provision shall never be superseded or waived and shall control every other
provision of the Trust Deed Note and all agreements between the pa1iies and the holder of this
Trnst Deed Note.

15. General Provisions. Both Holder and Maker acknowledge and agree that any and all
monies provided by Holder to Maker pursuant to the terms hereof are for a business purpose.
Holder may delay or forego enforcing any of its rights or remedies under this Trust Deed Note
without losing them. Upon any change in the tem1s of this Trnst Deed Note, and unless
otherwise expressly stated in writing, no party who sign this Trust Deed Note, whether as maker,
guarantor, accommodation maker or endorser, shall be released from liability. All such parties
agree that Holder may renew or extend (repeatedly and for any length of time) this loan, or
release any party or guarantor or collateral; or impair, fail to realize upon or perfect Holder's
security interest in the collateral; and take any other action deemed necessary by Holder without
the consent of or notice to anyone. All such parties also agree that Holder may modify this Trust
Deed Note without the consent of or notice to anyone other than the party with whom the
modification is made.
DATED this~ day of

~Qfd!)t}pj_k

, 2005.

MAKERS:

Michael J. Mill~

M & S Developm

, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company

B y : - - - -- - - - -

Its:
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On December 30, 2005, Michael Millward and M&S Development, executed a
Note and Trnst Deed in favor of Monitor Finance, L.<:;. a11d First Capital Funding, L.C. in
the amount of $244,000.00. The Trnst Deed was iecorded as Entry No. · 20528398 in the
records of the Bannock County, Idaho, Recorder. ·
The parties hereby modify said Trust Deed Note as follows:
• The Note will be expanded to include,the follow£ng draws:
q 8/14/07
$75,000.00
o 9/4/07
$25,000.00
o 9/19/07
$7,400.00
o 10/25/07
$100,000.00
o 3/1/08
$10,000.00
The parties acknowledge that the same terms and conditions of the original Note and ·
Trust Deed will apply to the run ended amount .and terms.

.r

Date: 3/3/08

Momlor Fi ce, L.C.
By: Miles C. Pitcher
Its: Iy.lan~ging Member
, -

/J

·. ,/),
[_'-c-,J
~,,u-~···,.>~--e____
tJirst Capital Funding, L.C.
By: Derek Ollivier
Its: Member

. '""-.

Acknowledged by:
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TRUST DEED, ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS,
SECURITY AGREEMENT AND
FIXTURE FILING

This Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing (the "Trust
Deed") is made and executed this 30th day of December, 2005 (the "Closing Date"), by M&S
Development, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company ( "Trustor") whose address is 1801 N. ARTHUR
STE c, POCATELLO, ID 83 204
, and Pioneer Title Company as Trustee ("Trustee"), in
favor of Monitor Finance, L.C. as to an undivided 50% interest whose address is 3191 North
Canyon Road, Provo, UT 84604, and First Capital Funding, L.C. as to an undivided 50%
interest whose address is 3191 North Canyon Road, Provo, UT 84604 ("Beneficiary") .

Beneficiary has loaned monies to Trustor and the transaction is memorialized by that
certain Promissory Note dated December 30, 2005 executed by Trustor in favor of Beneficiary in
the amount of Two Hundred Forty Four Thousand Dollars ($244,000.00) (the "Note").
See attached "Exhibit A"

In exchange for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and legal sufficiency of
which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:
ARTICLE I GRANT AND CONVEYANCE

1.1

General Grant. Trustor hereby assigns, grants, bargains, sells, conveys, warrants,
and transfers to Trustee in trust, for the Benefit of Beneficiary, with power of sale,
and right of entry and possession, the following described property (the "Real
Property''):
1.1.1 Real Property. All right, title, interest and estate of Trustor, now
owned or hereafter acquired, in and to the real property located in
Bannock County, State ofldaho (the "Real Property") as more particularly
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this
reference.
1.1.2 Buildings, Improvements and Interests. All right, title, interest and
estate of Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to: (a) All
buildings, improvements, works, structures, facilities and fixtures,
including any future additions to, and improvements and betterments now
or hereafter constructed upon, and all renewals and replacements of, any
of the foregoing, which are now or hereafter shall be constructed or
affixed or constructively affixed to the Property, or to any portion of the
Real Property (the "Improvements"). (b) All easements, licenses, streets,
ways, alleys, roads, passages, rights-of-way, minerals, oil, gas and other
hydrocarbon substances, development rights, air rights, water, water

106 of 325

r

20S28398

courses, water rights, and water stock (whether now owned or hereafter
acquired by Trnstor and whether arising by virtue of land ownership,
contract or otherwise), of any kind and nature, relating to or in any way
appurtenant or appertaining to the Real Property or to any portion of the
Real Property.
1.1.3 Tenements, Hereditaments. All right, title, interest and estate of
Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to all of the tenements,
hereditaments, rights, privileges, and appurtenances belonging, relating, or
in any way appertaining to any of the Real Property or the Improvements,
or any po1iion of the Real Property or the Improvements, or which shall
hereafter in any way belong, relate, or in any way appertain thereto,
whether now owned or hereafter acquired, and the reversion and
reversions, remainder and remainders, and estates, rights, titles, interests
possessions claims, and demands of every natures whatsoever, at law or in
equity, which Truster may have or may hereafter acquire in and to the
Real Property, the Improvements, or any portion thereof.

1.1.4 Leases. Rents. Issues, Etc. All right, title, interest and estate of
Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to all leases and
subleases of all or any portion of the Real Property or the Improvements
now or hereafter existing or entered into, and all lease agreements and
documents evidencing the same, including without limitation, any tenant
leases for all or a portion of the Real Property; and all right, title and
interest of Trustor thereunder, including without limitation, all rents, subrents, room rents and other amounts received for use of any portion of the
Real Property, including the Improvements, and any and all room rental
agreements and arrangements now owned or hereafter acquired, and all
proceeds from such room rents, issues, royalties, security deposits, income
and profits of and from the Real Property, the Improvements, or any
portion thereof.
1.2
Security Interest. Tmstor hereby assigns and grants to Beneficiary a
security interest in the following described property (collectively the
"Personalty"), whether now or hereafter existing, and in which Truster now has or
hereafter obtains any right, title, estate or interest, together with all additions and
accessions thereto and all rents and proceeds thereof:
1.2.1 Tangible Personal Property. All right, title, interest, and estate of
Truster, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and to: (a) All furniture,
fixtures and equipment and inventory as equipment inventory are defined
in the Uniform Commercial Code, wherever located, and all related right,
title and interest of Truster, now owned or hereafter acquired or created,
all proceeds and products of the foregoing and all additions and accessions
to, replacements of. insurance or condemnation proceeds of. and
documents covering any of the foregoing, all leases of any of the
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foregoing, and all rents, revenues, issues, profits and proceeds arising from
the sale, lease, license, encumbrance collection, or any other temporary or
permanent disposition of any of the foregoing or any interest therein.
1.2.2 Awards. All right, title, interest and estate of Trustor, now owned
or hereafter acquired, in and to: (a) All awards made for the taking by
eminent domain or by any proceeding or purchase in lieu thereof of the
Real Property or Personalty or any portion of the Real Property or
Pesonalty, the Improvements or any portion of the Improvements, or of
any other Improvements now or hereafter situate thereon or any estate or
easement in the Property (including any awards for change of grade of
streets); (b) All insurance polic ies and all proceeds of insurance paid on
account of any partial or total destruction of the Improvements or any
portion thereof; (c) All causes of action and recoveries for any loss or
diminution in the value of the Real Property or Personalty or the
Improvements; and (d) All proceeds of each of the foregoing.
1.2.3 General Intangibles. All general intangibles of Trustor, presently
existing or hereafter arising, including general intangibles as defined in the
Uniform Commercial Code, choses in action, proceeds, contracts,
distributions, dividends, refunds, secu1ity deposits, judgments, insurance
claims, any right to payment of any nature, intellectual property rights or
licenses, any other rights or assets of trustor customarily or for accounting
purposes classified as general intangibles, and all documentation and
supporting information related to any of the foregoing all rents, profits and
issues thereof, and all proceeds thereof.
1.3
Security Agreement. This Trust Deed constitutes a Security
Agreement with respect to the Personalty, and Beneficiary shall have all the rights
and remedies of a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code of Utah as
well as all other rights and remedies available at Jaw or in equity. Trustor and
Beneficiary acknowledge their mutual intent that all security interests
contemplated herein are given as a contemporaneous exchange for new value to
Trustor, regardless of when advances to Trustor are actually made or when the
Trust Estate is acquired.
1.4.
Fixture Filing. This Trust Deed is intended to be a fixture filing
under Utah Code Annotated; Section 70A-9-402. The addresses of the Secured
Party (Beneficiary) and the debtor (Trustor) from which information may be
obtained concerning this security interest granted hereunder are set forth in
Section 12.1 herein. This Trust Deed is to be recorded in the real estate records
in the County Recorder's office of the county in which the Real Property is
located. Trustor is the record owner of the Real Property.
1.5
Trust Estate. The Real Property, the Improvements and the
Personalty are sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Trust Estate".
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ARTICLE II OBLIGATION SECURED
2.1
Obligations. This Trust Deed is given for the purpose of securing
the following obligations (collectively the "Obligations") ofTrustor:
2.1 .1 Note. The payment and performance of each and every
agreement and obligation under the Note, including without limitation, the
payment of principal and interest under the Note.
2.1.2 Other Loan Documents. The payment and perfo1mance of
each and every agreement and obligation ofTrustor under this Trust Deed,
the Note, and any other Loan Document.
2.1.3 Advances by Trustee or Beneficiary. The payment of all
sums expended and advanced by Trustee or Beneficiary pursuant to the
terms of this Trust Deed, together with interest thereon as provided in this
Trust Deed.
2.1.4 Extensions, Etc. The payment and performance of any
extensions of, renewals of, modifications of, or additional advances under
the Note, or any of the obligations evidenced by the Note, regardless of
the extent of or the subject matter of any such extension, renewal,
modification or additional advance.
2.1.5 Other Obligations. The payment and performance of any
other note or obligation reciting that it is secured by this Trust Deed.
Truster expressly acknowledges its mutual intent with Beneficiary that the
security interest created by this Trust Deed secure any and all present and
future debts, obligations, and liabilities of Truster to Beneficiary without
any limitation whatsoever.
ARTICLE III REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
3.1
follows:

Property. Trustor represents and warrants to Beneficiary as

3.1.1 Fee Title. Truster is the owner of fee simple marketable
title in and to the Real Property.
3 .1.2 Defense of Title. Truster shall defend title to the Real
Property and the Improvements against all claims and demands
whatsoever.
3.1.3 Hazardous Material. No Hazardous Materials have been
stored, or improperly used, disposed of, discarded, dumped, or abandoned
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by any person or entity on, in or under the Real Prope1ty or the
Improvements in violation of any Environmental Laws. Truster has
complied with all applicable federal, state and local laws, rules, ordinances
and regulations relating to the storage, transportation, and disposal of
Hazardous Materials on, in or under the Real Property or the
Improvements.
3.2
as follows:

Personalty. Truster further represents and warrants to Beneficiary

3.2.1 Owner of Personalty. Trustor is the owner, or upon
acquisition thereof, will be the owner of the Personalty.
3.2.2 Location of Personalty. The Personalty will be located in
the State of Utah, will not be removed from that state without the prior
written consent of Beneficiary.
ARTICLE IV MAINTENANCE OF TRUST ESTATE
4.1
Maintenance. Truster shall do each of the following: (a) maintain
the Trust Estate at all times in good condition and repair; (b) not commit any
waste of the Trust Estate, or remove, damage, demolish, or structurally alter any
of the Improvements; (c) complete promptly and in good and workmanlike
manner any Improvement on the Real Property; (d) except to the extent that
insurance proceeds are applied by Beneficiary to the satisfaction of the
Obligations in accordance with Article V, restore promptly and in good and
workmanlike manner any of the Improvements or any portion thereof, which may
for any reason be damaged or destroyed; (e) comply at all times with all laws,
ordinances, regulations, covenants, and restrictions in any manner affecting the
Trust Estate; (f) not commit or permit any act upon the Trust Estate in violation of
law; and (g) do all acts which by reason of the character or use of the Trust Estate
may be reasonably necessary to maintain and care for the same, the specific
enumeration herein not excluding the general.
ARTICLE V INSURANCE

5.1
Insurance. Trustor shall secure and maintain in force on the Trnst
Estate commercial general liability insurance. All such insurance policies must
cover all risks required to be covered by Beneficiary, comply with any
requirements set forth in the Sales Agreement and be approved by Beneficiary as
to amount, form, terms, deductibles and insurer. All such policies of insurance
shall name Beneficiary as an additional insured or loss payee, as appropriate. All
such insurance policies shall contain a provision that such policies will not be
cancelled or amended, which term shall include any reduction in the scope or
limits of coverage, without at least thirty (30) days prior written notice to
Beneficiary.
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5.2
Notice of Casualty. In the event of loss or damage to the Trust
Estate, or any portion of the Trust Estate, Trustor shall immediately give notice
thereof to Beneficiary.
5.3
Proceeds ofinsurance. All proceeds of insurance on the Trust
Estate, and all causes of action, claims, compensation, awards and recoveries for
any damage, condemnation or taking of all or any part of the Trust Estate, or for
any damage or injury to it or for any loss or diminution in the value of the Trust
Estate, are hereby assigned to and shall be paid to Beneficiary, except as
otherwise provided in the Sales Agreement. Beneficiary may participate in any
suits or proceedings relating to any such proceeds, causes of action, claims,
compensation, awards or recoveries.
5.4
Disposition of Policies on Foreclosure. In the event Beneficiary
exercises the power of sale or foreclosure provisions of this Trust Deed or makes
any other transfer of title or assignment of the Trust Estate in extinguishment in
whole or in part of the Obligations, all right, title and interest ofTrustor in and to
the policies of insurance required by Section 5. I shall inure to the benefit of and
pass to the transferee of the interests conveyed under this Trust Deed or to the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale, as the case may be.
ARTICLE VI INDEMNIFICATION AND OFF-SET
6.1
Indemnification. Trustor hereby indemnifies and holds
Beneficiary ha1mless in accordance with the following:
6. I. I General Indemnification. Trnstor shall indemnify and hold
Beneficiary harmless from any and all losses, damages, claims, causes of
action, suits, debts, obligations, or liabilities which arise from or relate to,
the Note, this Trust Deed, but excluding any such claims based upon
breach or default by Beneficiary or gross negligence or wilful misconduct
of Beneficiary. If Beneficiary commences an action against Trustor to
enforce any of the terms, covenants or conditions of this Trust Deed or
because of the breach by Trustor of any of the terms, covenants, or
conditions, or for the recovery of any sum secured hereby, Trustor shall
pay to Beneficiary reasonable attorneys fees and costs actually incurred by
Beneficiary. The right to such attorneys fees and costs shall be deemed to
have accrued on the commencement of such action, and shall be
enforceable whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment. If
Truster breaches any term, covenant or condition of this Trust Deed,
Beneficiary may employ an attorney or attorneys to protect Beneficiary's
rights hereunder and in the event of such employment following any
breach of Truster, Trustor shall pay Beneficiary reasonable attorneys fees
and costs actually incuned by Beneficiary, whether or not action is
actually commenced against Trustor by reason of such material breach.
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6.1 .2 Mechanics Liens. If Beneficiary or the Real Property is
held liable or could be held liable for, or is subject to any losses, damages,
costs, charges or expenses, directly or indirectly on account of any claims
for work, labor, or material furnished in connection with or arising from
the construction of any building, fixture and improvements, then Trustor
shall indemnify, defend and hold Beneficiary harmless from all liability or
expense arising therefrom including reasonable attorneys fees and costs.
6.1.3 Hazardous Materials. Trustor hereby agrees to indemnify,
hold harmless and defend (by counsel of Beneficiary's choice)
Beneficiary, its directors, officers, employees, agent, successors and
assigns from and against any and all claims, losses, damages, liabilities,
fines, penalties, charges, administrative and judicial proceedings and
orders, judgments, remedial action requirements, enforcement actions of
any kind, and all costs and expenses incurred in connection therewith
(including but not limited to attorneys' fees and expenses), arising directly
or indirectly, in whole or in part, out of (a) the presence on or under the
Real Property of any Hazardous Materials, or any releases or discharges of
any Hazardous Materials on, under or off the Real Property, or (b) any
activity carried on or undertaken on or off the Real Property, whether prior
to or during the term of the Note, and whether by Trustor or any
predecessor in title or any employees, agents, contractors or
subcontractors of Trustor or any predecessor in title, or any third persons
at any time occupying or present on the Real Property, in connection with
the handling, treatment, removal, storage, decontamination, clean-up,
transport or disposal of any Hazardous Materials at any time located or
present on or under the Real Property. The foregoing indemnity shall
further apply to any residual contamination on or under the Real Property,
or affecting any natural resources, and to any contamination of any
property or natural resources arising in connection with the generation,
use, handling, storage, transport or disposal of any such Hazardous
Materials, and irrespective of whether any of such activities were or will
be undertaken in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, codes and
ordinances. Truster hereby acknowledges and agrees that,
notwithstanding any other provision of this Trust Deed or any of the other
Purchase Documents to the contrary, the obligations of Truster under this
Section 6.1.3 shall be unlimited personal obligations of Trustor and shall
survive any foreclosure under this Trust Deed, any transfer in lieu thereof,
and any satisfaction of the obligations ofTrustor in connection with the
Note. Trustor acknowledges that Beneficiary's appraisal of the Real
Property is such that Beneficiary would not extend the Note but for the
personal liability undertaken by Truster for the obligations under this
Section 6.1.4.
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6.2
Off-Set. All sums payable by Trustor under the Note and this
Trust Deed shall be paid without notices, demand, counterclaim, set-off,
deduction or defense and without abatement, suspension, deferment, diminution
or reduction. The Obligations and liabilities of Trustor hereunder shall in no way
be released, discharged or otherwise affected (except as expressly provided
herein) by reason of: (a) any damage to or destruction of, or any condemnation or
similar taking of the Trust Estate or any part thereof; (b) any destruction or
prevention of or interference with any use of the Tmst Estate or any part thereof;
(c) any title defect or encumbrance or any eviction from the Trust Estate or any
part thereof by title paramount or otherwise; (d) any bankruptcy, insolvency,
reorganization, composition, adjustment, dissolution, liquidation or other like
proceeding relating to Beneficiary, or any action taken with respect to this Trust
Deed by any tmstee or any action taken with respect to this Trust Deed by any
trustee or receiver of Beneficiary, or by any court, in any such proceeding; (e)
any claim which Trustor has or might have against Beneficiary; (f) the occurrence
of an Event of Default or any default or failure on the pai1 of Beneficiary to
perform or comply with any of the tenns, covenants or conditions of this Trust
Deed or of any other agreement with Trustor; or (g) any other occurrence
whatsoever, whether similar or dissimilar to the foregoing.
ARTICLE VII TAXES AND IMPOSITIONS
7.1
Payment of Taxes and Impositions. Trustor shall pay, prior to
delinquency, all real property taxes and assessments, general and special, and all
other taxes, assessments and other governmental, municipal, or other charges or
impositions of any kind or nature whalsoever (including without limitation,
charges and assessments on water or water stocks used on or with the Real
Property and levies or charges resulting from covenants, conditions and
restrictions affecting the Trust Estate) which are assessed or imposed upon the
Trust Estate, or become due and payable, and which create, may create, or appear
to create, a lien upon the Trust Estate or any portion of the Trust Estate, or upon
any equipment or other facility used in the construction, operation or maintenance
of the Trust Estate (all of which taxes, assessments and other governmental
charges of like nature are referred to as the "Impositions"); provided, however,
that if, by law, any such Imposition is payable, or may at the election of the
taxpayer be paid in installments, Trustor may pay the same together with any
accmed interest on the unpaid balance of such Imposition in installments as the
same become due and before any fine, penalty, interest or cost may be added
thereto for the nonpayment of any such installment and interest.

7.2
Evidence of Payment. Unless such Imposition is paid directly by
Beneficiary pursuant to Section 8.3, Trustor shall furnish Beneficiary, within
thirty (30) days after the date upon which such Imposition is due and payable by
Trustor, official receipts of the appropriate taxing authority, or other proof
satisfactory to Beneficiary, evidencing the payment thereof.
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7.3
Right to Contest. Trustor shall have the right before any
delinquency occurs to contest or object to the amount or validity of any
Imposition by appropriate legal proceedings, but such contest shall not be deemed
or construed in any way as relieving, modifying or extending Trnstor's covenant
to pay any such Imposition at the time and in the manner provided in Section 7. I
unless Trustor has given prior written notice to Beneficiary of Trustor's intent to
so contest or object to an Imposition, and unless, at Beneficiary's option, (a)
Trustor shall demonstrate to Beneficiary's satisfaction that the legal proceedings
shall conclusively operate to prevent the sale of the Trust Estate, or any part
thereof, to satisfy such Imposition prior to final determination of such
proceedings; or (b) Trnstor shall furnish a good and sufficient undertaking and
sureties as may be required or permitted by law to accomplish a stay of such
proceedings.
ARTICLE VIII ADDITIONAL COVENANTS
8.1
Payment of Utilities. Trustor shall pay when due all utility charges
incurred by Trustor for the benefit of the Trust Estate or which may become a
charge or lien against the Trust Estate for gas, electricity, water or sewer services
furnished to the Trust Estate and all assessments or charges of a similar nature,
whether public or private, affecting the Trust Estate or any portion thereof.
whether or not such assessments or charges are liens thereon.
8.2
Reserves for Taxes and Insurance. In furtherance of Article V and
Article VII of this Trust Deed and anything to the contrary herein
notwithstanding, if any Event of Default shall occur and be continuing, and at
Beneficiary's written request, Trustor shall deposit with Beneficiary in a noninterest bearing account, on the first day of each month, until the Note is paid in
full, an amount equal to one-twelfth of the annual Impositions, as defined in
Article VII, as reasonably estimated by Beneficiary to pay the installment of
Impositions next due on the Trust Estate, and one-twelfth of the estimated annual
aggregate insurance premiums on all policies of insurance required in Article V.
In such event, Trustor shall cause all bills, statements or other documents relating
to the Impositions and insurance premiums to be sent to Beneficiary. Providing
Trustor has deposited sufficient funds with Beneficiary pursuant to this Section
8.2, Beneficiary shall pay such amounts as may be due thereunder out of the funds
so deposited with Beneficiary. If at any time and for any reason the funds
deposited with Beneficiary are or will be insufficient to pay such amounts as may
then or subsequently be due, Beneficiary shall notify Trustor and Trustor shall
immediately deposit an amount equal to such deficiency with Beneficiary.
Nothing contained herein shall cause Beneficiary to be deemed a trnstee of such
funds deposited with Beneficiary pursuant to this Section 8.2. Beneficiary shall
not be obligated to pay any interest on any sums held b y Beneficiary pending
disbursement or application hereunder, and Beneficiary may impound or reserve
for future payment of Impositions and insurance premiums such portion of such
payments as Beneficiary may, in Beneficiary's absolute discretion, deem proper,
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applying the balance on the principal of or interest on the Obligations secured
hereby. Should Trustor fail to deposit with Beneficiary (exclusive of that portion
of the payments which has been applied by Beneficiary on the principal of or
interest on the Note) sums sufficient to fully pay such Impositions and insurance
premiums at least thirty (30) days before delinquency thereof, Beneficiary, at
Beneficiary's election, but without any obligation to do so, may advance any
amounts required to make up the deficiency, which advances, if any, shall be
secured by this Trust Deed and shall bear interest and be repayable to Beneficiary
in the manner specified in Section 8.4 of this Trust Deed.
8.3
Performance in Trustor's Stead. Should Trustor fail to make any
payment or to do any act as provided in this Trust Deed, then Beneficiary or
Trustee, but without any obligation to do so, and without notice to or demand
upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: (a)
make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may deem
necessary to protect the security hereof (Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized
to enter upon the Trust Estate for such purposes); commence, appear in and
defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the
rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; or (b) pay, purchase, contest, or
compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either
appears to be superior to the lien of this Trust Deed; and in exercising any such
powers, incur any liability, or expend such reasonable amounts as Beneficiary
may deem necessary therefor, including costs of evidence of title, employment of
attorneys, and payment of reasonable attorney fees and costs. All such amounts
expended by either or both Trustee or Beneficiary shall, at the election of
Beneficiary, be added to the principal indebtedness secured by this Trust Deed
and shall accrue interest in accordance with the terms of the Note. Trustor hereby
waives and releases all claims or causes of action which may hereafter arise in
favor of Trustor against Beneficiary by reason of any action taken by Beneficiary
pursuant to any power or authority granted in this Section 8.3, except for
Beneficiary's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.
8.4
Repayment of Advances. Tmstor shall immediately repay to
Beneficiary sums, with interest thereon as provided in the Note, which at any time
may be paid or advanced by Beneficiary for the payment of insurance premiums,
Impositions, title searches, title reports or abstracts, and any other advances made
by Beneficiary which are reasonably necessary or desirable to maintain this Trust
Deed as a prior, valid, and subsisting lien upon ;the Trust Estate, to preserve and
protect Beneficiary's interest in this Trust Deed, or to preserve, repair, or maintain
the Trust Estate. All such advances shall be wholly optional on the part of
Beneficiary, and Trustor's obligation to repay the same, with interest, to
Beneficiary shall be secured by the lien of this Trust Deed.
No Removal of Fixtures. Tmstor shall not, during the existence of
8.5
this Trust Deed and without the written consent of Beneficiary, remove from the
Real Property or the Improvements, any fixture, structure, or other improvement
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at any time affixed or constructively affixed to the Real Property or the
Improvements or any portion thereof, or any Personalty, except in the ordinary
course of Trnstor's business.
8.6
Further Assurance. Trustor shall execute and deliver to
Beneficiary such further instruments, including without limitation Uniform
Commercial Code Financing Statements and Continuation Statements, and do
such further acts as may be necessary or as may be reasonably required by
Beneficiary to carry out more effectively the purposes of this Trust Deed and to
subject to the lien, security interest and mo1tgage created or intended to be created
hereby any property, rights, or interests covered or intended to be covered by this
Trust Deed. Trnstor authorizes (to the extent such authorization is valid under
applicable law) Beneficiary to execute and file, without Trustor's signature, such
Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statements and Continuation Statements as
Beneficiary may deem necessary in order to perfect, or continue the perfection of
the security interests created by this Trust Deed.
8. 7
Attornment. Trustor shall assign to Beneficiary, as additional
security for Truster's performance of the Obligations, any and all existing or
future lease agreements entered into by Trustor, as landlord, which pertain to the
Property or the Improvements, or any portion thereof, and all such leases shall
contain a covenant on the part of the tenant thereunder, enforceable by
Beneficiary, obligating such tenant upon request of Beneficiary, to attom to and
become a tenant of Beneficiary, or any purchaser form Trustee or through
foreclosure of this Trust Deed, for the unexpired te1m, and subject to the terms
and conditions of such future lease agreements. The assignments of lease shall be
in form and content satisfactory to Beneficiary.
8.8
No Further Encumbrances. As an express condition of Beneficiary
making the loan secured by this Trust Deed, Trustor shall not further encumber,
pledge, mortgage, hypothecate, place any lien, charge or claim upon, or otherwise
give as security the Trust Estate or nay interest therein, not cause or allow by
operation of law the encumbrance of the Trust Estate or any interest therein
without the written consent of Beneficiary even though such encumbrance may be
junior to the encumbrance created by this Trust Deed. Encumbrance of the Trust
Estate contrary to the provisions of this Section 8.9 without the express written
consent of Beneficiary, shall constitute an Event of Default and at Beneficiary's
option, Beneficiary may declare the entire balance of principal and interest
immediately due and payable, whether the same be created by Trustor or an
unaffiliated third party asserting a judgment lien, mechanic's or materialmen's
lien or any other type of encumbrance or title defect.
8.9
Due on Sale. Other than (a) a transfer by devise, descent or by
operation oflaw upon the death of a joint tenant; (b) a transfer of Personalty in the
ordinary course of Trustor's business; or (c) the grant of any leasehold interest of
three (3) years or less not containing an option to purchase, Trustor shall not sell,
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convey or otherwise transfer the Trust Estate or any part thereof or interest
therein, without the prior written consent of Beneficiary. If the Trust Estate, or
any part thereof, or any interest therein, is sold, conveyed or otherwise transfe1Ted
without the prior written consent of Beneficiary, or ifTrustor be divested of title
to the Trust Estate, or any part thereof or involuntarily, then the full principal
indebtedness of the Note and the other Obligations, at the option of Beneficiary
and without demand or notice, shall inunediately become due and payable. It is
expressly acknowledged and agreed that any transfer of more than twenty-five
percent (25%) of the capital stock, partnership or member interests ofTrustor, as
the case may be, shall constitute a transfer of the entire Trust Estate within the
meaning of this Section 8.9.
8.10 Evidence of Title. Trustor shall deliver to, pay for and maintain
with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is pain in full, such
evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or policies
of title insurance and any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements or
endorsements thereto.
8.11 Additional Collateral. If, at any time, the value of all of the Trust
Estate, based on an appraisal acceptable to Beneficiary, is not sufficient to
establish a ratio between the total amount of the Obligations then due and owing
and the value of all of the Trust Estate equal to or less than one hundred percent
(100%), Truster shall provide Beneficiary with such additional collateral as is
necessary so that the total value of all collateral securing Trustor's perfonnance of
the Obligations is sufficient to establish a ratio between the total amount of the
Obligations due and owing and the value of all such collateral of no more than
one hundred percent (100%).
8.12 Compliance With Laws. Trustor shall company with all laws,
ordinances, regulations, easement agreements, covenants, conditions, and
restrictions (including laws relating to hazardous wastes and/or protection of the
environment, or species of plants or animals protected by federal, state, local or
other law) affecting the Trust Estate. Trustor shall not cause, permit nor suffer
any violation of any of the foregoing and shall pay all response costs, fees, or
charges of any kind in connection therewith and defend, indemnify, and hold
hannless Beneficiary with respect thereto.
8.13 Financial Statements. Trustor shall keep adequate books and
records of account of the Trust Estate and its own financial affairs sufficient to
permit the preparation of financial statements therefrom in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles. Beneficiary shall have the right to
examine, copy and audit Trustor's records and books of account at all reasonable
times. Truster shall furnish to Beneficiary copies of its financial statements and
other financial information satisfactory to Beneficiary at the time and in the
manner provided in the Loan Agreement.
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8.14 Inspections. Beneficiary, and its agents, representatives and
employees, are authorized, but not obligated, to enter at any reasonable time upon
the Real Property for the purpose of inspecting the same, and for the purpose of
performing any of the acts it or Trustor is authorized to perform under the terms
of this Trust Deed or any other Loan Document.
8.15 No Merger. If the Trust Estate is under any lease or any portion
thereof whi ch constitutes a part of the Trust Estate shalI at any tim e becom e
vested in one owner, this Trust Deed and the lien created hereby shall not be
destroyed or terminated by application of the doctrine of merger and, in such
event, Beneficiary shall continue to have and enjoy all of the rights and privileges
of Beneficiary as to the separate estates. In addition, upon the foreclosure of the
lien created by This Trust Deed on the Trust Estate pursuant to the provisions of
this Trust Deed, any leases or subleases then existing and created by Trustor shall
not be destroyed or terminated by application of the law of merger or as a matter
of law or as a result of such foreclosure unless Beneficiary or any purchaser at
any such foreclosure sale shall so elect. No act by or on behalf of Beneficiary or
any such purchaser shall constitute a tennination of any lease or sublease unless
Beneficiary or such purchaser shall give written notice thereof to such tenant or
subtenant.
ARTICLE IX CONDEMNATION AW ARDS

9 .1
If the Trust Estate or any portion thereof should be taken or
damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation proceeding,
Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or
relief therefor, and shall be entitled at Beneficiary's option to commence, appear
in, and prosecute in Beneficiary's own name any action or proceeding, and to
make any compromise or settlement, in cormection with such taking. Trustor
shall promptly give notice to Beneficiary of any condemnation proceeding or any
taking for public improvement. All such compensation, awards, damages, causes
of action, proceeds, or other payments are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, which
may, after deducting therefrom all costs and expenses (regardless of the particular
nature thereof and whether incurred with or without suit or before or after
judgment), including reasonable attorney fees, incurred by Beneficiary in
connection with such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action, proceeds,
or other payments, release any and all moneys so received by Beneficiary or apply
the same, or any portion thereof, on any of the Obligations (whether or not then
due) secured by this Trust Deed. Beneficiary shall have no obligation to apply
proceeds of condemnation to restore or repair damage to the Trust Estate
regardless of whether such taking has a significant adverse impact on the
operation of the remaining portion of the Trust Estate. Truster shall execute and
deliver to Beneficiary such further assignments of such compensation, awards,
damages, causes of action, proceeds, or other payments as Beneficiary may from
time to time require.
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ARTICLE X ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES. RENTS AND INCOME
10.1 Assigrunent. Trustor hereby absolutely assigns to Trustee all right,
title and interest of Trustor in and to all leases now existing or hereafter entered
into by Trustor and demising the whole or any pa11 of the Trust Estate, and does
hereby further assign any and all rents, subrents, room rents and other amounts
received for the use of any rooms in the Trust Estate, including the Improvements,
and any and all room rental agreements and arrangements now owned or hereafter
acquired, and all proceeds from such room rents, covering the Trust Estate or any
portion thereof, now or hereafter existing or entered into, together with issues,
royalties, income, profits and security deposits of and from the Trust Estate. Unti I
the occurrence of an Event of Default, Trustor may, under a temporary revocable
license granted hereby, collect and use all such rents, subrents, room rents, issues,
royalties, income, and profits which become payable prior to default. Upon the
occurrence of an Event or Default, Trustor's license to collect and use any of such
proceeds shall immediately cease without further action by or on behalf of any
party, and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without taking possession of
the Trust Estate, and either in person, by agent, or through a court-appointed
receiver (Trustor hereby consents to the appointment of Beneficiary or
Beneficiary's designee as such receiver), to sue for or otherwise collect all such
rents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties, income, and profits, including those
past due and unpaid. Any sums so collected, after the deduction of all costs and
expenses of operation and collection (regardless of the particular nature thereof
and whether incurred with or without suit or before or after judgment), including
reasonable attorney fees, shall be applied toward the payment of the Obligations.
Such right of collection and use of such proceeds by Beneficiary shall obtain both
before and after the exercise of the power of sale provisions of this Trust Deed,
the foreclosure of this Trust Deed and throughout any period of redemption . The
rights granted under this Section 10.1 shall in no way be dependent upon and shall
apply without regard to whether all or a portion of the Trust Estate is in danger of
being lost, removed, or materially injured, or whether the Trust Estate or any
other security is adequate to discharge the obligations secured by this Trust Deed.
Beneficiary's failure or discontinuance at any time to collect any of such proceeds
shall not in any manner affect the right, power, and authority of Beneficiary
thereafter to collect the same. Neither any provision contained herein, nor the
Beneficiary's exercise of Beneficiary's right to collect such proceeds, shall be, or
be constmed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease, sublease,
option, or other interest in the Trust Estate, or an assumption of liability under, or
a subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to, any tenancy, lease,
sublease, option, or other interest in the Trust Estate. All tenants, lessees,
sublessees and other persons which have any obligation to make any payment to
Trustor in connection with the Trust Estate or any portion thereof are hereby
authorized and directed to pay rents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties,
income, and profits payable t\by them with respect to the Trust Estate, or any part
thereof, directly to Beneficiary on the demand of Beneficiary. Beneficiary's
receipt of such rents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties, income, and profits
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shall be a good and sufficient discharge of the obligation of the tenant lessee,
sublessee, or other person concerned to make the payment connected with the
amount so received by the Trustee.
10.2 Application of Payments. If at any time during the term of this
Trust Deed Beneficiary receives or obtains a payment, installment, or sum which
is less than the entire amount then due under the Note secured by this Trust Deed
and under all other instruments further evidencing or securing the Obligations,
then Beneficiary shall, except as provided otherwise in the Note and
notwithstanding any instructions which may be given by Trustor, have the right to
apply such payment, installment, or sum, or any pait thereof, to such of the items
or obligations then due from Trustor or to Beneficiary as Beneficiary may in
Beneficiary's sole discretion determine.
10.3 No Waiver of Rights by Collection of Proceeds. The entering
upon and taking possession of the Trust Estate or any portion of the Trust Estate
or the collection ofrents, subrents, room rents, issues, royalties, income, profits,
proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any
taking or damaging of the Trust Estate, or the application or release thereof as
aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any Event of Default or notice of default
hereunder, shall not invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice of default, and
shall not operate to postpone or suspend the obligation to make, or have the effect
of altering the size of any scheduled installments provided for in any of the
Obligations secured by this Trust Deed.
10.4 Indemnification. Trustor shall indemnify, pay, protect, defend and
hold Beneficiary harmless from and against all claims, demands, judgments,
liabilities, actions, costs, and fees (including reasonable attorney fees) arising
from or related to receipt by Beneficiary of the rents, subrents, room rents, issues,
royalties, income and profit from the Trust Estate or any portion of the Trust
Estate, except those liabilities arising from Beneficiary's own gross negligence
and wilful misconduct.
ARTICLE XI EVENTS OF DEFAULT AND REMEDIES
11.1 Events of Default. Fifteen (15) days after written notice from
Beneficiary to Trustor for monetary defaults and thirty (30) days after written
notice from Beneficiary to Trustor for non-monetary defaults, if such defaults are
not cured within such fifteen (15) day or thirty (30) day periods, respectively,
each of the following shall constitute an event of default under this Trust Deed (an
"Event of Default"):
11 .1.1 Failure to Make Payment. If Trustor shall fail to make any
payment due and payable under the terms of the Note or this Trust Deed.
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11.1.2 Non-Monetary Default. Except as provided otherwise in
Section 11.1.1, failure to observe and perfom1 any of the ten11s, covenants,
or conditions to be observed or perfon11ed in the Note or this Trust Deed.
11.1.3 False Warranty. Any material representation or warranty
of the Trustor contained in the Note or this Trust Deed.
11 .1.4 Insolvency, Etc. If (a) Trustor commences any case,
proceeding, or other action seeking reorganization, arrangement,
adjustment, liquidation, dissolution, or composition of Trustor or Trustor's
debts under any Jaw relating to bankruptcy, reorganization, or relief of
debtors, or seeking appointment of a receiver, trustee, custodian, or other
similar official for Trustor of for all or any substantial part of Trustor's
property; (b) any guarantor of the Note commences any case, proceeding,
or other action seeking reorganization, arrangement, adjustment,
liquidation, dissolution, or composition of such guarantor or such
guarantor's debts under any law relating to bankruptcy, reorgani zation, or
relief of debtors, or seeking appointment of a receiver, trustee, custodian,
or other similar official for such guarantor or for any substantial part of
such guarantor's property; or (c) any such case, proceeding, or other
action is commenced against either Trustor or any guarantor of the Note.
11.1.5 Failure to Pay Debts. Trustor fails to pay Trustor's debts as
they become due, admits in writing Trustor's inability to pay Trustor's
debts, or makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors.
11.1.6 Failure to Perform Other Obligations. A default by Trustor
under the ten11s of any other promissory note, deed of trust, security
agreement, undertaking or arrangement between Trustor and Beneficiary
now existing or entered into hereafter.
11.2 Acceleration; Notice. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon the
occurrence of any Event of Default under this Trust Deed and following the
expiration of any cure period provided for herein, at Beneficiary's option and in
addition to any other remedy Beneficiary may have under the Note, Beneficiary
may declare all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable and elect to
have the Trust Estate sold in the manner provided herein. In the event
Beneficiary elects to sell the Trust Estate, Beneficiary may execute or cause
Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause the Trust
Estate to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such
notice for record in the office of the County Recorder of the County wherein the
Trust Estate is located. Beneficiary shall also deposit with Trustee the Note and
all documents evidencing expenditures secured by this Trust Deed.
11.3 Exercise of Power of Sale. Upon receipt of such notice from
Beneficiary, Trustee shall cause to be recorded, published and delivered to

16
121 of 325

(

'

Trustor and each Guarantor such Notice of Default and Election to Sell as then
required by Chapter 57 of the Utah Code Annotated. Trustee shall, without
demand on Trustor, after lapse of such time as may be required by law and after
recordation of such Notice of Default and Election to Sell first give notice of the
time and place of such sale, in the manner provided by the laws of the State of
Utah for the sale ofreal property under execution, and may from time to time
postpone such sale by such advertisement as it may deem reasonable, or without
further advertisement, by proclamation made to the persons assembled at the time
and place previously appointed and advertised for such sale, and on the day of
sale so advertised, or to which such sale may have been postponed, Trustee may
sell the Real Property so adve11ised, at public auction, at the time and place
specified in the notice, either in the county in which the Real Property, or any part
thereof, to be sold, is situated, or at the principal office of Trustee located in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, in its discretion, to the highest cash bidder. Trustee
shall execute and deliver to the purchaser a Trustee's Deed conveying the Real
Property so sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The
recitals in the Trustee's Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of
the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale.
Trnstee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (a) the costs and
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of
Trustee's and attorney's fees and costs; (b) cost of any evidence of title procured
in connection with such sale; (c) all sums expended under the terms hereof in
conjunction with any default provision hereunder, not then repaid, with accrued
interest at the rate then provided for in the Note; (d) all sums then secured by this
Trust Deed, including interest and principal on the Note; and (e) the remainder, if
any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or Trustee, in Trustee's
discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the
County wherein the Trust Estate is located.
11.4 Surrender of Possession. Trustor shall surrender possession of the
Trust Estate to the purchaser immediately after the sale of the Trust Estate as
provided in Section 11.3 above, in the event such possession has not previously
been surrendered by Trustor.
11.5 UCC Remedies. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in
Sections 11.3 and 11.4 of this Trust Deed, Beneficiary, with regard to all the
Personalty, shall have the right to exercise, from time to time, any and all rights
and remedies available to Beneficiary, as a secured party under the Unifonn
Conunercial Code of Utah, and any and all rights and remedies available to
Beneficiary under any other applicable law. Upon written demand from
Beneficiary, Truster shall, at Truster's expense, assemble the Personalty and
make them available to Beneficiary at a reasonably convenient place designated
by Beneficiary. Beneficiary shall have the right to enter upon any premises
where the Personalty or records pertaining to Personalty may be and take
possession of the Personalty and records relating to the Personalty. Beneficiary
may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the Personalty and , after
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deducting the reasonable costs and out of pocket expenses incurred by
Beneficiary, including, without limitation, (a) reasonable attorneys fees and legal
expenses, (b) transportation and storage costs, (c) advertising of sale of the
Personalty, (d) sale commissions, (e) sales tax,(£) costs for improving or repairing
the Personalty, and (g) costs for preservation and protection of the Personalty,
apply the remainder to pay, or to hold as a reserve against, the Obligations.
The rights and remedies of Beneficiary upon the occurrence of one or
more Events of Default (whether such rights and remedies are conferred by
statute, by rule oflaw, by this Trust Deed, the Loan Agreement or otherwise) may
be exercised by Beneficiary, either alternatively, concunently, or consecutively in
any order. The exercise of Beneficiary or Trustee at the express direction of
Beneficiary of any one or more of such rights and remedies shall not be construed
to be an election of remedies nor waiver of any other rights and remedies
Beneficiary might have unless, and limited to the extent that, Beneficiary shall
elect or so waive by an instrument in writing delivered to Trustee. Without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, to the extent that this Trust Deed covers
both the Real Property and the Personalty, Beneficiary may, in the sole discretion
of Beneficiary, either alternatively, concunently or consecutively in any order:
a.

Proceed as to the Real Property, Improvements and the Personalty
in accordance with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in respect to
real property.

b.

Proceed as to the Real Property and Improvements in accordance
with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in respect to real property
and proceed as to the Personalty in accordance with Beneficiary's
rights and remedies in respect to the personal property.

Beneficiary may, in the sole discretion of Beneficiary, appoint Trustee as
the agent of Beneficiary for the purpose of disposition of the Personalty in
accordance with the Utah Uniform Commercial Code - Secured Transactions.

If Beneficiary should elect to proceed as to the Real Property,
Improvements and the Personalty in accordance with Beneficiary's rights and
remedies in respect to real property:
c.

All the Personalty may be sold, in the manner and at the time and
place provided in this Trust Deed, in one lot, or in separate lots
consisting of any combination or combinations of the Real
Property, Improvements and Personalty, as the Beneficiary may
elect, in the sole discretion of Beneficiary.

d.

Truster acknowledges and agrees that a disposition of the
Personalty in accordance with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in
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respect to real property, as hereinabove provided, is a
commercially reasonable disposition of the Personalty.
If Beneficiary should elect to proceed as to the Personalty in accordance
with Beneficiary's rights and remedies in respect to personal property,
Beneficiary sha ll have all the rights and remedies conferred on a secured party by
the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by the State of Utah.

11.6 Foreclosure as a Mortgage. If an Event of Default occurs
hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to foreclose this Trust Deed in the
manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mo1igages on real property and
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses
incident thereto, including reasonable attorneys fees and costs in such amounts as
shall be fixed by the court.
11.7 Receiver. If an Event of Default occurs, Beneficiary, as a matter
of right and without regard to the interest of Trustor therein, shall have the right
upon notice to Trustor to apply to any court having jurisdiction to appoint a
receiver or receivers of the Trust Estate and Trustor hereby irrevocably consents
to such appointment. Any such receiver or receivers shall have all the usual
powers and duties of a receiver and shall continue as such and exercise all such
powers w1til completion of the sale of the Trust Estate or the foreclosure
proceeding, unless the receivership is sooner terminated.
11.8 No Remedy Exclusive. No remedy conferred upon or reserved to
Beneficiary under this Trust Deed shall be exclusive of any other available
remedy or remedies, but each and every such remedy shall be cumulative and
shall be in addition to every other remedy given under this Trust Deed or any
other Loan Document, or now or hereafter existing at law or in equity or by
statute. No delay or failure to exercise any right or power accruing upon any
Event of Default shall impair any such right or power or shall be construed to be a
waiver thereof, but any such right and power may be exercised from time to time
and as often as may be deemed expedient.
11.9 Rights upon Default. In making the Note, Beneficiary has relied
upon the rights available to Beneficiary under this Trust Deed upon the
occurrence of an Event of Default, including, but not limited to, the rights to
accelerate the payment of any and all amounts secured by this Trust Deed, to sell
the Real Property encumbered by this Trust Deed pursuant to the power of sale
granted hereunder, the right to foreclose this Trust Deed as a mortgage, and the
right to have a receiver appointed. In addition to any other damages that might be
recoverable by Beneficiary under the terms of this Trust Deed, Trustor shall be
liable for any damages incurred by Beneficiary because Beneficiary is, for any
reason, denied the opportunity to exercise Beneficiary's rights upon the
occurrence of an Event of Default, including, but not limited to, such damages as
are occasioned by depreciation of the Trust Estate, loss ofuse of the Trust Estate
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by Beneficiary, and all opportunity costs incurred through the loss of use of any
funds as would have been received by Beneficiary through exercise of the power
of sale or foreclosure, or the appointment of a receiver.
ARTICLE XII GENERAL PROVISIONS
12.1 Notices. All notices shall be in writing and shall be deemed to
have been sufficiently given or served when personally delivered, deposited in the
United States mail, by registered or certified mail, or deposited with a reputable
overnight mail carrier which provides deli very of such rnai I to be traced,
addressed as follows:
Beneficiary:

Monitor Finance, LC./
First Capital Funding, L.C.
3191 North Canyon Road
Provo, UT 84604

With copies to:

John G. Mulliner
363 North University, Suite 103
P.O. Box 1045
Provo, UT 84603

Trustee:

Trustor:

With copies to:

Such addresses may be changed by notice to the other party given in the
same manner provided in this Section.
12.2 Severability. If any provision of this Trust Deed shall be held or
deemed to be or shall, in fact, be illegal, inoperative, or unenforceable, the same
shall not affect any other provision or provisions contained in the Trust Deed or
render the same invalid, inoperative, or unenforceable to any extent whatsoever.
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by Beneficiary, and all opportunity costs incuITed through the loss of use of any
funds as would have been received by Beneficiary through exercise of the power
of sale or foreclosure, or the appointment of a receiver.
ARTICLE XII GENERAL PROVISIONS

12.1 Notices. All notices shall be in writing and shall be deemed to
have been sufficiently given or served when personally delivered, deposited in the
United States mail, by registered or certified mail, or deposited with a reputable
overnight mail carrier which provides delivery of such mail to be traced,
addressed as follows:
Beneficiary:

Monitor Finance, L.C. /
First Capital Funding, L.C.
3191 North Canyon Road
Provo, UT 84604

With copies to :

John G. Mulliner
363 North University, Suite 103
P.O. Box 1045
Provo, UT 84603

Trustee:

Trustor:

With copies to:

Such addresses may be changed by notice to the other party given in the
same manner provided in this Section.
12.2 Severability. If any provision of this Trust Deed shall be held or
deemed to be or shall, in fact, be illegal, inoperative, or unenforceable, the same
shall not affect any other provision or provisions contained in the Trust Deed or
render the same invalid, inoperative, or unenforceable to any extent whatsoever.
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12.3 Amendments, Changes, and Modifications. This Trust Deed may
not be amended, changed, modified, altered, or terminated without the written
consent of Beneficiary.
12.4 Governing Law. This Trust Deed shall be governed exclusively by
and construed in accordance with the applicable laws of the State of Utah.
12.5 Interpretation. Whenever the context shall include the singular, the
whole shall include any part thereof, and the gender shall include both other
genders. The section headings contained in this Trust Deed are for purposes of
reference only and shall not limit, expand, or otherwise affect the construction of
any provisions hereof.
12.6 Binding Effect. This Trust Deed shall be binding upon Trustor and
Trustor's successors and assigns. This Trust Deed shall inure to the benefit of
Beneficiary, and Beneficiary's successors and assigns, and the holders of any of
the Obligations secured hereby.
12.7 Waivers. Beneficiary's failure at any time or times hereafter to
require strict performance by Trustor of any of undertakings, agreements, or
covenants contained in this Trust Deed shall not waive, affect, or diminish any
right of Beneficiary hereunder to demand strict compliance and performance
therewith. Any waiver by Beneficiary of any Event of Default under this Trust
Deed shall not waive or affect any other Event of Default hereunder, whether such
Event of Default is prior or subsequent thereto and whether of the same or a
different type. None of the undertakings, agreements, or covenants of Trustor
under this Trust Deed, shall be deemed to have been waived by Beneficiary,
unless such waiver is evidenced by an instrument in writing signed by an officer
of Beneficiary and directed to Trustor specifying such waiver.
12.8 Successor Trustee. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at
any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of the county
wherein the Real Property is located, a substitution of trustee. From the time the
substitution is filed for record, the new Trustee shall succeed to all the powers,
duties, authority and title of Trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proofthereofmade in the
manner provided by law.
12.9 Heirs, Successors, Etc., Definitions. This Trust Deed shall apply
to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees,
devisees, administrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of
Trustor hereunder, if more than one party, are joint and several as between them.
The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee,
of the Note secured hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context so requires,
the masculine gender includes both the feminine and neuter, and the singular
·
number includes the plural.
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12.10 Acceptance of Trust. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust
Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by
law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of any pending sale under
any other deed of trust or any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary,
or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee.
12.11 Attorneys' Fees. Trustor agrees to reimburse Beneficiary for any
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs actually incurred by Beneficiary with respect
to any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, or other action involving Trustor or
any guarantor as a debtor.
Trustor additionally agrees to pay all reasonable costs and out of pocket
expenses, including, without limitation, (a) reasonable attorneys fees and legal
expenses, (b) transportation and storage costs, (c) advertising of sale of the Trust
Estate, (d) sale commissions, (e) sales tax, (f) costs for improving or repairing the
Trust Estate, and (g) costs for preservation and protection of the Trust Estate,
incurred by Beneficiary in obtaining possession of Trust Estate, storage and
preparation for sale, sale or other disposition, and otherwise incurred in
foreclosing upon the Trust Estate. Any and all such costs and out of pocket
expenses shall be payable by Trustor upon demand, together with interest thereon
from the date of the advance until repaid, both before and after judgment, at the
rate provided in the Note.
Regardless of any breach or default, Trustor agrees to pay all expenses,
including reasonable attorneys fees and legal expenses incurred by Beneficiary in
any bankruptcy proceedings of any type involving Trustor, the Trust Estate, or
this Trust Deed, including, without limitation, expenses incurred in modifying or
lifting the automatic stay, determining adequate protection, use of cash collateral,
or relating to any plan of reorganization.
12.12 Request for Notice. Trustor requests that a copy of any Notice of
Default and of any Notice of Sale hereunder be mailed to Trustor at the address
for Trustor specified in Section 12.1.
12.13 Limitation on Damages. Beneficiary and its officers, directors,
employees, representatives, agents, and attorneys, shall not be liable to Trustor or
any Guarantor for consequential damages arising from or relating to any breach of
contract, tort, or other wrong in connection with or relating to this Trust Deed or
the Trust Estate.
12.14 Preferential Transfers. If the incurring of any debt by Trustor or
the payment of any money or transfer of property to Beneficiary by or on behalf
of Trustor or any Guarantor should for any reason subsequently be determined to
be "voidable" or "avoidable" in whole or in part within the meaning of any state
or federal law (collectively "voidable transfers"), including, without limitation,
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fraudulent conveyances or preferential transfers under the United States
Bankruptcy Code or any other federal or state law, and Beneficiary is required to
repay or restore any voidable transfers or the amount or any portion thereof, or
upon the advice of Beneficiary's counsel in advised to do so, then, as to any such
amount or property repaid or restored, including all reasonable costs, expenses,
and attorneys fees of Beneficiary related thereto, the liability of Trnstor and
Guarantor, and each of them, and this Trnst Deed, shall automatically be revived,
reinstated and restored and shall exist as though the voidable transfers had never
been made.
12.15 Survival. All agreements, representations, warranties and
covenants made by Trustor shall survive the execution and delivery of this Trust
Deed, the filing and consummation of any bankruptcy proceedings, and shall
continue in effect so long as any obligation to Beneficiary contemplated by this
Trust Deed is outstanding and unpaid, notwithstanding any tennination of this
Trnst Deed. All agreements, representations, wananties and covenants in this
Trust Deed shall run with the land, shall bind the party making the same and its
heirs and successors, and shall be to the benefit of and be enforceable by each
party for whom made and their respective heirs, successors and assigns.
DATED:

DECEMBER 30

,20~.
TRUSTOR:

State of

IDAHO

)

) ss.
County of BANNOCK

)

On this 30th day of DECEMBER
, 2005
, before me, a Notary Public in and for
said State, personally appeared MICHAEL J. MILLWARI>
, known to me to be the
MANAGER
of M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC
'Inc. Iand that (s)he executed the same.
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Exhibit A

0/.;f 'r: OCI\ c 0u1:n 10!\HO

A Tract of land in the South Yi of the South Yi Section 31, Township 6 South, Range 35 East, Boise
Meridian, Bannock County, Idaho, more pa1ticularly described as follows:
Beginning at the South quarter comer of Section 31; thence South 89°36'40" East, 82.68 feet; thence
North 53°44'13" East, 88.1 feet; thence North 26°44'09" West, 320 feet; thence North 63°15'5 I" East,
260 feet; thence North 26°44'09" West 495 .62 feet, more or less, to the Southerly right of way line of
Barton Road; thence South 72°27'20" West along the Southerly right of way of Barton Road 472.74 feet;
thence continuing along the Southerly right of way line of Barton Road, South 83°18'20" West, 389.3
feet, more or less, to the Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail; thence South 26°44 '40" East along the
Easterly line of the Old Stock Trail 791.56 feet, more or less, to the South line of said Section 31; thence
South 89°44' East, 462.23 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning.
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Ron Kerl, Esq. - ISB # 1768
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COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED

151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
(208) 235-1182
Facsimile:
Emai I: ron@cooper-larsen .com

Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

vs.

WILDLIFE RIDGE EST A TES, LLC, an Idaho limited )
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an )
Idaho limited liability company,
)
Defendants.

)
)
)

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company;

)
)
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)

Counter-claimant,
vs.

)
)
)

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
)

Counter-defendant,
__________________
)
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COMES NOW the Plaintiffs and Counter-defendants Monitor Finance, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C., a Utah limited liability company
("First Capital"), by and through their attorney ofrecord, Ron Kerl; and the Defendant and Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC ("Wildlife Ridge"), by and through its attorney of record, A.
Bruce Larson, and stipulate and agree as follows:
1.

In their Complaint on file herein, Monitor and First Capital allege that on the

December 30, 2005, they jointly loaned to Michael Millward andM&S Development, LLC the sum
of $244,000, as evidenced by a Trust Deed Note dated December 30, 2005, in the principal sum of
$244,000, both principal and interest being payable in words and figures as set fo rth in Exhibit "A"
attached to their Complaint on file herein. They further allege that the Deed of Trust Note was
thereafter modified on March 3, 2008.
2.

In their Complaint Monitor and First Capital allege that as security for the repayment

of the Trust Deed Note as modified, M & S Development, LLC executed a Deed of Trust on certain
Bannock County real prope1ty. The Deed of Trust was recorded on the 30th day of December, 2005,
under Recorder's Instrument No. 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho.
3.

In its Answer and Counter-claim on file herein, Wildlife Ridge disputes the

enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, as modified, and the Deed of Trust.
4.

Wildlife Ridge has arranged for the sale of some of the real property described in the

Deed of Trust and has asked Monitor and First Capital to consent to the sale and release the Deed
of Trust on the property to be sold. Wildlife Ridge proposed that Monitor and First Capital 's
consent to such sales would be dependent upon the proceeds of such sales being deposited into a
trust account and the lien rights and security interests of Monitor and First Capital will
Stipu lation Consenting To Sale of Rea l Property and Deposit of Proceeds Into Trust
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automatically attach to the sale proceeds deposited into trust.
5.

Monitor and First Capital consent to the sale of the below described real property

provided that after payment of real estate commissions and closing costs the net proceeds of such
sales are deposited by the closing agent closing the sales into a trust account at Pioneer Title
Company, Pocatello, Idaho and the lien rights and security interests of Monitor and First Capital in
that real property automatically attach to the sale proceeds deposited into trust. Based upon that
agreement by Wildlife Ridge, Monitor and First Capital will consent to the following real property
sales, and execute any and all instruments required by the closing agent to release the Deed of Trust
as an encumbrance to the title of such prope1ty:
a.

Sale of Lot 4, Block 3, Wildlife Ridge Estates, Division 2, to Timothy D. And

Micaela Queen Jones for the Purchase Price of $49,900.00.
b.

Sale of Lot 6, Block 3, Wildlife Ridge Estates, Division 1, to Jonathan Vincent for

the Purchase Price of $38,000.00.
c.

Sale of Lot 7 and Lot 9, Block 3, Wildlife Ridge Estates, Division 2, to SDH

Construction, LLC for the Purchase Price of $92,926.00.
d.

Sale of Lot 1, Block 2, Wildlife Ridge Estates, Division 2, to Thomas James

McFarland for the Purchase Price of $44,000.00.
6.

Once deposited into Trust, the sale proceeds shall be held until either Wildlife

Ridge, Monitor and First Capital enter into a written agreement directing the distribution of
such sale proceeds, or the Comt in this proceeding issues its Order directing the distribution of
such sale proceeds.
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7.

The parties agree that this Stipulation shall not be enforceable against each other until

the Cou11 in this proceeding enters its Order approving the terms of this Stipulation and makes the
same binding upon Wildlife Ridge, Monitor and First Capital.
Dated this~day of March, 2017.

Ron Kerl
Dated this 61h day of March, 2017.

HEARN & WOOD, LLP
Attorney for Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC

A. Bruce Larson
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST ATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
)
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
)
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, )
)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company; M&S
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Defendants.

________________

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C
•
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

)
)

)
)
)
)

)
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company;
Counter-claimant,
vs.

' .........

~

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
)
limited liability comp~y; and FIRST CAPITAL )
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, )
)
Counter-defendant.
)

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This case was initiated by a Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed by the
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C.
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("First Capital"). 1 Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC2, filed an Answer
and also brought a counterclaim against Monitor and First Capital for fraud and declaratory and
injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs have now submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking dismissal of the affirmative defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer, as well as
dismissal of the Counterclaim. The Plaintiffs also submitted a Motion to Amend the Complaint,
which was scheduled for a hearing date separate from the motion for partial summary judgment.
In support of partial summary judgment, the Plaintiffs submitted a written brief and the Affidavit
of Ron Kerl, including exhibits. Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge responded with an
opposing brief and the Affidavit of Richard A. Hearn, with attached exhibits. The Plaintiffs then
followed up with a reply brief and the Second Affidavit of Ron Kerl , including exhibits.
Oral arguments were conducted on February 2 1, 2017. At the outset of the hearing, the
patties addressed the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Complaint. Although that motion was set
to be heard at a later date, counsel for the Defendants indicated they had no objection to the
amendment of the Complaint. Therefore, in a ruling from the bench, this Court granted the
Plaintiffs' request to add a new defendant based upon stipulation of the parties.
Having reviewed the entire file and the relevant law, and after consideration of the
arguments made by the parties, this Court now issues this Memorandum Decision and Order.

1.

Whether to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

1 Collectively

referred to herein as "the Plaintiffs".
Referred to herein as "Wildlife Ridge" or "the Defendant" .
Memorandum Decision and Order
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C

2

2

Re: Plaintiffs ' Motion for Partial Summa,y Judgm ent
136 of 325

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P.
56( c)(2016). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89,
867 P.2d 960,963 (1994). This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party
opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that pruty's favor.

Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). If the evidence
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v.
City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).

If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis
that no genuine iss_ue of material fact exists, the burden now shi_fts to the non-moving party to
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at
90, 867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving paity when
the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that pa1ty's case
upon which that paity bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P .2d
at 1037-38; Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing
the summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the paity's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
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forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2016)
(emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following pertinent facts are found by a preponderance of the evidence, with all
reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the Defendant. Bus hi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146
Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d 694, 698 (2009)("All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record
are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax

Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641,644 (2006)). 3
Wildlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of certain real property described in the Deed of
Trust attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' Complaint to JudiciaJly Foreclose Deed of Trust.
On December 3, 2014, Wildlife Ridge filed its initial Complaint seeking to quiet title in that
property against the same plaintiffs in this case, Monitor Finance and First Capital ("the First
Action"). 4 (See Exs. A and B, attached to Aff. of Ron Kerl in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. Filed by
Monitor and First Capital ("Kerl Aff."), Jan. 6, 2017.) That Complaint was amended on March
12, 2015. (Exs. A and C, attached to Kerl Aff.) By its Complaint and Amended Complaint,
Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of
Trust free and clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from

3

The background information was extracted from the patties' briefs and the submitted affidavits and exhibits.

Based on stipulation of the parties at oral arguments, this Court takes judicial notice of the filings and outcome of
the First Action.
4
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the district court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and the Modification of Trust
Deed Note ("the Modification") secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust had been
satisfied. (Exs. Band C, attached to Kerl Aff.) On June 14, 2016, a Judgment dismissing the
First Action with prejudice was entered. (Ex. E, attached to Kerl Aff.)
DISCUSSION

As explained above, the case presently before this Comt was initiated by a Complaint to
Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed against Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC and
M&S Development, LLC. Wildlife Ridge filed an Answer to Complaint and a Counterclaim
against the Plaintiffs for fraud and declaratory and injunctive relief. In an earlier action, Wildlife
Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of Trust free
and clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the
district court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and Modification had been
satisfied. That case was dismissed with prejudice. In seeking pa1tial summary judgment, the
Plaintiffs argue that all defenses and claims now raised by Wildlife Ridge in response to the
current lawsuit are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
a.

Law

Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon
the same claim. The Idaho Supreme Court explained the doctrine of res judicata, or claim
preclusion, as follows:
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Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the original action.

Berkshire investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81,278 P.3d 943,951 (2012) (citations
omitted, emphasis added). Thus, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent
relitigation of a claim previously asse1ted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating
to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Elliot v.

Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). As such, "in an action
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim

but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic
Valley Radiology, P..A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436-37, 849 P.2d 107, 109-10
(1993)(emphasis added); see also Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553,
208 P. 241. 242-43 (1922). As further explained by Idaho courts, because the transactional
concept of a claim is broad, "the bar of claim preclusion may apply even where there is not a
substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of a claim, or in the evidence
relating to those theories ." Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,259,668 P.2d 130, 135 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1983)(cited with approval by Kolouch, 123 Idaho at 437,849 P.2d at 110.) Thus, "a valid
and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Kolouch, 123 Idaho
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at 43 7, 849 P .2d at 11 O; see also Diamond v. Farmers Ins., 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 P .2d 319.
323 (1990) .
Res judicata serves tlu·ee fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of
judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho
at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133
(Ct.App.1983)).

Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 PJd 613, 617 (2007).
b.

Analysis

The Plaintiffs argue the First Action already addressed the enforceability of the same
Deed of Trust Note, Modification, and Deed of Trust at issue here. Because that lawsuit was
dismissed with prejudice, the Plaintiffs maintain that the Defendants are now prevented from
presenting any defense or claim challenging the enforceability of the debt which might have and
should have been litigated in that First Action. (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. Filed by
Monitor and First Capital ("Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J."), Jan. 6, 2017, 3-4.) The Plaintiffs have
therefore asked this Court to strike and dismiss the affirmative defenses and the Counterclaim
raised by the Defendant.
In response, the Defendant argues res Judicata is not a bar to the defenses and/or
counterclaim it has raised in the present lawsuit because none of those issues were "actually
litigated in the Quiet Title Action and they could not have been litigated." (Def. Wildlife
Ridge's Resp. to Pis. Monitor Finance L.C.'s and First Capital L.C.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J.
("Def. 's Resp."), Feb. 6, 2017, 12.) For example, Wildlife Ridge first argues that "[t]he entity
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that appeared in the Quiet Title Action as Monitor Financial LC. was not a real party in interest
to the transactions that were the subject matter of that action or the present action." (Def. 's Resp.
at 6.) In support of that allegation, the Defendant points to the fact that the Monitor Finance,
L.C. that was named as a party to the Note and Deed of Trust expired on September 17, 2012,
and was never renewed. Instead, "[a] new entity bearing the same name Monitor Financial L.C.
was established on January 23 , 2015 nearly two months after the Quiet Title Action was filed on
December 3, 2014." (Id.) Thus, the Defendant argues that one of the plaintiffs in this case,
Monitor Finance, L.C. , which entity was named as a defendant in the First Action to quiet title
filed by Wildlife Ridge, was not a real pa1ty in interest in that case because it had been
administratively dissolved before the First Action was filed. The Defendant fu1ther argues that
its pending counterclaim and affirmative defenses for fraud were not raised and could not have
been litigated in the quiet title action because neither M&S Development, LLC ("M&S"), or
Michael Millward were named parties. 5 (See id.) While the Defendant notes that M&S and Mr.
Millward were referenced in both the initial complaint and the amended complaint to quiet title,
the Defendant argues that neither M&S nor Mr. Millward were named parties in the quiet title
action and "there were no allegations made by any party in the Quiet Title Action that either
M&S or Millward had done anything wrong." (Id.) The Defendant thus argues: "As Millward
and M&S would have been necessary patties to any fraud claim brought against Plaintiffs,

5 "On

December 30, 2005, M&S Development, LLC and Michael Millward signed a promissory note with First
Capital Funding, L.C. and Monitor Finance, L.C. for $244,000.00." (Ex. C, attached to Kerl Aff., Am. Cornpl. to
Quite Title ("First Action"), March 16, 2016, ~7; see also Ex. B, attached to Kerl Aff., Compl. to Quiet Title, Dec. 1,
2014, §§7-8.)
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Wildlife Ridge had no duty to bring its claim for fraud against Plaintiffs, Millward and M&S in
association with its Quiet Title Action." (Def. 's Resp. at 8.) Finally, the Defendant argues that
the Modification of Trust Deed Note was never mentioned in the pleadings filed in the quiet title
action. (Id. at 7.) The Defendant argues the Modification is "central" to the foreclosure action
and Wildlife Ridge's counterclaim for fraud, and is another example of a claim that could not
have been brought in the First Action. (Id.)
First, this Cou1t must reject the Defendant's argument that Monitor Finance, L.C., while a
named defendant in the First Action, was nonetheless not a real pa1ty in interest to that lawsuit
because it had been previously administratively dissolved . Dissolution of a corporation does not
prevent the commencement of legal proceedings against that corporation in its corporate name.

Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, NA., 1999 UT 91,

~

14, 991 P .2d 584, 587; see also

UTAH CODE ANN.§ 16-lOa-1405 (West). 6 Because the debt owed existed prior to any

§ 16-IOa-1405. Effect of dissolution
(I) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any business except that
appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including:
(a) collecting its assets;
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be distributed in kind to its shareholders;
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities;
(d) distributing its remaining prope1ty among its shareholders according to their interests; and
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs.
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not:
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property;
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, although the authorization to dissolve may provide for closing the
corporation's share transfer records;
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8, Directors and
Officers;
(d) change:
(i) quorum or voting requirements for its board of directors or shareholders;
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal of its directors or officers or both; or
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its articles of incorporation;
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name;
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dissolution and Monitor Finance was sued during the winding down process to invalidate that
debt, Monitor Finance was a legitimate party in interest and a named defendant in the First
Action.
This Court further rejects the Defendant's argument that M&S and Michael Millward
were indispensable patties for a complete resolution regarding Wildlife Ridge's claim that the
debt due to the Plaintiffs was unenforceable. Whether a party is "indispensable" is governed by
IRCP _19(a)(l). 7 Under that rule, a pa1ty shall be joined if:
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing
parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the
interest; or
(ii) leave an existing pruty subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 19(a). In this case, complete relief could have been granted to Wildlife Ridge if
the court in the quiet title action had determined that the debt had been satisfied. If that had been

(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of the corporation.
UTAH

CODE A NN. § I6-IOa-1405 (West)(emphasis added).

Rule 19. Required joinder of parties
(a) Persons Required to be Joined if Feasible.

7

(I) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party in the action if:
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in
the person's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing paity subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations because of the interest.
Memorandum Decision and Order
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C
Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgm ent

JO

144 of 325

the outcome, the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust would have no debt to secure, and title to the premises
could have been quieted in Wildlife Ridge, free and clear of that encumbrance. No matter the
basis for such a finding, that outcome would not have adversely affected either M&S or Mr.
Millward since the debt they were personally liable for would no longer be enforceable. In
addition, there was no risk of double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations since M&S
and Mr. Millward would have been bound by a decree finding that the debt owed was
unenforceable, no matter whether the basis of such a decree was that the debt had been satisfied
or that the debt was unenforceable based on a statute of limitations or fraud argument. As such
M&S and Mr. Millward were not indispensable parties to Wildlife Ridge's quiet title action
and/or Wildlife Ridge's attempt to have the debt deemed unenforceable.
This Com1 must also reject the Defendant's arguments regarding the Modification. The
Defendant argued the Modification dated March 3, 2008, was fraudulent and the "statute of
limitations claim is related directly to the validity and effect of the claimed Modification."
(Def. 's Resp. at 10.) The Defendant argued that because the Modification of Trust Deed Note
was "never mentioned" in the pleadings filed in the quiet title action, the issues surrounding the
Modification could not have been litigated and therefore cannot now be barred by res Judicata.
However, the record shows the Defendant was aware of the Modification during the First Action,
since the Modification was produced to Wildlife Ridge through discovery. (Ex. 2, First Capital
Funding, L.C. 's Resp. to Pl. 's First Set of Discovery, attached to Second Aff. of Ron Kerl in
Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. Filed by Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., 114-5,
Feb. 14, 2017.) As such, any claims pe11aining to the Modification could have been raised in the
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First Action, and this Comt has also already determined that M&S and Mr. Millward were not
indispensable parties to the Quiet Title Action necessary to any fraud allegation attempting to
show the debt owed to the Plaintiffs was unenforceable.
Therefore, based on the above findings and the undisputed facts in this case, all of the
Defendant's claims that could have challenged the enforceability of the debt secured by the Deed
of Trust should have been liti gated in the quiet title action. There is no dispute that in the First
Action Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title to the property described in Monitor
Finance's and First Capital's Deed of Trust free and clear of that Deed of Trust by claiming there
was no enforceable debt which could be secured because the applicable promissory note had
been satisfied by previous payments made to the Plaintiffs. Thus, the gravamen of the first quiet
lillt: aclion was lhat there was no enforceable debt left to be secured by the Plaintiffs '
encumbering the Deed of Trust. Fmthermore, there is no question that both the First Action and
this matter involve the same parties and the same Deed of Trust. There is also no question that
the First Action was finally resolved and dismissed with prejudice by entry of a final judgment
rejecting the Defendant's attempt to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the
Modification, and the Deed of Trust. As explained, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not
only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of
any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have

been made. No matter the theory advanced by the Defendant in its original quiet title action, the
dismissal of the First Action serves as a dismissal with prejudice of every matter that was
available in the First Action to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the
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Modification, and the Deed of Trust in this case. A careful reading of Wildlife Ridge's Answer
and Counterclaim show that the affirmative defenses and claim of fraud all challenge the
enforceability of the same Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust Note, Modification and Deed
of Trust at issue in the First Action; therefore, those claims should have been litigated in the First
Action. The Defendant has not demonstrated that it was in any way prevented from presenting
in the First Action any of the claims it has now raised. This Court has found there to be no
question of fact that those claims, including any statute oflimitations defense, the equitable
doctrines of laches and unclean hands, and the claim of fraud all relate to and arose prior to the
dismissal of the First Action.
Therefore, because the First Case ended in a final judgment on the merits, because this
case involves the same parties as the First Case, and because all of the claims in this case arise
out of the same transaction or series of transactions as decided in the First Case, the affirmative
defenses and counterclaim now raised by the Defendant are barred by the doctrine of res

judicata.
CONCLUSION

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. This Court
has determined the Defendant's affirmative defenses and fraud claim are barred by the doctrine
of res judicata. Therefore, all of the affirmative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as
well as the Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud are hereby stricken and dismissed.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED thisa2_ day of March 2017.

~c.r')~
ROBERT C. NAFTZ
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

!lfJ._ day of f\1.tltttl

, 2017, I served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following in the manner
indicated.
Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen
PO Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

(bQ_k. Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

A. Bruce Larsen

MtHt ' Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deli very
( ) Facsimile

£

155 S. 211 d Ave.
Pocatello, ID 83201

ROBERT POLEKI, Clerk

By:

'?Rki~~

KERIPOVEY
Deputy Clerk
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Ron Kerl, Esq. - ISB #1768
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
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Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182
Email: ,·,·;n i, ,,li.j>c.T-_1:i.-~-\.'il_.:..·u1:'
Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO , IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2016-3588-0C

DEFAULT

)

WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company;
Counter-claimant,

)
)
)
)
)

VS.

)

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
)

Counter-defendant,

)

___________________ )
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In this action the Defendant M & S Development, LLC, having been regularly served with
process, and having failed to appear or answer Plaintiffs Comp laint on file herein, and the time
allowed by law for answering having expired, upon application of the Plaintiff herein, the default
of the Defendant M & S Deve lopment, LLC, in the premises, is hereby duly entered according to
law.
DATED This ~() day of March, 2017.

Hon. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge

Default
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ft.I\

I HEREBY CERTIFY on the ;,LU_ day of March, 20 17, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document as follows:
A. Bruce Larson

Hearn & Wood LLP
155 S. 211 d Ave.
Pocatello, ID 83201
Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen, Chtd.
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205

M&S Development, LLC
c/o Michael Millward, Registered Agent
9716 W. Bighorn Drive
Pocatello, ID 83204

[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083
[ ] Email to: bruce@hwlawpro.com

[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083
[ ] Email to: ro n(i/)cnopc r-larscn.corn
[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083
[ ] Emai l to: ron@cooper-larsen.com

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Default
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Ron Kerl, Esq. - ISB # 1768
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182
Email: ron (l1icoo pcr-l arscn.com
Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAP IT AL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)
)

VS.

)

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTA TES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

Defendants.

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTA TES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company;
Counter-claimant,
vs.
MONITOR FlNANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
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THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF RON
KERL IN SUPPORT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOTION AND OPPOSING
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)

Counter-defendant,

)

_ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ )
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STATE OF IDAHO )
ss
County of Bannock )

I, Ron Kerl, being first duly sworn upon my oath, depose and say:
1.

I am a citizen of the United States, a resident of Idaho, of legal age, and competent

to be a witness. If called upon to testify I could testify to the following all of which are within my
own personal knowledge.
2.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state ofldaho, and counsel of record

for the Plaintiffs and Counter-defendants Monitor Finance, L.C., a Utah limited liability company
("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("First Capital"), .
3.

Attached as Exhibit "1" is a true and accurate copy of page 3 of 5 of Schedule B

Personal Property filed by Michael Millward and Stephanie Millward in their Chapter 7 Bankrnptcy
case, Case No. 12-41260-JDP, Docket No. 21.
Dated this

(day

of May, 2017.

Ron Kerl
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this z1!1>- day of May, 2017.

NOTARY PUBLIC for Idaho
Residing at: Pocatello, Idaho
Commission Expires: -'6, - I " I~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY on the 411, day of May, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document as follows:
A. Bruce Larson

Hearn Law, PLLP
P.O. Box 70
Pocatello, ID 83204

Chamber Copy:
Hon. Robert C. Naftz
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201

[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083
~mail to: bruce@hwlawpro.com
[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-547-2147
~Email to:
nicoled@bannockcounty.us

Ron Kerl, of the firm

Third Affidavit of Ron Kerl in Support of Summary Judgment Motion and Opposing Motion
for Reconsideration
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Case 12-41260-JDP

D1.,.., 21

Filed 10/01/12 Entered 10/01,~L 20:10:48
Document
Page 7 of 58

Desc Main

868 (Official Form 68) (1 2/07) - Cool.

In re

Case No. __1~2~-4~1~2~6~0 _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Michael Millward,
Stephanie Millward

Debtors

SCHEDULE B - PERSONAL PROPERTY
(Continuation Sheet)

Type of Prope1ty

N
0
N
E

7.

Furs and jewelry.

X

8.

Firearms and sports, photographic,
and other hobby equipment.

X

9.

Interests in insurance policies.
Na me insurance company of each
policy and itemize surrend er or
refund value of each .

X

10. Annuities. Itemize and name each
issuer.

X

I I. Interests in an education IRA as
defined in 26 U.S .C. § 530(b)(l) or
under a qualified State tuition plan
as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 529(b)(J).
Give particulars. (File separately the
record(s) of any such interest(s).
I 1 U.S .C. § 521 (c).)

X

12. Interests in IRA, ERISA, Keogh, or

Description and Location of Property

Husband,
Curren t Value of
Wife,
Debtor's Interest in Property,
Joint, or
without J:?educting any
Community Secured Claim or Exemption

PERSI

C

2,298.91

100% Ownership of M & S Development

C

Unknown

65% interest in Wildlife Ridge LLC

C

Unknown

other pension or profit sharing
plans. Give particulars.
13. Stock and interests in incorporated
and unincorporated businesses.
Itemize.

X

14. interests in partnerships or joint
ven tures. Itemize.

15. Government and corporate bonds
and other negotiable and
nonnego tiable instruments.

X

16. Accounts receivable.

X

17. Alimony, maintenance, suppo1t, and
property settlements to which the
debtor is or may be entitled. Give
particulars.

X

18. Other liquidated debts owed to debtor X
including tax refunds. Give particulars.

Sub-Total >
(Total of this page)

2,298.91

Sheet _ 3_ of_5_ continuation sheets attached
to the Schedule of Personal Property
Software Copyright (c) 1996-2012 - CCH INCORPORATED - www.bestcase.com

Best Case Bankruptcy
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Ron Kerl , Esq. - ISB # 1768
COOPER & LARSEN , CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182
Email : •u1.-, ; r:-_,,,p,·r -l:1r~.,·11.u 111
1

Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF rDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FI ANCE, L.C. , a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; and PIONEER TITLE
COMPANY OF BANNOCK COUNTY, INC.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

CASE NO . CV-2016-3588-0C

MEMORANDUM OPPOSING
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)

AND
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an ldaho limited
liability company;
Counter-claimant,
vs.
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liabil ity
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTION
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COME NOW the Plaintiffs Monitor Finance, LC., a Utah limited liability company
("Monitor"), and First Capital Funding, LC., a Utah limited liability company ("First Capital"), by
and through their attorneys and submit this memorandum (I) in opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Wild life Ridge Estates, LLC on May l, 2017, and (2) as a Reply
Memorandum in support of Monitor and First Capital's Motion for Summary Judgment dated April
13, 2017. 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This lawsuit was commenced when Monitor and First Capital filed a Complaint to enforce
a Trust Deed Note dated December 30, 2005 , in the principal sum of $244,000, as set forth in Exhibit
"A" attached to the Amended Complaint on file herein ("Deed of Trust Note"). The Deed of Trust
Note was amended by the Modification attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit "B"
("Modification"). Plaintiffs seek t9 judicially foreclose a Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security
Agreement and Fixture Filing dated December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trnst") on the Bannock County
real property therein described. A true and accurate copy of the Deed of Trust is attached to the
Amended Complaint as Exhibit "C".
Wi ldlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of the rea l prope1ty described in the Deed of Trust
and has filed its Answer (including Affirmative Defenses) and Counter-claim in this action seeking
a declaration from this Court that the Deed of Trust Note, as Modified, and the Deed of Trust
securing that Note, are unenforceable. On March 27, 2017, this Court entered its Memorandum
Decision and Order granting Plaintiffs' prior motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed

Plaintiffs also submit a Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Foreclosure
Decree (dated May 3, 2017) and Third Affidavit of Ron Kerl (dated May 4, 2017) in Support of
Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motion and in opposition to Wildlife Ridge's Motion for
Reconsideration.
1
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Wildlife Ridge's affim1ative defenses and counter-claim against the Plaintiffs, finding that they are
barred by the doctrines of res judicata and co llateral estoppel. Wildlife Ridge's Motion for
Reconsideration seeks to reverse the Court's March 27, 20 17 decision.
The Court, on March 30, 20 17, entered a default against the Defendant, M&S. On May 4,
2017, the Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock County filed a waiver of its right to respond
further to the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and consented to the entry of a Judgment and Decree
of Foreclosure as prayed for by Monitor and First Capital in their Amended Complain t.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Wildlife Ridge's motion for reconsideration makes two affirmations of fact and law which
are incorrect and not support by either the law or the facts:
1.
The Statute ofLimitations Defense was not Available in the First Quiet Title
Action.

and,
2.

A.

The Debt [owed to Monitor and First Capital} Cannot be Relitigated.

The Applicability of Statute of Limitations to Bar Plaintiff's Enforcement of its
Obligation and Right to Foreclose its Deed of Trust was Availab le in the First Quiet
Title Action .
Wi ldlife Ridge cites this Court to the 1952 Idaho Supreme Court decision in Trusty v Ray,

73 Idaho 232, 249 P.2d 814 (Idaho, 1952) for the proposition that in the Quiet Title Action 2 it had
no standing to quiet title and raise a claim that the statute oft imitations prohibited Monitor and First
Capital from enforcing the debt secured by, and foreclosing, the Deed of Trust.

On December 3, 20 14, Wildlife Ridge commenced a quiet title action against the
Plaintiffs in Bannock County Case No. CV 20 14-4783 OC (the "First Quiet Title Action").
2
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A careful reading of that case does not support this broad conclusion. The Court in Trusty
only concluded that a "mortgagor or his successor in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee,
while the secured debt remains unpaid, although the statute of limitations has run against the right
to foreclose the mortgage."
This simple statement, however, does not also state that Wildlife Ridge was prohibited from
bringing alI available claims for relief other than one for quieting title to the property. Wildlife
Ridge was free to request a declaration from the Court that subject obligation and Deed ofTrust were
unenforceabl e for any other legitimate reason 3 and cou ld have made a request for relief that included
the cou1t's permanent injunction prohibiting Monitor and First Capital from enfo rcing the subject
obligation through foreclosure of the Deed ofTrnst. It did not do so. Having not done so, it cannot
now raise additional claims for reli ef which cou ld have been raised in the First Quiet Title Action.
Resjudicata's subparts, issue and claim preclusion, as explained in Ticor Title Company
v. St anion , I 44 Idaho 119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007), cover not only the theory of recover advanced in

the first action (here, "Quiet Title") but any theory of recovery at law or inequity which could have
been raised in the first action. At 144 Idaho, page 123, the Supreme Court stated:
The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and
issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Hindm arsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d
803,805 (2002). Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties
upon the same claim or upon claims "relating to the same cause of action ... which
might have been made." Id. Issue preclusion protects litigants from litigating an
identical issue with the same pa11y or its privy. Rodriguez v. Dep 't of Corr., 136

Such as those claims raised in its answer and counterclaim filed in this case: ( l) Statute
of Limitations - ~10, (2) Laches - ip 1, (3) Collateral Estoppel - ~12, (4) Res Judicata, claim
and/or issue preclusion - ~13, (5) Unclean Hands - ~14, and (6) Fraud as set out in the Counterclaim - ~~10-13.
3
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Jdaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 40 1, 403 (200 1). Separate tests are used to determine whether
claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies. See, D.A.R., Inc., v. Sheffer, 134 Idaho
14 1, 144,997 P.2d 602,605 (2000). Resjudicata serves three fundamental purposes:
( 1) it preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive
disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice litigated to inconsistent
results; (2) it serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the burdens of
repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the private interest in repose from the
harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805
(quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,257,668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983)).
In other words, Wildlife Ridge should have asserted eve1y legal rule and/or equitable remedy
estab li shing that Monitor and First Cap ital's Deed of Trust Note was unenforceable; and, Wildlife
Ridge shou ld have requested any remedy, other than to 'quiet title', to prevent foreclosu re of the
Deed of Trust.
Wildlife Ridge did not have to limit its requested relief to simply seeking a decree quieting
titl e to the land. Wildlife Ridge, having chosen that solitary claim for relief cannot now attempt to
add new and additional claims for relief that were available at the time the First Quiet Title action
was litigated to a final judgment.
B.

The Debt owed to Monitor and First Capital Is Not Being Relitigated Because It Was
Not Raised by Monitor and First Capital as a "Claim" in the First Quiet Title Action.
First, Wildlife Ridge conflates Monitor and First Capital's defense that the obligation owed

by Michael Millward ("Millward") and M & Development, LLC ("M & S Development") had not
been satisfied - as a 'claim actually litigated' in the First Quiet Title Action. Monitor and First
Capital's denial that the obligation was fully satisfied and their production of evidence in discovery
supporting that denial does not constitute a 'claim' within the scope of res judicata or collateral
estoppel.
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A 'claim' is where one seeks affirmative relief, that is, seeking a ' remedy' from the court.
A 'defense' is where an opposing party seeks to prevent a claim made against it from succeeding.
"Claim" is defined very broadly for res judicata purposes: "all rights of the plaintiff to remedies
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected
transactions, out of which the action arose." Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 24( 1), at 196 &
Comment c ( 1982). That broad definition comports with the goal of res judicata to require a plaintiff
to seek all relief or available remedies in a single action.
Second, Monitor and First Capital did not seek any relief in the First Quiet Title Action they
were defending because they was prohibited from doing so under applicable bankruptcy law. The
makers of the Deed of Trust Note, as modified, were Millward and M &S Development. They were
not parties to the First Quiet Title Action commenced by Wildlife Ridge. They would have been
necessary and indispensable parties to any claim by Monitor and First Capital to foreclose the Deed
of Trust and enforce the Deed of Trust Note and Modification. l.R.C.P. Rule 20(a)(2).
On September 10, 2012, Millward filed for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankrnptcy Code,
Case No. 12-41260 pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho.
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an automatic stay commenced on September IO, 2012 which prohibited
the Plaintiffs from taking any action to enforce the Trust Deed Note, as amended, and foreclose the
Deed of Trust securing that Trust Deed Note. That automatic stay existed until Millward 's
bankruptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016. 4

Paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint; Wildlife Ridge's answer to the original
complaint, at paragraph 7, admits the filing of Millward's bankruptcy, Case No. 12-41260.
Wildlife Ridge has not yet answered Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.
4
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Millward 'spending chapter 7 bankruptcy prevented Monitor and First Capital from asserting
their foreclosure claims against Millward, M & S Development, and Wildlife Ridge in the First Quiet
Title Action.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) provides:
Compulso,y Counterclaim.

( 1) In General. A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that, at the time of
its service, the pleader has against an opposing pa1iy if the claim:
(A) arises out of the transaction or occunence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim; and
(B) does not require adding another party over whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. (Emphasis added).

The automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 commenced on September 10, 2012 and
continued until Millward 's bankruptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016, a date falling after the First
Quiet title Action was dismissed with prejudice on June 14, 2016.
The bankruptcy stay prohibited Monitor and First Capital from taking any action to enforce
the Trust Deed Note, as amended, against either Millward or his prope1ty, M & S Development. 11
U.S.C. § 362 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section
301 [a voluntary case under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, including Chapter
7], 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay, applicable to all
entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the
case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;

(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
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(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;

(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, pe,fect, or enforce against property ofthe debtor any lien to the
extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement ofthe case
under this title; .... (Emphasis added)

Millward owned 100% ofM & S Development, and that ownership interest became property
of his bankruptcy estate when he filed his bankruptcy case in 2012.5 See, 11 U.S.C. §541 (a){l ). Any
suit against Millward or M & S Development to collect and enforce the obligation they owed to
Monitor and First Capital was prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 362 .
As a result of the bankruptcy stay the court in the First Quiet Title Action could not issue its
process or summons against Millward and M & S Development and therefore obtain jurisdiction
over them during the pendency of the First Quiet Title Action. The bankruptcy stay protected
Millward and M & S from any effort by Monitor and First Capital to seek enforcement of the Deed
of Trust Note and Modification, or foreclose the Deed of Trust in the Fi rst Quiet Title Action.
Since Monitor and First Capital were not required to request foreclosure relief in the form
of a compu lsory counterclaim in the First Action, Monitor and First Capital were prohibited from
'litigating its claim' in the First Quiet Title Action. A fortiori, Monitor and First Capital did not
actually litigate its claim in the First Quiet Title Action because they were prohibited by law from
actually doing so.

See, Third Affidavit of Ron Kerl, dated May 4, 2017, Exhibit - Schedule B Personal
Property.
5
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
A.

The Statute of Limitations has Not Expired.
Wildlife Ridge urges the Court to conclude that the applicable statute of limitations bars

Monitor and First Capital from enforcing their rights under Deed ofTrust Note and Modification and
to foreclose the Deed of Trust on the lands described therein. 6 That is not true, and the record befo re
the Court and applicable law supports a finding that the subject obligation is not time barred by any
appl icable statute of Iimitations.
LC. §5-2 I4A provides a general five year statute oflimitations applicable to the foreclosure
of a mortgage:
5-2 l 4A. Action to foreclose mortgage on real property. An action for the foreclosure
of a mortgage on real prope11y must be commenced within five (5) years from the
maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage. If the
obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage does not state a maturity date,
then the date of the accrua l of the cause of action giving rise to the right to foreclose
shall be deemed the date of maturity of such obligation or indebtedness.
LC. §45-15 15 adopts the same statute of limitations for the foreclosure of a deeds of trust:
45-1515. Time limits for foreclosure. The foreclosure of a trust deed by
advertisement and sale shall be made and the foreclosure of a trust deed by judicial
procedure shall be commenced within the time limited by the same period and
accord ing to the same provisions including extensions as provided by law for the
forec losure of a mortgage on real property.
Wildlife Ridge urges thi s Court to find that the applicable five year statute ofl imitatio ns began from
the maturity date stated in the Deed of Trust Note, to wit: June 26, 2006. But, the above noted
statutes cannot be read in a vacuum. They must also be read in conjunction with LC. §5-238 which

Most of the lots encumbered by the Deed of Trnst have been sold by Wildlife Ridge
pursuant to two stipulations and this Court's April 28, 2017 Order approving the stipulations.
The parties' stipulation provided that Monitor and First Capital's lien on the land would attach to
the net sale proceeds from the partial sales of that land. Net sale proceeds on the sale of several
lots are now being held in trust by Pioneer Ti tle Company of Bannock County.
6
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provides:
5-238. Acknowledgment or new promise - Effect on operation of statute - Effect
of pa11ial payment. No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new
or continuing contract by which to take the case out of the operation of this chapter,
un less the same is contained in some writing, signed by the pa11y to be charged
thereby; but any payment ofprincipal or interest is equivalent to a new promise in
,vritiug, duly signed, to pay the residue of the debt. (Emphasis added)
On November 8, 2012, Monitor and First Capital received a payment on the Deed of Trust
Note in the amount of $38,472.24 and applied that payment to the principal due on the obligation.
This payment represented the net sale proceeds derived from the sale of Lot 2, Block 3, Division 2
of the Wildlife Ridge Estates Subdivision, property that had been encumbered by the Deed ofTrnst. 7
In Horkley v Horkley, 144 Idaho 879, 173 P.3d 1138 (Idaho 2007), the Idaho Supreme Court
ruled that such a payment as that received by Monitor and First Capital on November 8, 2012, served
to "restart the statute of limitations on all in stallments of the Note." 173 P3d 1140.
This partial payment resta1ted the applicable five year statute of limitations, extending the
maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust, and the right to foreclose that Deed
of Trust, to November 8, 2017.
The partial payment of $38,472.24 received and applied to the obligation owed to Monitor
and Fi rst Capital on November 8, 2012, was made after Wildlife Ridge had acquired the subject
prope11y from M & S Development on June 13, 2006.8 This partial payment was made to Monitor
and First Capital with Wildlife Ridge's full knowledge and consent.
As provided by I.C. §5-214A, this partial payment to the Plaintiffs constituted a 'new
promise in writing, duly signed, to pay the residue' of the obligation and extended the statute of

See, Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Foreclosure Decree dated May 3,
2017, and page 3 of its exhibit.
7

8

See, paragraph 9 of Wildlife Ridge's Complaint filed in the First Quiet Title Action.

Memorandum Opposing Motion for Reconsideration and
Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Mo tion
Page-10
167 of 325

limitations for an additional five years under J.C. §§ 5-214A, 5-216 and 45-1515 and permits
Monitor and First Capital's present action to foreclose its Deed of Trust. This action was filed on
October 7, 2016, well within five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation created by the
November 8, 2012 payment and new promise to pay Monitor and First Capital's obligation.

CONCLUSION
Wildlife Ridge's Motion for Reconsideration should be denied because Wildlife Ridge could
have raised alternative claims for relief other than its request that the court 'quiet title' in the First
Quiet Title Action. Wildlife Ridge could have sought a declaration from that court that Monitor and
First Capital's right to collect on their obligation secured by the Deed of Trust were barred by the
applicable statute of limitations, or !aches, or fraud, or any other legal theory or claim for relief
besides its actual request for a decree quieting title. Wildlife Ridge did not seek remedies under any
alternative claims for relief, and it is now prohibited from asserting any alternative claims for relief
in this proceeding under the doctrine of resjudicata.
The amount of Monitor and First Capital's debt owed by Millward and M & S Development
was not actually litigated in the First Quiet Title Action. Raising a defense to Wildlife Ridge's claim
that the debt had been fully satisfied is not the equivalent of making a claim for the payment of that
obligation. Further, Monitor and First Capital were prevented from making such a claim because
their debtors, Millward and M & S Development, were not parties to the First Quiet Title Action and
the bankruptcy stay prohibited Monitor and First Capital from using the process of that court to bring
them into the First Quiet Title Action. Because of the bankruptcy stay, Monitor and First Capital
were not compelled by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) to bring a counterclaim against Millward
and M & S Development to prosecute its 'claim' that the obligation was unpaid, in default and the
Deed of Trust was ripe for foreclosure.
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Lastly, Wildlife Ridge's claim that the obligation owed to Monitor and First Capital are time
barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and their right to foreclose their Deed of Trust has
lapsed, is simply wrong and without any supporting facts or applicable law. The undisputed fact is
that the November 8, 2012, partial payment on the Deed of Trust Note, by operation oflaw, resta1ted
the app licable five year statute of limitations, thereby extending the maturity date of the obligation
to November 8, 2017. This foreclosure action was commenced timely.
Monitor and First Capita l respectfully request the Court to deny Wildlife Ridge's Motion for
Reconsideration, and to grant Monitor and First Capital's motion for summary judgment and issue
its Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale. 9
DATED This £ a y of May, 2017 .

Ron Kerl

Most of the lots still encumbered by the Deed of Trust have been sold by Wildlife Ridge
pursuant to two stipulations and this Coutt's April 28, 2017 Order approving the stipulations. As
part of its requested relief, Monitor and First Capital ask that the Court to include in its Decree an
order directing Pioneer Title of Bannock County to surrender the funds it holds in trust to the
Plaintiffs, in care of their counsel, Ron Kerl.
9
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company,
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C

Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs.

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company; M&S
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Defendants.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counterclaimant,

vs.
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,
Counterdefendants,

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This case was initiated by a Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed by the
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C.
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("First Capital"). 1 Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLc2, filed an Answer
and also brought a counterclaim against Monitor and First Capital for fraud and declaratory and
injunctive relief.
On January 6, 2017, the Plaintiffs submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking dismissal of the affirmative defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer, as well as
dismissal of the Counterclaim. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was
granted, and all of the affirmative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as well as the
Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud were stricken and dismissed. (Mem. Decision and Order,
March 27, 2017, 13.)
On April 13, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, along
with a brief and affidavits. Defendant Wildlife Ridge opposed the Motion for Summary
Judgment by submitting a Motion for Reconsideration, seeking reversal of this Court's prior
entry of summary judgment granting the Plaintiffs' request to strike the Defendant's affirmative
defenses and Counterclaim. The Defendant's brief addressed both the Motion for
Reconsideration and opposed the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Defendant did
not submit any affidavits or other evidence.
Oral arguments regarding both motions were heard on May 15, 2017. Having reviewed
the entire file and the relevant law, and after consideration of the arguments made by the parties,
this Court now issues this Memorandum Decision and Order.

1
2

Collectively referred to herein as "the Plaintiffs".
Referred to herein as "Wildlife Ridge" or "the Defendant".
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Wildlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of ce1tain real prope1ty described in the Deed of
Trust attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust.
On December 3, 2014, Wildlife Ridge filed a Complaint seeking to quiet title in that prope1ty
against the same plaintiffs in this case, Monitor Finance and First Capital ("the First Action"). 3
(See Exs. A and B, attached to Aff. of Ron Kerl in Supp. of Surnm. J. Mot. Filed by Monitor and
First Capital ("Kerl Aff. "), Jan. 6, 2017.) That Complaint was amended on March 12, 2015.
(Exs. A and C, attached to Kerl Aff.) By its Complaint and Amended Complaint, Wildlife Ridge
sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of Trust free and
clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the district
court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and the Modification of Trust Deed Note
("the Modification") secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust had been satisfied.
(Exs. Band C, attached to Kerl Aff.) On June 14, 2016, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, a
Judgment dismissing the First Action with prejudice was entered. (Ex. E, attached to Kerl Aff.)
The dismissal of the First Action was followed by the Plaintiffs' present lawsuit to judicially
foreclose the Deed of Trust.
As explained, this Court previously granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. In seeking partial summary judgment, the Plaintiffs argued that all of the defenses
and claims raised by Wildlife Ridge in response to the current lawsuit were barred by the

Based on stipulation of the parties at oral arguments, this Court takes judicial notice of the filings and outcome of
the First Action.
3
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doctrine of res Judi cata based on the dismissal of the First Action. In granting that motion, this
Court detem1ined that the First Action ended in a final judgment on the merits and that the
present case involves the same patties as the First Action. (Mem. Decision and Order, March 27,
2017, 13.) This Court further determined that because all of the claims in this case arise out of
the same transaction or series of transactions as decided in the First Action, the affirmative
defenses and counterclaim raised by the Defendant were baITed by res judicata. (Id.) Therefore,
all of the affirmative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as well as the Defendant's
Counterclaim for fraud were stricken and dismissed. (Id.) A Judgment to that effect was entered
on March 27, 2017. Then, on March 30, 2017, Default was entered against Defendant M & S
Development, LLC ("M&S"), for failure to appear or answer the Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Subsequently, Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock Cow1ty filed a waiver of its right to
respond further to the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and consented to the entry of a Judgment
and Decree of Foreclosure as sought by Monitor and First Capital pursuant to the Amended
Complaint.
The Plaintiffs then filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. By that motion, the
Plaintiffs are seeking a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure against Defendant Wildlife Ridge
on the basis of this Cowt's prior Memorandum Decision and Order dismissing Wildlife Ridge's
affirmative defenses and counterclaim against the Plaintiffs, as well as the fact that Defendant
Pioneer Title Company waived its right to respond and consented to the entry of a Judgment and
Decree of Foreclosure.
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ISSUES

I.

Whether to grant the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration.

2.

Whether to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
DISCUSSION

It is necessary for this Comt to first address the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration,
as resolution of that motion necessarily resolves the question of smmnary judgment.
Motion for Reconsideration
a.

Standard of Review

Rule 11.2(b)( 1)4 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP") governs motions for
reconsideration. Under that rule, "[a] motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered
before final judgment may be made at any time prior to or with.in 14 days after the entry of a
final judgment."
In explaining motions for reconsideration, the Idaho Supreme Comt has stated: "A
motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the court-when new law is applied to
previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to previously presented law, or any
combination thereof-to reconsider the correctness of an interlocutory order." Johnson v. N.

Idaho Coll., 153 Idaho 58, 62, 278 P.3d 928, 932 (2012). "[T]he most important consideration is
the conectness of the interlocutory order." Id. Thus, "[a]fter a final judgment, a party has one
more chance under [Rule l l.2(b)(l)] to ask the couit to decide the law and facts correctly."

Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 913, 332 PJd 815,825 (2014). That rule "allows
Prior to 2016, this rule was labeled as Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B).
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the trial comt to reconsider facts in light of any new or additional facts that are submitted in
support of the motion. This ensures the district court decides a case on the proper law and facts."

Id. (internal citation omitted.) Therefore, the district court should consider any new facts and
new evidence presented by the moving party bearing on the correctness of the interlocutory
order. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d
1026, 1037 (1990); Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cty., 152 Idaho 207, 210, 268 P.3d 1159, 1162
(2012). "The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention to the new facts."

Coeur d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 823,800 P.2d at 1037. A trial court is not required "to
search the record to determine if there is any new info1mation that might change the specification
of facts deemed to be established." Id. However, while Rule 1 l.2(b)(l) "permits a party to
present new evidence when a motion is brought under that rule, [the rule] does not require that
the motion be accompanied by new evidence." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,472, 147
P .3d 100, 104 (Idaho Ct.App. 2006). Thus, this Court is not precluded from reconsidering an
interlocutory decision on the grounds of the initial evidence. Id. at 473, 147 P.3d at 105.
"When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district comt must apply the same
standard of review that the comt applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). This
Comt is being asked to reconsider the granting of a prutial motion for summary judgment.
Therefore, this Court "must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of
material fact to defeat summary judgment." Id.
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b.

Analysis

As explained, this Court previously dismissed the Defendant's affirmative defenses and
counterclaim on the basis of res Judicata. This Couii specifically determined that the First
Action between the parties ended in a final judgment on the merits, that case involved the same
pa11ies as the First Action, and all of the claims in this case arise out of the same transaction or
series of transactions as decided in the First Action. (Mem. Decision and Order at 13.) Because
"the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously
asse11ed, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which
were actually made or which might have been made", this Court ruled that "[n]o matter the
theory advanced by the Defendant in its original quiet title action, the dismissal of the First
Action serves as a dismissal with prejudice of eve1y matter thal was available in the First Action
to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the Modification, and the Deed of
Trust in this case." (Id. at 12.) This Court further determined that all of the affirmative defenses
and the counterclaim raised by Wildlife Ridge challenged "the enforceability of the same
Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust Note, Modification and Deed of Trust at issue in the
First Action; therefore, those claims should have been litigated in the First Action." (Id. at 13.)
This Court found that the Defendant had "not demonstrated that it was in any way prevented
from presenting in the First Action any of the claims it has now raised." (Id.) As such, this
Court found there were no questions of fact regarding the Defendant's defenses or counterclaim,
and the defenses and counterclaim were necessarily stricken and dismissed. (Id.)
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Tlu·ough the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant specifically challenges the
dismissal of the statute of limitations defense, arguing that defense was not available in the First
Action and therefore should not have been ban-ed by this CoUit under the theory of res judicata.
(Mem. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. of Def. 's Mot. for Reconsideration
("Mem. in Opp'n"), May 1, 2017, 2.) Wildlife Ridge, the Defendant in this action, was the
Plaintiff in the First Action to quiet title filed against Monitor and First Capital, now the
Plaintiffs in the present case. The Defendant argues that during the time of the First Action,
Wildlife Ridge had no standing to quiet title and raise a claim that the statute of limitations
prohibited Monitor and First Capital from enforcing the debt secured by, and foreclosing, the
Deed of Trust. (See id. at 2-3.) In support of that argument, the Defendant cited to Idaho Code§
5-214A, which provides a five-year statute of limilations for the commencement of an action for
the foreclosure of a mortgage. The Defendant also cited to one sentence from a 1952 Idaho
Supreme Court case pertaining to that statute of limitations. Quoting from Trusty v. Ray, 73
Idaho 232, 249 P.2d 814 (1952), the Defendant argued: "In Idaho, a 'mortgagor or his successor
in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, while the secured debt remains unpaid,
although the statute of limitations has run against the right to foreclose the mortgage.'" (Id. at 2.)
The Plaintiffs dispute the Defendant's analysis of Trusty as being too broad. The
Plaintiffs agree that the Idaho Supreme Court in the Trusty case concluded that the "mortgagor or
his successor in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, while the secured debt remains
unpaid, although the statute of limitations has run against the right to foreclose the mmtgage."
(Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration and Reply Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. ("Mem.
Memorandum Decision and Order
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Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration"), May 8, 2017, 4.) However, the Plaintiffs argue that
"simple statement" did not prohibit Wildlife Ridge "from bringing all available claims for relief

olher than one for quieting title to the properly" in the First Action. (Id.) Thus, the Plaintiffs
argue that even if quiet title was not available to Wildlife Ridge in the First Action, there is
nothing about the Trusty case that prevented the Defendant from pursuing other, still available
avenues of relief, such as seeking a permanent injunction stopping any enforcement of the deed
of trust by foreclosure. The Plaintiffs point out, for example, that the Defendant raised different
fonns for relief other than quiet title in responding to this action. (See id.) The Plaintiffs argue
that because Wildlife Ridge did not pursue those other avenues of relief in the First Action, the
Defendant is baned under the theory of res judicata from "now rais[ing] additional claims for
relief which could have been raised in the First Quiet Title Action." (Id.) Therefore, the
Plaintiffs maintain that this Court was correct in its decision granting paitial summary judgment
because "[r]esjudicata 's subparts, issue and claim preclusion, ... cover not only the theory of
recover[y] advanced in the first action (here, 'Quiet Title') but any theory of recovery at law or
inequity [sic] which could have been raised in the first action." (Id.)
Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon
the same claim. "[R]es judicata is an umbrella term for different but related concepts: claim
preclusion and issue preclusion." Steve Wieland, Don't Let the Ttab Decide Your Next

Infringement Dispute, 59 ADVOCATE 38 (2016); see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880,892,
128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008). "Separate tests are used to determine whether
Memorandum Decision and Order
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claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies." Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 ldaho 119, 123,
157 P.3d 613,617 (2007)(intemal citation omitted).
Pursuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment bars a party from relitigating that same claim, regardless of whether the subsequent litigation involves new or
different issues. Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892, 128 S. Ct. at 2171 . The Idaho Supreme CoU1t fmther
explained claim preclusion as follows:
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the original action.

Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P .3d 943, 951 (2012) (citations
omitted, emphasis added) . Thus, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent
relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating
to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Elliot v.

Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). As such, "in an action
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the fmmer adjudication concludes
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim

but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic
Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436- 37, 849 P.2d 107, 109- 10
(1993)(emphasis added); see also Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co. , 35 Idaho 549, 553,
208 P. 24 1, 242-43 (1922). Similarly, "[i]ssue preclusion ... bars 'successive litigation of an
Memorandum Decision and Order
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issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the
prior judgment,' even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim." Sturgell, 553 U.S . at
892, 128 S. Ct. at 2171 (internal citation omitted). Thus, when a court finally determines an
issue in one case that is essential to that judgment, a litigant is barred from raising the issue again
in another lawsuit.

Res Judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of
judicial dispute resolution against the conosive disrespect that would follow if the same
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho
at 94, 57 P .3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P .2d 130, 133
(Ct.App.1983)).
Stanion, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617; see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S . 880,892, 128
S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008).
Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars relitigation between the same parties of
a prior litigation is a question of law upon which this Court exercises free review.
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 319, 78 P.3d 379, 386 (2003). Res Judicata is an
affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a
preponderance of the evidence. Foster v. City of St. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883, 890, 841
P.2d 413,420 (1992).

Id. at 122, 157 P.3d at 616.
In its decision granting partial summary judgment, this Court detennined that the doctrine
of res Judicata applied to not only the theory of recovery advanced by Wildlife Ridge in the First
Action, but to any theory of recovery at law or equity which could have been raised in that First
Action. Thus, Wildlife Ridge should have asserted every legal rule and/or equitable remedy to
establish that the Deed of Trust Note was unenforceable. The Defendant's new reliance on the
Memorandum Decision and Order
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Trusty case does not support the Defendant's argument that it was prohibited in the First Action
from bringing all available claims for relief other than a claim for quieting title. Wildlife Ridge
was not required to limit its requested relief to simply seeking a decree quieting title to the land.
However, having selected that solitary claim for relief, the doctrine of res judicata prohibits
Wildlife Ridge from now adding new or additional claims for relief that were available at the
time of the First Action, which action was indisputably litigated to a final judgment. When the
First Action was dismissed, Wildlife Ridge lost the ability to relitigate any other theories of
recovery arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions which were actually made
or which might have been made in the First Action. Unfortunately, Wildlife Ridge limited itself
by seeking a relief that was too narrow, and this Court can find no error of fact or law in its
previous decision to that effect.
The Defendant additionally argued reconsideration should be granted because the
Plaintiffs are simply ban-ed from "the commencement of a foreclosure action in this matter"
because "[ a]n action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on a real property must be commenced
within five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such
mortgage." (Mem. in Opp'n at 3.) Citing to the Trust Deed Note attached to the Plaintiffs'
Complaint, the Defendant argued:
The Deed of Trust being foreclosed is subject to the mandatory maturity date
contained in the Trust Deed Note. The note specifically states that "2. The term of this
Trust Deed Note shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. This Trust Deed Note shall
fully mature on June 28, 2006 (the 'Maturity Date').''
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(Id. at 3.) The Defendant argues there was no stay on the statute oflimitations, and the five-year

timeframe for commencing an action for the foreclosure of the subject mortgage has expired
based on the maturity date of June 28, 2006. Therefore, the Defendant claims the Plaintiffs are
now time-baned from enforcing their rights under the Deed of Trust Note and Modification.
(See Mem. in Opp'n at 3.) The Plaintiffs dispute that contention, arguing that "the record before

the Court and applicable law supports a finding that the subject obligation is not time barred by
any applicable statute oflimitations." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 9.)
As mentioned earlier, Idaho Code § 5-2 l 4A provides a five-year statute of limitations for
the commencement of an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage. That statute states:
An action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real prope1ty must be commenced within

five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such
m01tgage. If the obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage does not state a
maturity date, then the date of the accrnal of the cause of action giving rise to the right to
foreclose shall be deemed the date of matmity of such obligation or indebtedness.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-214A (West). Idaho Code § 45-1515 adopts the same five-year statute of
limitations for the foreclosure of deeds of trust. That statute states:
The foreclosure of a trust deed by advertisement and sale shall be made and the
foreclosure of a trust deed by judicial procedure shall be commenced within the time
limited by the same period and according to the same provisions including extensions as
provided by law for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 45-1515 (West). The Defendant points to the maturity date stated in the
Deed of Trust Note, which is June 28, 2006. (See Ex. A, Trust Deed Note, attached to Compl. to
Judicially Foreclose Deed ofTrnst, Oct. 7, 2016.) That date is not in dispute, and the Complaint
to foreclose the Deed of Trust was not filed until 2016. However, the Plaintiffs argue the statute
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of limitations was restarted by a partial payment made on November 8, 2012, "extending the
maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust, and the right to foreclose that Deed
of Tmst, to November 8, 2017." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 10.)
In support of the extension argument, the Plaintiffs direct this Court to Idaho Code § 5238, which pertains to the effect of partial payments. That statute provides:
No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract by
which to take the case out of the operation of this chapter, unless the same is contained in
some writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby; but any payment ofprincipal or
interest is equivalent to a new promise in writing, duly signed, to pay tile residue of the
debt.
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 5-238 (West)(emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has found that
payments of interest or principal serve to restart the statute of limitations on all installments on
the note pursuant to IC§ 5-238. Horkley v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 879,881, 173 P.3d 1138, 1140
(2007). There is no dispute in this case that on November 8, 2012, the Plaintiffs "received a
payment on the Deed of Trust Note in the amount of $38,472.24 and applied that payment to the
principal due on the obligation." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 10; see also,
Supplemental Aff. in Supp. of Pls.' Foreclosure Decree, May 8, 2017, ~ 3.) As such, the partial
payment made on the Deed of Trust in this case on November 8, 2012, restarted the five-year
statute of limitations, extending the maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of
Trust, including the right to foreclose that Deed of Trust, to November 8, 2017. The Complaint
to Judicially Foreclose the Deed of Trust was filed on October 7, 2016, within the five-year limit.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the partial payment extending the maturity date was made
after Wildlife Ridge had acquired the subject property and was therefore made with the
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Defendant's full knowledge and consent. Thus, under the provisions of IC § 5-238, the partial
payment to the Plaintiffs constituted "a new promise in writing", extending the statute of
limitations found in IC§§ 5-214A and 45-1515 for an additional five years. As such, the
Plaintiffs' action to foreclose the Deed of Trust, filed on October 7, 2016, was timely filed, and
the Plaintiffs are not barred by the statute of limitations from commencing this action.
Therefore, the Defendant's statute of limitation argument does not provide a valid basis for this
Court to reconsider its prior decision granting pa11ial summary judgment in favor of the
Plaintiffs.
Motion for Summary Judgment

The Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment seeking a Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure against Wildlifo Ridge. As set forth above, the Plaintiffs' request is supported by
this Comi's previous entry of partial summary judgment and the subsequent Default entered
against Defendant M & S Development, LLC, for failure to appear or answer the Plaintiffs'
Complaint. Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock County has also consented to the
entry of a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure as sought by Monitor and First Capital pursuant
to the Amended Complaint. Based on that procedural history, the Plaintiffs argue this Cow1
need now only make a determination that there remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of
Trust, and make a fmiher finding as to the description and reasonable value of the property still
encumbered by that Deed of Trust. (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot., April 13, 2017, 4.)
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a.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving patty is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." IDAHO R. CIV. P.
56(c)(2016). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89,
867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). This Comt liberally construes the record in favor of the pa1ty
opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that patty's favor.

Friel v. Boise City Rous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). If the evidence
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v.
City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).

If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 90,
867 P.2d at 964. Summat-y judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when the
nomnoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case upon
which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 5 30-31, 887 P .2d at
1037-38; Radell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing the
summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
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forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." IDAHO R. C1v. P. 56(e)(2016)
(emphasis added).
b.

Analysis

In opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant argued the amount of the
debt cannot be relitigated because the amount of the debt was already raised and litigated in the
First Action. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Reconsideration at 4.) The Defendant stated: "[T]he
amount of the debt was raised and litigated in the first quiet title action the result was a joint
stipulation dismissing the action." (Id.) Relying on the doctrine of res judicata, the Defendant
contends that the issue of whether a debt was owed was already litigated in the First Action, and
based on the joint stipulation entered there, the Plaintiffs are now barred from relitigating the
debt owed. 5
This Comt has already extensively set forth the law regarding res judicata in the
proceeding sections, as well as in its prior Memorandum Decision and Order. There is no need
to repeat that discussion in great depth here. It is sufficient to note that under principles of res

judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an
absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim. A judgment,
"once rendered, is treated as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties
on the same 'claim' or 'cause of action."' Aldape, I 05 Idaho at 256, 668 P.2d at 132(quoting

Kaspar Wire Works, Inc., 575 F.2d at 535-36).

Outside of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant did not raise any factual issues challenging summary
judgment, and the Defendant did not submit any affidavits or other evidence to challenge summary judgment.
Memorandum Decision and Order
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Monitor and First Capital were defendants in the First Action. One defense raised by
Monitor and First Capital was the denial that the obligation owed by Michael Millward and
M&S Development had been satisfied. Mr. Millward and M&S were the makers of the Deed of
Trust Notes. However, Monitor and First Capital did not pursue any claims for relief in the First
Action because they were prohibited from doing so under applicable bankruptcy laws. As
makers of the Deed of Trust Notes, as modified, Mr. Millward and M&S were necessary parties
to any claim to foreclose the Deed of Trust and enforce the Deed of Trust Note and Modification.

See

IDAHO

R. C1v. P. 20(a)(2)(2016). 6 However, at the time of the First Action, Mr. Millward

had already filed for bankruptcy. Pursuant to Title 11, Section 362 of the United States Code 7,
an automatic stay commenced on September 10, 2012. The Plaintiffs submit they were

Rule 20. Permissive joinder of parties
(a) Persons Who May Join or be Joined.
(I) Plaintiffs. Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if:
(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occw-rences; and
(B) any question of Jaw or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.
(2) Defendants. Persons may be joined in one action as defendants if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
6

7 (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,302, or 303 of this title,
or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities, of--

(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over
property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against prope1ty of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a
claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;

11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West).
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prohibited by that bankruptcy stay from taking any action to enforce the Trust Deed Note, as
amended, and foreclose the Deed of Trust securing that Trust Deed Note. According to the
Plaintiffs, the automatic stay existed until the bankruptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016.
Thus, the pending Chapter 7 bankruptcy prevented Monitor and First Capital from asserting any
foreclosure claims against Defendants Millward, M&S Development, and Wildlife Ridge in the
First Action, and the amount of Monitor and First Capital's debt still owed was therefore never
actually litigated. In responding to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant offered no
evidence to dispute the fact that Monitor and First Capital could not have actually litigated a
claim for foreclosure in the First Action because they were prohibited from pursuing such a
claim against the makers of the Note based on the bankruptcy stay. As res Judicata is only a bar
to the relitigation of claims that have already been decided, and the Plaintiffs made no "claim"
for foreclosure in the First Action, res judicata cannot now prevent the Plaintiffs from pursuing
litigation regarding the amount of debt still owed.
Fmthermore, notwithstanding the proceeding discussion regarding res judicata, no
factual issues have been raised by the Defendant in challenging summary judgment. Under the
governing standards, the patty opposing the motion for summary judgment must produce
"evidence by way of affidavit or deposition ... to contradict the assertions of the moving party."

Ambrose By & Through Ambrose v. Buhl Joint Sch. Dist. No. 412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d
1088, 1091 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994)(intemal citations omitted). Such evidence must be anchored
in something more than mere speculation. See id. A non-moving party's failure to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that patty's case, on which
Memorandum Decision and Order
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that pruty will bear the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment. See

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S . 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 295
(1986). "In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonrnoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322- 23, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. Thus, where
the non-moving patty has fai led to make a showing of proof on any element for which it bears
the burden at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; see
also, Sparks v. St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd. , 115 Idaho 505,509, 768 P.2d 768, 772 (1988).
The Defendant here has failed to present any affidavits or evidence to challenge summary
judgment or to support any defense to the foreclosure relief sought by the Plaintiffs. On the
other hand, the Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits in support of summary judgment. Therefore,
based on the governing standards, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment must
necessarily be granted.
CONCLUSION

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. This Cowt fiuther
finds there remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of Trust. Pursuant to the affidavit filed
in supp01t of the Plaintiffs' motion, "[a] s of the

1st day

of April, 2017, there will be due, owing

and unpaid upon the Trust Deed Note, as modified, the sum of $6,814,076.41, together with
interest thereafter accruing at the default rate of 35% per annum until date of Judgment herein,
together with costs, foreclosure expenses, attorney ' s fees and expenses necessary to preserve
Plaintiffs' interest in the property heretofore advanced or hereafter accruing." (Aff. in Supp. of
Memorandum Decision and Order

20

Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C

Re: Defendant 's Motion for Reconsideration/Plaintiffs • Motion for Summary Judgment
190 of 325

Pls.' Foreclosure Decree at 6:6.) Based on that undisputed affidavit, this Court finds there
remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of Trust and owing to the Plaintiffs in the amount of
$6,814,076.41.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs shall submit a proposed Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure
detailing the amount remaining on the unpaid debt and the description and reasonable value of
the property still encumbered by that Deed of Trust for this Court's consideration and signature.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs may also submit an appropriate memorandum detailing the
grounds for any claimed award of litigation costs and attorney fees. However, any decision
regarding costs and fees will be made in a separate order after this Court is provided an
opportunity to review such a request in detail.
Based on the preceding discus~ion and this Court's findings, no claims remain. As such,
this case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

r r2

DATED this ~

day of June 2017.

~ c.\\_~
ROBERT C. NAFTZ
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thel41h day ofJune, 2017, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document upon each of the following in the marmer indicated.

Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen
PO Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

(X) E-Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deli very
( ) Facsimile

A. Bruce Larsen
155 S. 2nd Ave.
Pocatello, ID 83201

(X) E-Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

ROBERT POLEK!, Clerk

By:

KE~RN~
Deputy Clerk
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A ltorney for Monitor Finance, L. C and First Capital Funding, L. C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, LC. , a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAP IT AL FUNDING, LC., a
Utah limited li abi lity company,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company;
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liab ili ty company; and
PIONEER TITLE COMPANY OF
BANNOCK COUNTY, INC.,
Defendants.
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limited liability company,
Counter-claimant,
VS.

MONITOR FINANCE, LC., a Utah limited liability
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This matter having come on regularly before the Court, the Honorable Robert C. Naftz
presiding, and finding good cause therefore;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
I.

Pursuant to the parties stipulation and this Court's Stipulated Order Approving

Stipulations Consenting to the Sale of Real Property dated April 28, 2017, Pioneer Title Company
is hereby ordered to tum over to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., in care of
their attorney of record, Ron Kerl of the firm of Cooper & Larsen, Chtd., 151 N. 3rd Ave., Second
Floor, Pocatello, Idaho, the net proceeds from the sale of the below described prope1ty, totaling
$256,76 1.67. Said funds are currently deposited in the trust account of Pioneer Title Company. The

net proceeds from the sale of the following property:
Lot 2, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTA TES DIVISION 2 - $44,195.82
Lot 5, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $44,928 .14
Lot 7 & Lot 9, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $86,749.80
Lot 4, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $45,433.92
Lot 6, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTA TES DIVISION 1 - $35,453.99
2.

The Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated

December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trust") , executed and delivered by M&S Development LLC , to
Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., recorded on the 301" day of December, 2005,
under Recorder's Instrnment No. 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho, is a valid first
lien on the below described real property securing an indebtedness of $6,828,907.39, as of June 19,
2017, plus any additional attorney fees and costs awarded by the Comt pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54,

and costs related to the enforcement of this Decree by Sheriffs Foreclosure Sale, plus legal interest
on the entire sum of the aforesaid indebtedness from the date of this Decree to and including the date
of Sheriffs sale at the highest rate allowed by law;
Judgement and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale - pg . 2
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The real property encumbered by the Deed of Trust is situated in the County of Bannock,
State of Idaho, is more particularly described as follows:
Lot 1, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2; and
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDUFE ESTATES DIVISION 1
3.

The Deed of Trust described in paragraph 2 is foreclosed, and all interests which the

Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC , Michael J. Millward, M&S Development LLC, and
Pioneer Title Company have in the above described real prope1ty, and any fixtures on the prope1ty,
shall be sold by the Sheriff of Bannock County, Idaho, in the manner provided by law, payable in
cash lawful money of the United States of America and in accordance with the practice of this Court.
The reasonable value of said prope1ty as of the date of this Decree is as follows:
Lot 1, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES DIVISION 2 - $50,000.00
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION 1 - $50,000
4.

The proceeds of sale shall be applied as follows: First, to the costs of sale; second,

towards the satisfaction of the indebtedness owing to Monitor Finance, LC. and First Capital
Funding, LC. as set forth in paragraph 2 above; and third, any surplus thereafter remaining shall be
paid into the District Court for fu1ther determination regarding priority among those parties to this
litigation whose rights are subordinate to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, LC ..
5.

The Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J. Millward, M&S

Development LLC, and Pioneer Title Company, and all persons claiming through or under them
as purchasers, encumbrancers, or otherwise and all persons claiming to have acquired any equity or
interest in said premises are foreclosed of all interests, liens, or claims in the real property herein
above described, and eve1y portion thereof, save and except such statutory rights of redemption as
said parties or any of them may have.
Judgement and Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale - pg. 3
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6.

The Plaintiff, with either a cash bid or a credit bid against the sum herein found to be

due it, or any party to this suit may become the purchaser at the sale of said property, and the
purchaser thereof shall be entitl ed to all of the rights and privileges of such a purchaser under the
laws of the State of Idaho.
( ·

DA TED This ill}_ day of June, 2017 .

r

'- ·

Hon. Robe1t C. Naftz
DISTRICT JUDGE
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] Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
] Facsimile - 208-932-1083
] Email to: brnce@hwlawpro.com
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[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
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Idaho limited liability company;
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
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This matter having come on regularly before the Court, the Honorable Robert C. Nath
presiding, and finding good cause therefore;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS :
l.

Pursuant to the parties stipulation and this Court's Stipulated Order Approving

Stipulations Consenting to the Sale of Real Property dated April 28, 2017, Pioneer Title Company
is hereby ordered to turn over to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., in care of
their attorney of record, Ron Kerl of the firm of Cooper & Larsen, Chtd., 151 N.

3rd

Ave., Second

Floor, Pocatello, Idaho, the net proceeds from the sale of the below described prope1ty, totaling
$256,761.67. Said funds are currently deposited in the ttust account of Pioneer Title Company. The

net proceeds from the sale of the following prope1ty:
Lot 2, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $44,195.82
Lot 5, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $44,928.14
Lot 7 & Lot 9, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $86,749.80
Lot 4, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $45,433.92
Lot 6, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION I - $35,453.99
2.

The Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated

December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trnst") , executed and delivered by M&S Development LLC , to
Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., recorded on the 301h day of December, 2005,
under Recorder's Instrument No . 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho, is a valid first
lien on the below described real property securing an indebtedness of $6,828,907.39, as of June 19,
2017, plus any additional attorney fees and costs awarded by the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54,

and costs related to the enforcement of this Decree by Sheriff's Foreclosure Sale, plus legal interest
on the entire sum of the aforesaid indebtedness from the date of this Decree to and including the date
of Sheriffs sale at the highest rate allowed by law;
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The real property encumbered by the Deed of Trust is situated in the County of Bannock,
State of Idaho, is more particularly described as follows:
Lot I, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2; and
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION 1
3.

The Deed of Trust described in paragraph 2 is foreclosed, and all interests which the

Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J. Millward, M&S Development LLC, and
Pioneer Title Company have in the above described real property, and any fixtures on the property,
shall be sold by the Sheriff of Bannock County, Idaho, in the manner provided by law, payable in
cash lawful money of the United States of America and in accordance with the practice of this Court.
The reasonable value of said property as of the date of this Decree is as follows:
Lot I, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $50,000.00
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION 1 - $50,000
4.

The proceeds of sale shall be applied as follows: First, to the costs of sale; second,

towards the satisfaction of the indebtedness owing to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital
Funding, L.C. as set forth in paragraph 2 above; and third, any surplus thereafter remaining shall be
paid into the District Court for further detennination regarding priority among those parties to this
litigation whose rights are subordinate to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C ..
5.

The Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J_. Millward, M&S

Development LLC, and Pioneer Title Company, and all persons claiming through or under them
as purchasers, encumbrancers, or otherwise and all persons claiming to have acquired any equity or
interest in said premises are foreclosed of all interests, liens, or claims in the real prope11y herein
above described, and every portion thereof, save and except such statutory rights of redemption as
said parties or any of them may have .
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6.

The Plaintiff, with either a cash bid or a credit bid against the sum herein found to be

clue it, or any party to this suit may become the purchaser at the sale of said property, and the
purchaser thereof shall be entitled to all of the rights and privileges of such a purchaser under the
laws of the State of Idaho.
DATED This

Jd}_ day of June, 2017.

~c.~~

Hon. Robert C. Naftz
DISTRICT JUDG E

.

,,,,r :;s.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY on the
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A. Bruce Larson
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[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
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[ ] Overnight Mail
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Attorney for Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2016-3588-0C

)
)

VS.

)
)

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; Defendant/Appellant
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company, Defendant.

)
)
)
)

WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company;

)
)
)

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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)

Counter-claimant/Appellant,
vs.

)
)
)

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Counter-defendants/Respondents,

_________________ _

)
)
)
)
)
)
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, MONITOR FINANCE, L.C. a Utah
limited liability company, FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company, THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD, RON KERL OF THE FIRM COOPER &
LARSEN, CHARTERED AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT;
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

Designation of Appeal: That the above-named Appellant, Wildlife Ridge Estates,

an Idaho limited liability company, appeals against the above-named Respondents to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the following appealable judgments and orders issued by the District Court
in this matter pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l(a):
a.

Memorandum Decision and Order (3/27/2017);

b.

Memorandum, Decision & Order (6/ 13/2017);

c.

Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale (6/20/2017).

2.

Issues:

a.

Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the

Respondent, dismissing Appellant's Affomative Defenses and Counterclaim and in issuing its
subsequent orders referenced hereinabove;
b.

The District Court erred in granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment

dismissing the Affomative Defenses and Counterclaim of Appellant in that there are disputed
material issues of fact and issues of law;
c.

The District Court's determinations on the Respondents' Motions for Summary

Judgment were not based upon a proper legal basis or suppo1ied by substantial undisputed
evidence;
d.

The District Court ened in determining that the Respondents' Trust Deed should

be judicially foreclosed, in that there are legal issues and disputed materials issues of fact that
would precluded the entry of summary judgment allowing the foreclosure; and,
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e.

Such other issues that may be identified subsequent to the filing of this Notice of

Appeal.
3.

Jmisdictional Statement: Under and pursuant to I.A.R. 11, Appellant has the right

to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court the aforementioned appealable orders under and pursuant
to LA.R. l l(a).
4.

Transcript: There was no trial or recorded testimony and, therefore, Appellant

does not request a reporter's transcript of any comt proceedings.
5.

Record: The documents to be included in the clerk's record in addition to those

automatically included pursuant to I.AR. 28 are:
a.

Respondents' two Motions for Summary Judgment and Supporting

Memoranda;
b.

Respondents' Affidavits and affidavit exhibits filed in support of the

motions for Summary Judgment;
c.

Appellant's Memoranda in opposition to the motions for Summary

Judgment;
d.

Appellant's Motion to Reconsider and Memorandum in Opposition to

Motion for Summary Judgment and in Supp01t of Motion for Reconsideration;
6.

Exhibits : No exhibits were offered or admitted.

7.

No order has been entered sealing any part of the record or transctipt.

8.

I hereby certify that:
a.

A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court Reporter of
these proceedings, no reporter's transcript has been requested;
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b.

The Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for the
preparation of the reporter's transcript pursuant to I.A.R. 24;

c.

That all appellate filing fees have been paid; and

d.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to I.A.R. 20.

DATED this-ll-~ofJuly, 2017.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

Jl

tl<of July, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the

above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:

Ron Kerl
COOPER & LARSEN, Chartered
151 North Third Avenue, 2nd Floor
P.0. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145

[ ]
[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail - Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: 208-235-1182
Email: ron@cooper-larsen.com

HEARN LAW PLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
)
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
)
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, )
Plaintiffs,
vs.

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company; M&S
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Defendants.

-

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

)
)
)
)

---------- )

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company;
Counter-claimant,

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

VS.

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
)
)
limited liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, )
)
Counter-defendant.
)

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This case was initiated by a Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed by the
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C.
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("First Capital"). 1 Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC 2, filed an Answer
and also brought a counterclaim against Monitor and First Capital for fraud and declaratory and
injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs have now submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking dismissal of the affirmative defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer, as well as
dismissal of the Counterclaim. The Plaintiffs also submitted a Motion to Amend the Complaint,
which was scheduled for a hearing date separate from the motion for partial summary judgment.
In support of partial summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs submitted a written brief and the Affidavit
of Ron Kerl, including exhibits. Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge responded with an
opposing brief and the Affidavit of Richard A. Hearn, with attached exhibits. The Plaintiffs then
followed up with a reply brief and the Second Affidavit of Ron Kerl, including exhibits.
Oral arguments were conducted on February 21, 2017. At the outset of the hearing, the
paities addressed the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Complaint. Although that motion was set
to be heard at a later date, counsel for the Defendants indicated they had no objection to the
amendment of the Complaint. Therefore, in a ruling from the bench, this Court granted the
Plaintiffs' request to add a new defendant based upon stipulation of the parties.
Having reviewed the entire file and the relevant law, and after consideration of the
arguments made by the parties, this Court now issues this Memorandum Decision and Order.

1.

Whether to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

1 Collectively

2

referred to herein as "the Plaintiffs".
Referred to herein as "Wildlife Ridge" or "the Defendant".
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving patty is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P.
56(c)(2016). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89,
867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party
opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.

Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). If the evidence
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v.
City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).

If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at
90, 867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when
the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case
upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P .2d
at 1037-38; Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing
the summary judgment motion 1'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
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forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e)(20I6)
(emphasis added).
STATEMENT OFF ACTS

The following pertinent facts are found by a preponderance of the evidence, with all
reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the Defendant. Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146
Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d 694, 698 (2009)("All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record
are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax

Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006)). 3
Wildlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of certain real property described in the Deed of
Trust attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust.
On December 3, 2014, Wildlife Ridge filed its initial Complaint seeking to quiet title in that
property against the same plaintiffs in this case, Monitor Finance and First Capital ("the First
Action"). 4 (See Exs. A and B, attached to Aff. of Ron Kerl in Supp. ofSumm. J. Mot. Filed by
Monitor and First Capital ("Kerl Aff."), Jan. 6, 2017.) That Complaint was amended on March
12, 2015. (Exs. A and C, attached to Kerl Aff.) By its Complaint and Amended Complaint,
Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of
Trust free and clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from

3

The background information was extracted from the parties' briefs and the submitted affidavits and exhibits.

Based on stipulation of the parties at oral arguments, this Court takes judicial notice of the filings and outcome of
the First Action.
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the district court that the sums due under the Deed ofTrnst Note and the Modification of Trust
Deed Note ("the Modification") secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust had been
satisfied. (Exs. Band C, attached to Kerl Aff.) On June 14, 2016, a Judgment dismissing the
First Action with prejudice was entered. (Ex. E, attached to Kerl Aff.)
DISCUSSlON

As explained above, the case presently before this Court was initiated by a Complaint to
Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed against Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC and
M&S Development, LLC. Wildlife Ridge filed an Answer to Complaint and a Counterclaim
against the Plaintiffs for fraud and declaratory and injunctive relief. In an earlier action, Wildlife
Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of Trust free
and clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the
district court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and Modification had been
satisfied. That case was dismissed with prejudice. In seeking partial summary judgment, the
Plaintiffs argue that all defenses and claims now raised by Wildlife Ridge in response to the
current lawsuit are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
a.

Law

Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon
the same claim. The Idaho Supreme Court explained the doctrine of res Judicata, or claim
preclusion, as follows:
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Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the original action.

Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81 , 278 P.3d 943 , 951 (2012) (citations
omitted, emphasis added). Thus, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent
relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating
to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Elliot v.

Darvvin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). As such, "in an action
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes
pat1ies and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim

but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic
Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436-37, 849 P.2d 107, 109-10
(1993)(emphasis added); see also Joyce v. Jvfurphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553,
208 P. 241. 242-43 ( 1922). As further explained by Idaho courts, because the transactional
concept of a claim is broad, "the bar of claim preclusion may apply even where there is not a
substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of a claim, or in the evidence
relating to those theories." Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 259, 668 P.2d 130, 135 (Idaho Ct.
App . 1983)(cited with approval by Kolouch, 123 Idaho at 437,849 P.2d at 110.) Thus, "a valid
and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho
Memorandum Decision and Order
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at 43 7, 849 P.2d at 11 O; see also Diamond v. Farmers Ins., 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 P .2d 319,
323 (1990) .

Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of
judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho
at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133
(Ct.App.1983)).

Ticor Title Co.
b.

v.

Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613,617 (2007).

Analysis

The Plaintiffs argue the First Action already addressed the enforceability of the same
Deed of Trust Note, Modification, and Deed of Trust at issue here. Because that lawsuit was
dismissed with prejudice, the Plaintiffs maintain that the Defendants are now prevented from
presenting any defense or claim challenging the enforceability of the debt which might have and
should have been litigated in that First Action. (Mem. in Supp. of Surnm. J. Mot. Filed by
Monitor and First Capital ("Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J."), Jan. 6, 2017, 3-4.) The Plaintiffs have
therefore asked this Court to strike and dismiss the affirmative defenses and the Counterclaim
raised by the Defendant.
In response, the Defendant argues res judicata is not a bar to the defenses and/or
counterclaim it has raised in the present lawsuit because none of those issues were "actually
litigated in the Quiet Title Action and they could not have been litigated." (Def. Wildlife
Ridge's Resp. to Pls. Monitor Finance L.C.'s and First Capital L.C.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J.
("Def.'s Resp."), Feb. 6, 2017, 12.) For example, Wildlife Ridge first argues that "[t]he entity
Memorandum Decision and Order
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that appeared in the Quiet Title Action as Monitor Financial L.C. was not a real party in interest
to the transactions that were the subject matter of that action or the present action." (Def.' s Resp.
at 6.) In support of that allegation, the Defendant points to the fact that the Monitor Finance,
L.C. that was named as a party to the Note and Deed of Trust expired on September 17, 2012,
and was never renewed. Instead, "[a] new entity bearing the same name Monitor Financial L.C.
was established on January 23, 2015 nearly two months after the Quiet Title Action was filed on
December 3, 2014." (Id.) Thus, the Defendant argues that one of the plaintiffs in this case,
Monitor Finance, L.C., which entity was named as a defendant in the First Action to quiet title
filed by Wildlife Ridge, was not a real party in interest in that case because it had been
administratively dissolved before the First Action was filed. The Defendant further argues that
its pending counlerclaim and affirmative defenses for fraud were not raised and could not have
been litigated in the quiet title action because neither M&S Development, LLC ("M&S"), or
Michael Millward were named parties. 5 (See id.) While the Defendant notes that M&S and Mr.
Millward were referenced in both the initial complaint and the amended complaint to quiet title,
the Defendant argues that neither M&S nor Mr. Millward were named parties in the quiet title
action and "there were no allegations made by any party in the Quiet Title Action that either
M&S or Millward had done anything wrong." (Id.) The Defendant thus argues: "As Millward
and M&S would have been necessary parties to any fraud clai~ brought against Plaintiffs,

5 "On

December 30, 2005, M&S Development, LLC and Michael Millward signed a promissory note with First
Capital Funding, L.C. and Monitor Finance, L.C. for $244,000.00." (Ex. C, attached to Kerl Aff., Am. Compl. to
Quite Title ("First Action"), March 16, 2016, 17; see also Ex. B, attached to Kerl Aff., Compl. to Quiet Title, Dec. I,
20 14, §§7-8.)
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Wildlife Ridge had no duty to bring its claim for fraud against Plaintiffs, Millward and M&S in
association with its Quiet Title Action." (Def.'s Resp. at 8.) Finally, the Defendant argues that
the Modification of Trust Deed Note was never mentioned in the pleadings filed in the quiet title
action. (Id. at 7.) The Defendant argues the Modification is "central" to the foreclosure action
and Wildlife Ridge's counterclaim for fraud, and is another example of a claim that could not
have been brought in the First Action. (Id.)
First, this Court must reject the Defendant' s argument that Monitor Finance, L.C. , while a
named defendant in the First Action, was nonetheless not a real party in interest to that lawsuit
because it had been previously administratively dissolved. Dissolution of a corporation does not
prevent the commencement of legal proceedings against that corporation in its corporate name.

Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, NA ., 1999 UT 91,

~

14, 991 P.2d 584, 587; see also

UTAH CODE ANN.§ 16-lOa-1405 (West). 6 Because the debt owed existed prior to any

§ 16-lOa-1405. Effect of dissolution
(I) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any business except that
appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including:
(a) collecting its assets;
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be distributed in kind to its shareholders;
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities;
(d) distributing its remaining property among its shareholders according to their interests; and
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs.
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not:
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property;
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, although the authorization. to dissolve may provide for closing the
corporation's share transfer records;
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8, Directors and
Officers;
(d) change:
(i) quorum or voting requirements for its board of directors or shareholders;
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal of its directors or officers or both; or
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its articles of incorporation;
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name;
Memorandum Decision and Order
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dissolution and Monitor Finance was sued during the winding down process to invalidate that
debt, Monitor Finance was a legitimate party in interest and a named defendant in the First
Action.
This Court further rejects the Defendant's argument that M&S and Michael Millward
were indispensable parties for a complete resolution regarding Wildlife Ridge's claim that the
debt due to the Plaintiffs was unenforceable. Whether a party is "indispensable" is governed by
IRCP .19(a)(l ). 7 Under that rule, a party shall be joined if:
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing
parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the
interest; or
(ii) leave an existing pruiy subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
Idaho R. Civ. P. l 9(a). In this case, complete relief could have been granted to Wildlife Ridge if
the court in the quiet title action had determined that the debt had been satisfied. If that had been

(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of the corporation.
UTAH CODE A NN.§ 16-IOa-1405 (West)(emphasis added).
7 Rule 19. Required joinder of parties
(a) Persons Required to be Joined if Feasible.
(I) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party in the action if:
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or
(8) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in
the person's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations because of the interest.
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the outcome, the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trnst would have no debt to secure, and title to the premises
could have been quieted in Wildlife Ridge, free and clear of that encumbrance. No matter the
basis for such a finding, that outcome would not have adversely affected either M&S or Mr.
Millward since the debt they were personally liable for would no longer be enforceable. In
addition, there was no risk of double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations since M&S
and Mr. Millward would have been bound by a decree finding that the debt owed was
unenforceable, no matter whether the basis of such a decree was that the debt had been satisfied
or that the debt was unenforceable based on a statute of limitations or fraud argument. As such,
M&S and Mr. Millward were not indispensable parties to Wildlife Ridge's quiet title action
and/or Wildlife Ridge's attempt to have the debt deemed unenforceable.
This Court must also reject the Defendant's arguments regarding the Modification. The
Defendant argued the Modification dated March 3, 2008, was fraudulent and the "statute of
limitations claim is related directly to the validity and effect of the claimed Modification."
(Def.'s Resp. at 10.) The Defendant argued that because the Modification ofTrnst Deed Note
was "never mentioned" in the pleadings filed in the quiet title action, the issues surrounding the
Modification could not have been litigated and therefore cannot now be barred by res judicata.
However, the record shows the Defendant was aware of the Modification during the First Action,
since the Modification was produced to Wildlife Ridge through discovery. (Ex. 2, First Capital
Funding, L.C.'s Resp. to Pl.'s First Set of Discovery, attached to Second Aff. of Ron Kerl in
Supp. of Surnm. J. Mot. Filed by Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., ~~4-5,
Feb. 14, 2017.) As such, any claims pertaining to the Modification could have been raised in the
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First Action, and this Court has also already determined that M&S and Mr. Millward were not
indispensable parties to the Quiet Title Action necessary to any fraud allegation attempting to
show the debt owed to the Plaintiffs was unenforceable.
Therefore, based on the above findings and the undisputed facts in this case, all of the
Defendant's claims that could have challenged the enforceability of the debt secured by the Deed
of Trust should have been litigated in the quiet title action. There is no dispute that in the First
Action Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title to the property described in Monitor
Finance's and First Capital's Deed of Trust free and clear of that Deed of Trust by claiming there
was no enforceable debt which could be secured because the applicable promissory note had
been satisfied by previous payments made to the Plaintiffs. Thus, the gravamen of the first quiet

title action was that there was no enforceable debt left to be secured by the Plaintiffs'
encumbering the Deed of Trust. Furthermore, there is no question that both the First Action and
this matter involve the same parties and the same Deed of Trust. There is also no question that
the First Action was finally resolved and dismissed with prejudice by entry of a final judgment
rejecting the Defendant's attempt to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the
Modification, and the Deed of Trust. As explained, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not
only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of
any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have

been made. No matter the theory advanced by the Defendant in its original quiet title action, the
dismissal of the First Action serves as a dismissal with prejudice of every matter that was
available in the First Action to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the
Memorandum Decision and Order
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Modification, and the Deed of Trust in this case. A careful reading of Wildlife Ridge's Answer
and Counterclaim show that the affirmative defenses and claim of fraud all challenge the
enforceability of the same Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust Note, Modification and Deed
of Trust at issue in the First Action; therefore, those claims should have been litigated in the First
Action. The Defendant has not demonstrated that it was in any way prevented from presenting
in the First Action any of the claims it has now raised. This Court has found there to be no
question of fact that those claims, including any statute of limitations defense, the equitable
doctrines of laches and unclean hands, and the claim of fraud all relate to and arose prior to the
dismissal of the First Action.
Therefore, because the First Case ended in a final judgment on the merits, because this
case involves the same parties as the First Case, and because all of the claims in this case arise
out of the same transaction or series of transactions as decided in the First Case, the affirmative
defenses and counterclaim now raised by the Defendant are barred by the doctrine of res

judicata.
CONCLUSION

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. This Court
has determined the Defendant's affirmative defenses and fraud claim are barred by the doctrine
of res judicata. Therefore, all of the affirmative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as
well as the Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud are hereby stricken and dismissed.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

cf)_ day of March 2017.

~ C. (') _,.,~
ROBERT C. NAFTZ
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ~ day of

f\!latc!J

, 2017, I served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing docwnent upon each of the following in the manner
indicated.
Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen
PO Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

M_&l.Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Deli very
( ) Facsimile

A. Bruce Larsen

M~Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

£

155 S. 2nd Ave.
Pocatello, ID 83201

ROBERT POLEK!, Clerk
By:

---4¥fu~
·)J_>M~
__
KERJPOVEY
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STAt:E" .,\
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company,

Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company; M&S
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Defendants.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,
Counterdefendants,

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This case was initiated by a Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed by the
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C.
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("First Capital"). 1 Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC 2, filed an Answer
and also brought a counterclaim against Monitor and First Capital for fraud and declaratory and
injunctive relief.
On January 6, 2017, the Plaintiffs submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking dismissal of the affirmative defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer, as well as
dismissal of the Counterclaim. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was
granted, and all of the affomative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as well as the
Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud were stricken and dismissed. (Mem. Decision and Order,
March 27, 2017, 13 .)
On April 13, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, along
with a brief and affidavits. Defendant Wildlife Ridge opposed the Motion for Summary
Judgment by submitting a Motion for Reconsideration, seeking reversal of this Court's prior
entry of summary judgment granting the Plaintiffs' request to strike the Defendant's affirmative
defenses and Counterclaim. The Defendant's brief addressed both the Motion for
Reconsideration and opposed the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Defendant did
not submit any affidavits or other evidence.
Oral arguments regarding both motions were heard on May 15, 2017. Having reviewed
the entire file and the relevant law, and after consideration of the arguments made by the parties,
this Court now issues this Memorandum Decision and Order.

Collectively referred to herein as "the Plaintiffs".
Referred to herein as "Wildlife Ridge" or ''the Defendant".
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STATEMENT OFFACTS

Wildlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of certain real property described in the Deed of
Trust attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust.
On December 3, 2014, Wildlife Ridge filed a Complaint seeking to quiet title in that property
against the same plaintiffs in this case, Monitor Finance and First Capital (''the First Action"). 3

(See Exs. A and B, attached to Aff. of Ron Kerl in Supp. of Surnm. J. Mot. Filed by Monitor and
First Capital ("Kerl Aff."), Jan. 6, 2017.) That Complaint was amended on March 12, 2015 .
(Exs. A and C, attached to Kerl Aff.) By its Complaint and Amended Complaint, Wildlife Ridge
sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of Trust free and
clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the district
court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and the Modification of Trust Deed Note
("the Modification") secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust had been satisfied.
(Exs. Band C, attached to Kerl Aff.) On June 14, 2016, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, a
Judgment dismissing the First Action with prejudice was entered. (Ex. E, attached to Kerl Aff.)
The dismissal of the First Action was followed by the Plaintiffs' present lawsuit to judicially
foreclose the Deed of Trust.
As explained, this Court previously granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. In seeking partial summary judgment, the Plaintiffs argued that all of the defenses
and claims raised by Wildlife Ridge in response to the current lawsuit were barred by the

Based on stipulation of the parties at oral arguments, this Court takes judicial notice of the filings and outcome of
the First Action.
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doctrine of res judicata based on the dismissal of the First Action. In granting that motion, this
Court determined that the First Action ended in a final judgment on the merits and that the
present case involves the same parties as the First Action. (Mem. Decision and Order, March 27,
2017, 13 .) This Court further determined that because all of the claims in this case arise out of
the same transaction or series of transactions as decided in the First Action, the affirmative
defenses and counterclaim raised by the Defendant were barred by res judicata. (Id.) Therefore,
all of the affirmative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as well as the Defendant's
Counterclaim for fraud were stricken and dismissed. (Id.) A Judgment to that effect was entered
on March 27, 2017. Then, on March 30, 2017, Default was entered against Defendant M & S
Development, LLC ("M&S"), for failure to appear or answer the Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Subsequently, Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock County filed a waiver of its right to
respond further to the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and consented to the entry of a Judgment
and Decree of Foreclosure as sought by Monitor and First Capital pursuant to the Amended
Complaint.
The Plaintiffs then filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. By that motion, the
Plaintiffs are seeking a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure against Defendant Wildlife Ridge
on the basis of this Court's prior Memorandum Decision and Order dismissing Wildlife Ridge's
affirmative defenses and counterclaim against the Plaintiffs, as well as the fact that Defendant
Pioneer Title Company waived its right to respond and consented to the entry of a Judgment and
Decree of Foreclosure.
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ISSUES

1.

Whether to grant the Defendant' s Motion for Reconsideration.

2.

Whether to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
DISCUSSION

It is necessary for this Court to first address the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration,
as resolution of that motion necessarily resolves the question of summary judgment.
Motion for Reconsideration
a.

Standard of Review

Rule 1 l .2(b )(1 )4 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP") governs motions for
reconsideration. Under that rule, "(a] motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered
before final judgment may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a
final judgment."
In explaining motions for reconsideration, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: "A
motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the court-when new law is applied to
previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to previously presented law, or any
combination thereof-to reconsider the correctness of an interlocutory order." Johnson v. N

Idaho Coll. , 153 Idaho 58, 62,278 P.3d 928, 932 (2012). "[T]he most important consideration is
the correctness of the interlocutory order." Id. Thus, "[a]fter a final judgment, a party has one
more chance under [Rule 1 l.2(b)(l)] to ask the court to decide the law and facts correctly."

Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903,913,332 P.3d 815, 825 (2014). That rule "allows
Prior to 2016, this rule was labeled as Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1l(a)(2)(B).
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the trial court to reconsider facts in light of any new or additional facts that are submitted in
support of the motion. This ensures the district court decides a case on the proper law and facts."
Id. (internal citation omitted.) Therefore, the district court should consider any new facts and

new evidence presented by the moving party bearing on the correctness of the interlocutory
order. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank ofN. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d
1026, 1037 (1990); Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cty., 152 Idaho 207,210,268 P.3d 1159, 1162
(2012). "The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention to the new facts."
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 823, 800 P.2d at 1037. A trial court is not required "to

search the record to determine if there is any new information that might change the specification
of facts deemed to be established." Id. However, while Rule 1 l.2(b)(l) "permits a party to
present new evidence when a motion is brought under that rule, [the rule) does not require that
the motion be accompanied by new evidence." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147
P .3d 100, 104 (Idaho Ct.App. 2006). Thus, this Court is not precluded from reconsidering an
interlocutory decision on the grounds of the initial evidence. Id. at 473, 147 P.3d at 105.
"When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). This
Court is being asked to reconsider the granting of a partial motion for summary judgment.
Therefore, this Court "must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of
material fact to defeat summary judgment." Id.
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b.

Analysis

As explained, this Court previously dismissed the Defendant's affirmative defenses and
counterclaim on the basis of res judicata. This Court specifically determined that the First
Action between the parties ended in a final judgment on the merits, that case involved the same
parties as the First Action, and all of the claims in this case arise out of the same transaction or
series of transactions as decided in the First Action. (Mem. Decision and Order at 13.) Because
''the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously
asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which
were actually made or which might have been made", this Court ruled that "[n]o matter the
theory advanced by the Defendant in its original quiet title action, the dismissal of the First
Action serves as a dismissal with prejudice of every matter that was available in the First Action
to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the Modification, and the Deed of
Trust in this case." (Id. at 12.) This Court further determined that all of the affirmative defenses
and the counterclaim raised by Wildlife Ridge challenged "the enforceability of the same
Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust Note, Modification and Deed of Trust at issue in the
First Action; therefore, those claims should have been litigated in the First Action." (Id. at 13.)
This Court found that the Defendant had "not demonstrated that it was in any way prevented
from presenting in the First Action any of the claims it has now raised." (Id.) As such, this
Court found there were no questions of fact regarding the Defendant's defenses or counterclaim,
and the defenses and counterclaim were necessarily stricken and dismissed. (Id.)
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Through the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant specifically challenges the
dismissal of the statute of limitations defense, arguing that defense was not available in the First
Action and therefore should not have been barred by this Court under the theory of res judicata.
(Mem. in Opp' n to Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. ofDef.'s Mot. for Reconsideration
("Mem. in Opp'n"), May 1, 2017, 2.) Wildlife Ridge, the Defendant in this action, was the
Plaintiff in the First Action to quiet title filed against Monitor and First Capital, now the
Plaintiffs in the present case. The Defendant argues that during the time of the First Action,
Wildlife Ridge had no standing to quiet title and raise a claim that the statute of limitations
prohibited Monitor and First Capital from enforcing the debt secured by, and foreclosing, the
Deed of Trust. (See id. at 2-3.) In support of that argument, the Defendant cited to Idaho Code§
5-214A, which provides a five-year statute of limitations for the commencement of an action for
the foreclosure of a mortgage. The Defendant also cited to one sentence from a 1952 Idaho
Supreme Court case pertaining to that statute of limitations. Quoting from Trusty v. Ray, 73
Idaho 232, 249 P.2d 814 (1952), the Defendant argued: "In Idaho, a 'mortgagor or his successor
in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, while the secured debt remains unpaid,
although the statute of limitations has run against the right to foreclose the mortgage."' (Id. at 2.)
The Plaintiffs dispute the Defendant's analysis of Trusty as being too broad. The
Plaintiffs agree that the Idaho Supreme Court in the Trusty case concluded that the "mortgagor or
his successor in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, while the secured debt remains
unpaid, although the statute oflirnitations has run against the right to foreclose the mortgage."
(Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration and Reply Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. ("Mem.
Memorandum Decision and Order
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Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration"), May 8, 2017, 4.) However, the Plaintiffs argue that
"simple statement" did not prohibit Wildlife Ridge "from bringing all available claims for relief

other than one for quieting title to the property" in the First Action. (Id.) Thus, the Plaintiffs
argue that even if quiet title was not available to Wildlife Ridge in the First Action, there is
nothing about the Trusty case that prevented the Defendant from pursuing other, still available
avenues of relief, such as seeking a permanent injunction stopping any enforcement of the deed
of trust by foreclosure. The Plaintiffs point out, for example, that the Defendant raised different
forms for relief other than quiet title in responding to this action. (See id.) The Plaintiffs argue
that because Wildlife Ridge did not pursue those other avenues of relief in the First Action, the
Defendant is barred under the theory of res judicata from "now rais[ing] additional claims for
relief which could have been raised in the First Quiet Title Action." (Id.) Therefore, the
Plaintiffs maintain that this Court was conect in its decision granting partial summary judgment
because "[rJes judicata 's subparts, issue and claim preclusion, ... cover not only the theory of
recover[y] advanced in the first action (here, 'Quiet Title') but any theory ofrecovery at law or
inequity [sic] which could have been raised in the first action." (Id.)
Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon
the same claim. "[R]es judicata is an umbrella term for different but related concepts: claim
preclusion and issue preclusion." Steve Wieland, Don't Let the Ttab Decide Your Next

Infringement Dispute, 59 ADVOCATE 38 (2016); see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892,
128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008). "Separate tests are used to determine whether
Memorandum Decision and Order
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claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies." Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123,
157 P.3d 613,617 (2007)(intemal citation omitted).
Pursuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment bars a party from relitigating that same claim, regardless of whether the subsequent litigation involves new or
different issues. Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892, 128 S. Ct. at 2171. The Idaho Supreme Court further
explained claim preclusion as follows:
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the original action.

Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81,278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012) (citations
omitted, emphasis added). Thus, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent
relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating
to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Elliot v.

Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803,805 (2002). As such, "in an action
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim

but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic
Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436-37, 849 P.2d 107, 109-10
(1993)(emphasis added); see also Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553,
208 P. 241, 242-43 (1922). Similarly, "[i]ssue preclusion ... bars 'successive litigation of an
Memorandum Decision and Order
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issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the
prior judgment,' even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim." Sturgell, 553 U.S. at
892, 128 S. Ct. at 2171 (internal citation omitted). Thus, when a court finally detennines an
issue in one case that is essential to that judgment, a litigant is barred from raising the issue again
in another lawsuit.
Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of
judicial dispute resolution against the conosive disrespect that would follow if the same
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho
at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133
(Ct.App.1983 )).
Stanion, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617; see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 128

S. Ct. 2161, 2171 , 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008).
Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars relitigation between the same parties of
a prior litigation is a question of law upon which this Court exercises free review.
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 319, 78 P.3d 379, 386 (2003). Res judicata is an
affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a
preponderance of the evidence. _Foster v. City of St. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883 , 890, 841
P.2d 413,420 (1992).
Id. at 122, 157 P.3d at 616.

In its decision granting partial summary judgment, this Court determined that the doctrine
of res judicata applied to not only the theory of recovery advanced by Wildlife Ridge in the First
Action, but to any theory of recovery at law or equity which could have been raised in that First
Action. Thus, Wildlife Ridge should have asserted every legal rule and/or equitable remedy to
establish that the Deed of Trust Note was unenforceable. The Defendant's new reliance on the
Memorandum Decision and Order
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Trusty case does not support the Defendant's argument that it was prohibited in the First Action

from bringing all available claims for relief other than a claim for quieting title. Wildlife Ridge
was not required to limit its requested relief to simply seeking a decree quieting title to the land.
However, having selected that solitary claim for relief, the doctrine of res judicata prohibits
Wildlife Ridge from now adding new or additional claims for relief that were available at the
time of the First Action, which action was indisputably litigated to a final judgment. When the
First Action was dismissed, Wildlife Ridge lost the ability to relitigate any other theories of
recovery arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions which were actually made
or which might have been made in the First Action. Unfortunately, Wildlife Ridge limited itself
by seeking a relief that was too narrow, and this Court can find no error of fact or law in its
previous decision to lhal effect.
The Defendant additionally argued reconsideration should be granted because the
Plaintiffs are simply barred from "the commencement of a foreclosure action in this matter"
because "[a]n action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on a real property must be commenced
within five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such
mortgage." (Mem. in Opp'n at 3.) Citing to the Trust Deed Note attached to the Plaintiffs'
Complaint, the Defendant argued:
The Deed of Trust being foreclosed is subject to the mandatory maturity date
contained in the Trust Deed Note. The note specifically states that "2. The term of this
Trust Deed Note shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. This Trust Deed Note shall
fully mature on June 28, 2006 (the 'Maturity Date')."
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(Id. at 3.) The Defendant argues there was no stay on the statute oflimitations, and the five-year

timeframe for commencing an action for the foreclosure of the subject mortgage has expired
based on the maturity date of June 28, 2006. Therefore, the Defendant claims the Plaintiffs are
now time-barred from enforcing their rights under the Deed of Trust Note and Modification.

(See Mem. in Opp'n at 3.) The Plaintiffs dispute that contention, arguing that "the record before
the Comt and applicable law supports a finding that the subject obligation is not time barred by
any applicable statute of limitations." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 9.)
As mentioned earlier, Idaho Code § 5-214A provides a five-year statute oflimitations for
the commencement of an action for the foreclosure of a mo1tgage. That statute states:
An action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property must be commenced within
five (5) years from the matmity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such
mortgage. If the obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage does not state a
maturity date, then the date of the accrual of the cause of action giving rise to the right to
foreclose shall be deemed the date of maturity of such obligation or indebtedness.

IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 5-214A (West). Idaho Code§ 45-1515 adopts the same five-year statute of
limitations for the foreclosure of deeds of trust. That statute states:
The foreclosure of a trust deed by advertisement and sale shall be made and the
foreclosure of a trust deed by judicial procedure shall be commenced within the time
limited by the same period and according to the same provisions including extensions as
provided by law for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1515 (West). The Defendant points to the maturity date stated in the
Deed of Trust Note, which is June 28, 2006. (See Ex. A, Trust Deed Note, attached to Compl. to
Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust, Oct. 7, 2016.) That date is not in dispute, and the Complaint
to foreclose the Deed of Trust was not filed until 2016. However, the Plaintiffs argue the statute
Memorandum Decision and Order
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of limitations was restarted by a partial payment made on November 8, 2012, "extending the
maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed ofTrnst, and the right to foreclose that Deed
of Trust, to November 8, 2017." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 10.)
In support of the extension argument, the Plaintiffs direct this Court to Idaho Code § 5238, which pertains to the effect of partial payments. That statute provides:
No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract by
which to take the case out of the operation of this chapter, unless the same is contained in
some writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby; but any payment ofprincipal or
interest is equivalent to a new promise in writing, duly signed, to pay the residue of the
debt.
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 5-238 (West)(emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has found that
payments of interest or principal serve to restart the statute of limitations on all installments on
the note pursuant to IC§ 5-238. Horkley v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 879, 881, 173 P.3d 1138, 1140
(2007). There is no dispute in this case that on November 8, 2012, the Plaintiffs "received a
payment on the Deed of Trust Note in the amount of $38,472.24 and applied that payment to the
principal due on the obligation." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 10; see also,
Supplemental Aff. in Supp. of Pls.' Foreclosure Decree, May 8, 2017, 13.) As such, the partial
payment made on the Deed of Trust in this case on November 8, 2012, restarted the five-year
statute of limitations, extending the maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of
Trust, including the right to foreclose that Deed of Trust, to November 8, 2017. The Complaint
to Judicially Foreclose the Deed of Trust was filed on October 7, 2016, within the five-year limit.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the partial payment extending the maturity date was made
after Wildlife Ridge had acquired the subject property and was therefore made with the
Memorandum Decision and Order
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Defendant's full knowledge and consent. Thus, under the provisions ofIC § 5-238, the partial
payment to the Plaintiffs constituted "a new promise in writing", extending the statute of
limitations found in IC§§ 5-214A and 45-1515 for an additional five years. As such, the
Plaintiffs' action to foreclose the Deed of Trust, filed on October 7, 2016, was timely filed, and
the Plaintiffs are not barred by the statute of limitations from commencing this action.
Therefore, the Defendant's statute oflimitation argument does not provide a valid basis for this
Court to reconsider its prior decision granting partial summary judgment in favor of the
Plaintiffs .
Motion for Summary Judgment
The Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment seeking a Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure against Wildlife Ridge. As set forth above, the Plaintiffs' request is supported by
this Court's previous entry of pruiial summary judgment and the subsequent Default entered
against Defendant M & S Development, LLC, for failure to appear or answer the Plaintiffs'
Complaint. Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock County has also consented to the
entry of a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure as sought by Monitor and First Capital pursuant
to the Amended Complaint. Based on that procedural history, the Plaintiffs argue this Court
need now only make a determination that there remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of
Trust, and make a further finding as to the description and reasonable value of the property still
encumbereq by that Deed of Trust. (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot., April 13, 2017, 4.)

Memorandum Decision and Order
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C

15

Re: Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration/Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
238 of 325

a.

Standard of Review

Swnmary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." IDAHO R. Crv. P.
56(c)(2016). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89,
867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994 ). This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party
opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.

Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). If the evidence
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then swnmary judgment should be granted. Loomis v.

City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).

If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 90,
867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when the
nonrnoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case upon
which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P.2d at
1037-38; Radell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing the
summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
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forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." IDAHO R. Crv. P. 56(e)(2016)

(emphasis added).
b.

Analysis

In opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant argued the amount of the
debt cannot be relitigated because the amount of the debt was already raised and litigated in the
First Action. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Reconsideration at 4.) The Defendant stated: "[T]he
amount of the debt was raised and litigated in the first quiet title action the result was a joint
stipulation dismissing the action." (Id.) Relying on the doctrine of res judicata, the Defendant
contends that the issue of whether a debt was owed was already litigated in the First Action, and
based on the joint stipulation entered there, the Plaintiffs are now barred from relitigating the
debt owed. 5
This Court has already extensively set forth the law regarding res judicata in the
proceeding sections, as well as in its prior Memorandum Decision and Order. There is no need
to repeat that discussion in great depth here. It is sufficient to note that under principles of res
judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an

absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim. A judgment,
"once rendered, is treated as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties
on the same 'claim' or 'cause of action.,,, Aldape, 105 Idaho at 256, 668 P .2d at 132(quoting
Kaspar Wire Works, Inc., 575 F.2d at 535- 36).

5 Outside

of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant did not raise any factual issues challenging swnmary
judgment, and the Defendant did not submit any affidavits or other eviden_ce to challenge summary judgment.
Memorandum Decision and Order
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Monitor and First Capital were defendants in the First Action. One defense raised by
Monitor and First Capital was the denial that the obligation owed by Michael Millward and
M&S Development had been satisfied. Mr. Millward and M&S were the makers of the Deed of
Trust Notes. However, Monitor and First Capital did not pursue any claims for relief in the First
Action because they were prohibited from doing so under applicable bankruptcy laws. As
makers of the Deed of Trust Notes, as modified, Mr. Millward and M&S were necessary parties
to any claim to foreclose the Deed of Trust and enforce the Deed of Trust Note and Modification.

See IDAHO R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(2016).6 However, at the time of the First Action, Mr. Millward
had already filed for bankrnptcy. Pursuant to Title 11, Section 362 of the United States Code 7,
an automatic stay commenced on September 10, 2012. The Plaintiffs submit they were

Rule 20. Permissive joinder of parties
(a) Persons Who May Join or be Joined.
(I) Plaintiffs. Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if:
(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.
(2) Defendants. Persons may be joined in one action as defendants if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
6

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,302, or 303 of this title,
or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities, of-7 (a)

(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over
property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a
claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;

11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West).
Memorandum Decision and Order
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prohibited by that bankruptcy stay from taking any action to enforce the Trust Deed Note, as
amended, and foreclose the Deed of Trust securing that Trust Deed Note. According to the
Plaintiffs, the automatic stay existed until the bankruptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016.
Thus, the pending Chapter 7 bankruptcy prevented Monitor and First Capital from asserting any
foreclosure claims against Defendants Millward, M&S Development, and Wildlife Ridge in the
First Action, and the amount of Monitor and First Capital's debt still owed was therefore never
actually litigated. In responding to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant offered no
evidence to dispute the fact that Monitor and First Capital could not have actually litigated a
claim for foreclosure in the First Action because they were prohibited from pursuing such a
claim against the makers of the Note based on the bankruptcy stay. As resjudicata is only a bar
to the relitigation of claims that have already been decided, and the Plaintiffs made no "claim"
for foreclosure in the First Action, res judicata cannot now prevent the Plaintiffs from pursuing
litigation regarding the amount of debt still owed.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the proceeding discussion regarding res judicata, no
factual issues have been raised by the Defendant in challenging summary judgment. Under the
governing standards, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment must produce
"evidence by way of affidavit or deposition ... to contradict the assertions of the moving party."
Ambrose By & Through Ambrose v. Buhl Joint Sch. Dist. No. 412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P .2d

1088, 1091 (Idaho Ct. App. l 994)(intemal citations omitted). Such evidence must be anchored
in something more than mere speculation. See id. A non-moving party's failure to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which
Memorandum Decision and Order
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that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment. See

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 295
(1986). "In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322-23, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. Thus, where
the non-moving party has failed to make a showing of proof on any element for which it bears
the burden at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; see
also, Sparks v. St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd., 115 Idaho 505,509, 768 P.2d 768, 772 (1988).
The Defendant here has failed to present any affidavits or evidence to challenge summary
judgment or to support any defense to the foreclosure relief sought by the Plaintiffs. On the
other hand, the Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits in support of summary judgment. Therefore,
based on the governing standards, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment must
necessarily be granted.
CONCLUSION

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. This Cowt fwther
finds there remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of Trust. Pursuant to the affidavit filed
in support of the Plaintiffs' motion, "[a]s of the

1st day

of April, 2017, there will be due, owing

and unpaid upon the Trust Deed Note, as modified, the sum of $6,814,076.41, together with
interest thereafter accruing at the default rate of 35% per annum until date of Judgment herein,
together with costs, foreclosure expenses, attorney's fees and expenses necessary to preserve
Plaintiffs' interest in the property heretofore advanced or hereafter accruing." (Aff. in Supp. of
Memorandum Decision and Order
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/

Pls.' Foreclosure Decree at 6:6.) Based on that undisputed affidavit, this Court finds there
remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of Trust and owing to the Plaintiffs in the amount of
$6,814,076.41.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs shall submit a proposed Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure
detailing the amount remaining on the unpaid debt and the description and reasonable value of
the property still encumbered by that Deed of Trust for this Court's consideration and signature.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs may also submit an appropriate memorandum detailing the
grounds for any claimed award of litigation costs and attorney fees. However, any decision
regarding costs and fees will be made in a separate order after this Court is provided an
opportunity to review such a request in detail.
Based on the preceding discussion and this Cowt's .findings, no claims remain. As such,
this case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

I~

day of June 2017.

ROBERT C. NAFTZ
District Judge

Memorandum Decision and Order
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the14th day of June, 2017, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document upon each of the following in the manner indicated.

Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen
PO Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

(X) E-Mail

( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

A. Bruce Larsen
155 S. 2nd Ave.
Pocatello, ID 83201

(X) E-Mail

( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

ROBERT POLEK.I, Clerk

By:

KE~XN~
Deputy Clerk
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Ron Kerl, Esq. - ISB # 1768
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182
Email: _.,., :'. :·,·11)p,~r-:_:1r,,:n .l on1
Allorn ev for Mo11itor Finance, L. C. a11d First Capital Funding, L. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAP IT AL FUNDING, L.C. , a
Utah limited liability company,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

VS.

)

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company;
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; rtnd
PIONEER TITLE COMPANY OF
BANNOCK COUNTY, INC. ,

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

)

Defendants.

)

CASE NO. CV-20 l 6-3588-0C

JUDG.MENT, DECREE Of'
FORECLOSURE AND ORDER
OFSALE

)
)

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an ldal10
limited liability company,

)
)
)

Counter-claimant,
vs.

)
)
)

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Counter-defendant,

_ _________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
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Thi matter having come on regularly before the Court, the Honorable Robert C. Naftz
presiding, and finding good cause therefore;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
I.

Pursuant to the parties stipulation and this Court's Stipulated Order Approving

Stipulations Consenti ng to the Sale of Real Property elated April 28 2017, Pioneer Title Company
is hereby ordered to turn over to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., in care of
their attorney of record, Ron Kerl of the firm of Cooper & Larsen, Chtd., 151 N. 3"1 Ave., Second
Floor, Pocatello, Idaho, the net proceeds from the sale of the below described prope1ty, totaling
$256,76 1.67. Said funds are currently deposited in the trust account of Pioneer Title Company. The

net proceeds from the sale of the following property:
Lot 2, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2- $44,195.82
Lot 5, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $44,928.14
Lot 7 & Lot 9, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DLVISION 2 - $86,749.80
Lot 4, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $45,433.92
Lot 6, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION I -$35,453.99
2.

The Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated

December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trust") , executed and delivered by M&S Development LLC , to
Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., recorded on the 3011, day of December, 2005,
under Recorder's Instrument No. 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho, is a valid first
lien on the below described real property seeming an indebtedness of $6,828,907.39, as of June 19,
2017, plus any additional attorney fees and costs mvarded by the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54,

and costs related to the enforcement of this Decree by Sheriffs Foreclosure Sale, plus legal interest
on the entire sum of the aforesaid indebtedness from the date of this Decree to and including the date
of Sheriffs sale at the highest rate allowed by law;
.l udgc111c11t and Decree of Foreclosure and Order

or Sale - pg. 2
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The real property encum bered by the Deed of Trust is situated in the County of Bannock,
State of Idaho, is more particularly described as follows :
Lot I, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2; and
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION 1
3.

The Deed of Trust described in paragraph 2 is fo reclosed, and all interests which the

Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J. Mil lward, M&S Development LLC, and
Pioneer Title Company have in the above described real property, and any fixtures on the property,
shal l be sold by the Sheriff of Bannock County Idaho, in the manner provided by law, payable in
cash lawful money of the United States of America and in accordance with the practice of this Court.
The reasonable value of said prope1ty as of the date of this Decree is as follows:
Lot I, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2- $50,000.00
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION I -$50,000
4.

The proceeds of sale shall be app lied as follows: First, to the costs of sale; second,

toward ' the satisfaction of the indebtedness owing to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Cap ital
Funding, L.C. as set forth in paragraph 2 above; and third, any surplus thereafter remaining shall be
paid into the District Court for further dcte1111ination regarding priority among those parties to thi s
litigation whose rights are subordinate to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, LC ..
5.

The Defendants Wild life Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J. Millward, M&S

Development LLC, and Pioneer Ti tle Company, and all persons claiming through or under them
as purchasers, encumbrancers, or otherwise and all persons claiming to have acquired any equity or
interest in said premises are foreclosed of all interests, liens, or claims in the real property herein
above described, and every portion thereof, save and except such statutory rights of redemption as
sa id parties or any of them may have.
Judgc111cn1 .in ti Dcl'l'ec of' F orcdosurc an ti Order or Snlc - pg. 3
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6.

The Plaintiff, with either a cash bid or a credit bid against the su m herein found to be

due it, or any party to this suit may become the purchaser at the sale or said property, and the
purchaser thereof sha ll be entitled to all of the rights and privileges of such a purchaser und..:r the
laws of the State of Idaho.
DATED This

:1.fJ__ day of June, 2017.
Hon . Robert C. Naftz
DISTRICT JUDGE
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l HEREBY CERT IFY on the -:lfJ__ day of June, 20 17, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoin g document as follows :
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile - 208-932-1083
( ] Email to: bruce@hwlawpro.com

A. Bruce Larson
Hearn Law, P~LP , ,.,,., ,,J A.. 1
·P:e>:-B'OTI(:)'.' 10£3 S·fl\{/1·I( V'f./
Poca tel lo, ID 8320 I

[x]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen, Chtd.
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205

[x] U.S . Mail, postage prepaid
[ J Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083
[ ] Email to: ron@cooperlarsen.com

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:

-

rm;·r=n1

--1--~......:......:.-'---'-~
--~~
---

Deputy
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Ron Kerl, Esq. - ISB # 1768
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 235-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182
Email: rnti 11 cdO IH,; r --br,;L·11. l ·t i 111
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Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,

)
)
)
)
)
)

VS.

)

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2016-3588-0C

)

Defendant/ Appellant,

)
)

M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; and PIONEER TITLE
COMPANY OF BANNOCK COUNTY, INC.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

RESPONDENTS'
DESIGNATION OF
ADDITIONAL RECORD ON
APPEAL

)

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTA TES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company, Counter-claimant/Appellant,
vs.
MONITOR FINANCE, LC., a Utah limited liability
company; and FlRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Counter-defendants/Respondents.

_ _ _ ______ _____ _ _ _ _

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Respondents' Designation Of Additional Record On Appeal - pg. I
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COME NOW the Plaintiffs and Respondents Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First
Capital Funding, L.C. ("First Capital"), by and through their attorneys of record, and pursuant to
I.A.R. 28 designate the following additional documents for inclusion in the Clerk's Record on
Appeal, in addition to the documents automatically included in the Clerk's Record pursuant to I.A.R.
28 and those documents identified in paragraph 5. of the Appellant's Notice of Appeal fi led on July
11 , 2017:
1.

Third Affidavit of Ron Kerl in Support of Summary Judgment and Opposing Motion
for Reconsideration filed on May 8, 2017; and

2.

Memorandum Opposing Motion for Reconsideration and Reply Memorandum in
Support of Summary Judgment Motion fi led on May 8, 2017.

Respectfolly submitted this _15day of July, 2017.

COOPER & LARSEN, CHTD
Attorney for Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital
Funding, L. .
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY on the 18(" day of July, 2017, I served a trne and correct copy of the
foregoing document as follows:
A. Bruce Larson

[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-904-1816
[ ] Emai l to:

Richard A. Hearn
HEARN LAW PLC
P.O. Box 70
Pocatello, ID 83204

I_;! rs_~~ 1~~1Jl_i_t:i!r!~
I." \\j:crs. c. '.;11
Jicrn(c/! hCilrll Ja \.\'\'Cl"S .COl ll

COOP:mHTD

By:___,~,_______,
_ ___,__ _ _ _ _ __
Ron Kerl, of the firm
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I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, LC., a Utah limited)
Liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL )
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability )
Company,
)
)
)
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
)
)

vs.

Supreme Court No.

)

)
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an
)
Idaho limited liability company;
)
Defendant/Appellant M&S DEVELOPMENT)
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, )
)
Defendant
)
)
)
)
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an
)
Idaho Limited liability company;
)
)
Counter-Claimant/Appellant,
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

OF
APPEAL

__________

vs.

)

)
MONITOR FINANCE, LC., a Utah limited)
Liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL )
FUNDING, LC., a Utah limited liability )
Company,
)
)
Counter-Defendants/Respondents)
)
)

________

Appealed from: Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County
Honorable Judge Robert C. Naftz presiding
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Bannock County Case No: CV-2016-3588-0C
Order of Judgment Appealed from: Memorandum Decision and Order filed the
2ih day of March, 2017, Memorandum Decision and Order filed the 14th day of
June, 2017 and Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale filed the 20th
day of June, 2017.
Attorney for Appellant: Richard A. Hearn, Attorney HEARN LAW PLC, Pocatello
Attorney for Respondent: Ron Kerl, Attorney COOPER & LARSEN, Chartered,
Pocatello
Appealed by: Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
Defendant/Appellant M&S Development, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
Defendant.
Appealed against: Monitor Finance, L.C., a Utah limited liability company; and
First Capital Funding, L.C., a Utah limited liability company.
Notice of Appeal filed: July 11, 2017
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: No
Appellate fee paid: Yes
Request for additional records filed: No
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Name of Reporter: N/ A
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? No
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Ron Kerl, Esq., ISB #1768
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 No1ih Third Avenue, Suite 210
P.O. Box 4229
Pocate11o, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
(208) 235-1182
Facsimile:
Email: ron@cooper-larsen.com
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Attorneys for Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES , LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Counter-claimant,
V.

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability ,
Counter -defendants.

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C

NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE IN
FORECLOSURE

Counter-claimant,
V.

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,
Counter -defendants.

UNDER AND BY VIRTUE of a Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale
entered in the above entitled action in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State

NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE IN FORECLOSURE - 1
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of Idaho, in and for the County of Baimock on the 20th day of June, 2017, in which said action
Plaintiffs Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C. obtained a Judgment, Decree of
Foreclosure and Order of Sale for the sum of$6,828,907.39 as of June 20, 2017, plus any additional
attorney fees and costs awarded by the Comi pursuant to I.R.C.P . Rule 54, and costs related to the
enforcement of this Decree by Sheriffs Foreclosure Sale, plus legal interest on the entire sum of
the aforesaid indebtedness from the date of this Decree to and including the date of Sheriffs sale
at the highest rate allowed by law; and
Pursuant to a Writ of Execution issued by the Clerk of the above entitled Court on the 27'h
day of June, 2017, I, the Sheriff of Bannock County, Idaho, am commanded to sell ce1iain lots,
pieces or parcels of land situated and lying and being in Bannock County, State of Idaho, said
property being more paiiicularly described as follows, to-wit:
Lot 1, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 and
Lot2,B1ock3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION 1

PUBLIC NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on Wednesday
August

, 2017, at the hour of

, the 30th_ day of

10:00 a .m., at the Bannock County She1iffs Office, 5800 S.

5th Ave., in Pocatello, Idaho, I will, in obedience to said Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and
Order of Sale and Execution issued pursuant thereto, sell the said prope1iy above described, or so
much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the indebtedness due the Plaintiffs, with interest, costs
and accruing costs at public auction to the highest bidder for cash, lawful money of the United
States of Amelica.
You are notified that the Plaintiffs, Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C.,
may purchase the property by making a credit bid against the amount due to them pursuant to the
Judgment.

NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE IN FORECLOSURE - 2
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You may contact Ron Kerl , whose address 151 N. Third , Pocatello, Idaho 83205, and
whose telephone number is (208) 235-1145, for specific information regarding the location of the
property and the foreclosure.
As of June 20, 20 17, there remained unpaid upon said Judgment a total amount due of
$6,828,907.39, plus accrued and accruing legal interest at the rate of 5.375% per arurnm from June
20, 2017 and costs pennitted by law.
DATED This~ day of

July

, 2017.
BANNOCK COUNTY SHERIFF

By~ --='D~·~Ar==m=s=tr~on=g..,_~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Deputy Sheriff

NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE IN FORECLOSURE - 3
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MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,

)
)

Plaintiffs-CounterdefendantsRespondents,

)

)
)
)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

)

)
Supreme Court Docket No. 45275-2017
) · Bannock County No. CV·2016-3588-0C

v.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Defendant-Counterc]aimantAppellant,

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

and

)
)

M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

)

Defendant.

)
)
)

An ORDER CONDITIONALLY DlSMI.SSlNG APPEAL was issued by this Court on August

22, 20 I 7, as it appeared· the JUDGMENT, DECREE OF FORECLOSURE AND ORDER OF SALE
entered by Distdct Judge Robert C. Naftz and filed on June 20, 2017, did not comply with I..R.C.P.
54(a). This appeal was suspended for entry of a final judgment in the District Court, pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54(a).

WHEREAS, there having been no final judgment entered in the District Court, pursuant to
l.R.C.P. 5.4(a), and Appellant having filed no Response with this Co.urt .to the Order Conditionally
Dismissing }\ppeal entered by thiS'Court on August 22, 2017; therefore,

IT HEREBY 1.z~RED that this appeal be, and hereby is, DISMISSED.
DATED .this

%''

day of September, 2017.

.

.

K

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge Robert C. Naftz

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL - Docket No.45275-2017
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In the Supr.eme· Court of the State of Idaho
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited 1iability
company,
Plaintiffs-CounterdefendantsRespondents,

v.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Defendant-CounterclaimantAppellant,
and
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Defendant.
An ORDER CONDITIONALLY DlSMI.SSING APPEAL was issued by this Court on August
22, 2017, as it appeared· the JUDGMENT, DECREE OF FORECLOSURE AND ORDER OF SALE
entered by Dist.rict Judge Robert C. Naftz and filed on June 20, 2017, did not comply with 1..R.C.P.
54(a). This appeal was suspended for entry of a final judgment in the District Court, pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54(a).
WHEREAS, there having been no final judgment entered in the District Court, pursuant to
l.R.C.P. 54(a), and Appellant having filed ·no Response with this Court_to the Order Conditionally
Dismissing Appeal entered by this·court on Augus.t 22, 2017; therefore,

IT HEREBY 1.z~RED that this appeal be, and hereby is, DISMISSED . .
DATED .this

g''

day of September, 2017.

.

.

. } .

For the SuP1e Cou

K
cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court C1erk
District Judge Robert C. Naftz
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Ron Kerl, Esq. - ISB #1768
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
I 51 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 23 5-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235-1182
Email: ,·0::.:1 \.ll,lJ2.'..T J.w-.,'il ,:11111
A ttomey.for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

VS.

)

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; and PIONEER TITLE
COMPANY OF BANNOCK COUNTY, INC.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2016-3588-0C

JUDGMENT

)
)

WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

)
)
)

Counter-claimant,
vs.
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAP IT AL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Counter-defendant,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _

)
)

Judgment - Pg. I
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Judgment is entered against M & S Development, LLC for the sum of $6,728,907.39, as of
June 19, 20 17, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate set by LC.§ 28-22- 104, to wit: 5.625%
per annum.
DATED This f

O day of October, 20 17.

~fe:fr C -( r.{3t
Hon. Robert C. Naftz
DISTRICT JUDG E
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY on the

1L

day of October, 2017, 1 served a true and correct copy

of the forego ing document as follows:

A. Bruce Larson
Hearn & Wood LLP
155 S. 2'"1 Ave.
Pocatello, ID 83201

[x] U.S . Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083
[ ] Email to: bruce@hwlawpro .com

Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen, Chtd.
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205

[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

[
[
[
[

] Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
] Facsimile - 208-932-1083
] Email to: !~'.2_111,1Kr-

lar:-:cn .c11111

M&S Development, LLC
c/o Michael Millward, Registered Agent
9716 W. Bighorn Drive
Pocatello, ID 83204

[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932- 1083
[ ] Email to: ron@cooperlarsen.com

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:

--+-\16vi
~·

<...L.J--

~ +-----'---'I---·

Dep~
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A. Brnce Larson (ISB#: 2093)
Richard A. Heam (ISB# 5574)
HEARN LAW PLC
P.O. Box 70
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone: (208) 904-0004
Facsimile: (208) 904-1816
Email: larson@heamlawyers.com
heam@heamlawyers.com

Attorney for Defendant/Applellant,
Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C. , a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,

Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C

V

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company, Defendant/Appellant;
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company, Defendant.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counter-Claimant/Appellant;
V

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Counter-defendants/Respondents.

Notice of Appeal - Page 1
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, Monitor Finance, L.C., a Utah

limited liability company, First Capital Funding, L.C., a Utah limited liability

company, AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD, Ron Kerl of the firm Cooper &
Larsen, Chartered, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

I. Designation of Appeal: That the above-named Appellant, Wildlife Ridge Estates, an
Idaho limited liability company, appeals against the above-named Respondents to the
Idaho Supreme Court from the following appealable judgments and orders, attached
hereto, issued by the District Court in this matter pursuant to I.A.R. 11 (a):
a. Memorandum Decision and Order dated March 27, 2017, Honorable Robert C.
Naftz presiding;
b. Memorandum, Decision & Order dated June 13, 2017, Honorable Robert C. Naftz
presiding;
c. Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale dated June 20, 2017,
Honorable Robert C. Naftz presiding; and,
d. Judgment dated October 10, 2017, Honorable Robe1t C. Naftz presiding.
2. Issues:
a. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the
Respondent, dismissing Appellant's Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim and
in issuing its subsequent orders referenced hereinabove;

Notice of Appeal - Page 2
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b. The District Com1 erred in granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment
dismissing the Affinnative Defenses and Counterclaim of Appellant in that there
are disputed mate1ial issues of fact and issues of law;
c. The District Comt's determinations on the Respondents' Motions for Summary
Judgment were not based upon a proper legal basis or supported by substantial
undisputed evidence;
d . The District Court erred in determining that the Respondents' Trnst Deed should
be judicially foreclosed , in that there are legal issues and disputed materials issues
of fact that would preclude the entry of summary judgment allowing the
foreclosure; and,
e. Such other issues that may be identified subsequent to the filing of this Notice of
Appeal.
3. Jurisdictional Statement: Under and pursuant to I.AR. 11, Appellant has the right to
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court the aforementioned appealable orders under and
pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l(a).
4. Transcript: There was no trial or recorded testimony and, therefore, Appellant does not
request a rep011er's transcript of any court proceedings.
5. Record: The documents to be included in the clerk's record in addition to those
automatically included pursuant to I.AR. 28 are:
a. Respondents' two Motions for Summaiy Judgment and Supporting Memoranda;
b. Respondents' Affidavits and affidavit exhibits filed in supp011 of the motions for
Summary Judgment;
c. Appellant's Memoranda in opposition to the motions for Summary Judgment;

Notice of Appeal - Page 3
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d. Appellant's Motion to Reconsider and Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Support of Motion for Reconsideration;
6.

Exhibits: No exhibits were offered or admitted.

7. Sealed Record: No order has been entered sealing any part of the record or transcript.
8. I hereby certify that:
a. A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Couit Reporter of these
proceedings, no reporter's transcript has been requested;
b. The Clerk of the District Com1 has been paid the estimated fee for the preparation
of the reporter's transcript pursuant to I.A.R. 24;
c. That all appellate filing fees have been paid; and,
d. That service has been made upon all pa11ies required to be served pursuant to
I.A.R. 20.
DATED t h i s *day of October, 2017.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
copy of the above and foregoing documen
Ron Kerl
COOPER & LARSEN, Chattered
151 North Third A venue, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145

day of October, 2017, I served a ttue and con-ect
he following person(s) as follows:
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

[,JJ

U.S. Mail - Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: 208-235-1182
Email: ron@cooper-larsen.com

RICHA
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
)
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
)
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, )
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

VS.

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company; M&S
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

)
)
)

Defendants.
)
________________
)
)

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company;

)
)

)

Counter-claimant,

)
)
)
)

vs.

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
)
limited liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL )
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, )
)
Counter-defendant.
)

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This case was initiated by a Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed by the
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C.

Memorandum Decision and Order
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C
Re: Plaintiffs· Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment
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("First Capital"). 1 Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC 2, filed an Answer
and also brought a counterclaim against Monitor and First Capital for fraud and declaratory and
injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs have now submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking dismissal of the affirmative defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer, as well as
dismissal of the Counterclaim. The Plaintiffs also submitted a Motion to Amend the Complaint,
which was scheduled for a hearing date separate from the motion for partial summary judgment.

In support of partial summary judgment, the Plaintiffs submitted a written brief and the Affidavit
of Ron Kerl, including exhibits. Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge responded with an
opposing brief and the Affidavit of Richard A. Hearn, with attached exhibits. The Plaintiffs then
followed up with a reply brief and the Second Affidavit of Ron Kerl, including exhibits.
Oral arguments were conducted on February 21, 2017. At the outset of the hearing, the
parties addressed the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Complaint. Although that motion was set
to be heard at a later date, counsel for the Defendants indicated they had no objection to the
amendment of the Complaint. Therefore, in a ruling from the bench, this Court granted the
Plaintiffs' request to add a new defendant based upon stipulation of the parties.
Having reviewed the entire file and the relevant law, and after consideration of the
arguments made by the parties, this Court now issues this Memorandum Decision and Order.

1.

\.Vhether to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

1

Collectively referred to herein as "the Plaintiffs".
Referred to herein as "Wildlife Ridge" or "the Defendant".
Memorandum Decision and Order
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Idaho R. Civ. P.
56( c)(2016). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89,
867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party
opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.

Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). If the evidence
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v.
City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).

If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at
90, 867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when
the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case
upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P .2d
at 1037-38; Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing
the summary judgment motion ''may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
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forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2016)
(emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following pertinent facts are found by a preponderance of the evidence, with all
reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the Defendant. Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146
Idaho 764,768,203 P.3d 694, 698 (2009)("All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record
are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax

Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641,644 (2006)). 3
Wildlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of certain real property described in the Deed of
Trust attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust.
On December 3, 2014, Wildlife Ridge filed its initial Complaint seeking to quiet title in that
property against the same plaintiffs in this case, Monitor Finance and First Capital ("the First
Action"). 4 (See Exs. A and B, attached to Aff. of Ron Kerl in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. Filed by
Monitor and First Capital ("Kerl Aff."), Jan. 6, 2017.) That Complaint was amended on March
12, 2015 . (Exs. A and C, attached to Kerl Aff.) By its Complaint and Amended Complaint,
Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of
Trust free and clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from

3

The background infonnation was extracted from the parties' briefs and the submitted affidavits and exhibits.

4 Based on stipulation of the parties at oral arguments, this Court takes judicial notice of the
fi lings and outcome of
the First Action.
Memorandum Decision and Order
4

Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C
Re: Plaintiffs' Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment
274 of 325

the district court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and the Modification of Trust
Deed Note ("the Modification") secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust had been
satisfied. (Exs. Band C, attached to Kerl Aff.) On June 14, 2016, a Judgment dismissing the
First Action with prejudice was entered. (Ex. E, attached to Kerl Aff.)
DISCUSSION

As explained above, the case presently before this Court was initiated by a Complaint to
Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed against Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC and
M&S Development, LLC. Wildlife Ridge filed an Answer to Complaint and a Counterclaim
against the Plaintiffs for fraud and declaratory and injunctive relief. In an earlier action, Wildlife
Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of Trust free
and clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the
district court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and Modification had been
satisfied. That case was dismissed with prejudice. In seeking partial summary judgment, the
Plaintiffs argue that all defenses and claims now raised by Wildlife Ridge in response to the
current lawsuit are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
a.

Law

Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon
the same claim. The Idaho Supreme Court explained the doctrine of res judicata, or claim
preclusion, as follows:

Memorandum Decision and Order
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Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the original action.

Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81,278 P.3d 943,951 (2012) (citations
omitted, emphasis added). Thus, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent
relitigation of a claim previously asse1ied, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating
to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Elliot v.

Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803,805 (2002). As such, "in an action
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim

but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic
Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436-37, 849 P.2d 107, 109-10
(l 993)(emphasis added); see also Joyce v. A1urphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553,
208 P. 241, 242 -43 (1922). As further explained by Idaho courts, because the transactional
concept of a claim is broad, "the bar of claim preclusion may apply even where there is not a
substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of a claim, or in the evidence
relating to those theories." Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,259,668 P.2d 130, 135 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1983)(cited with approval by Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho at 437, 849 P.2d at 110.) Thus, "a valid
and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho
Memorandum Decision and Order
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at 437, 849 P.2d at 110; see also Diamond v. Farmers Ins., 119 Idaho 146,150,804 P.2d 319,
323 (1990).
Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of
judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho
at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133
(Ct.App.1983)).
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613,617 (2007).

b.

Analysis

The Plaintiffs argue the First Action already addressed the enforceability of the same
Deed of Trust Note, Modification, and Deed of Trust at issue here. Because that lawsuit was
dismissed with prejudice, the Plaintiffs maintain that the Defendants are now prevented from
presenting any defense or claim challenging the enforceability of the debt which might have and
should have been litigated in that First Action. (Mem. in Supp. of Swnm. J. Mot. Filed by
Monitor and First Capital ("Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J."), Jan. 6, 2017, 3-4.) The Plaintiffs have
therefore asked this Court to strike and dismiss the affirmative defenses and the Counterclaim
raised by the Defendant.
In response, the Defendant argues res judicata is not a bar to the defenses and/or
counterclaim it has raised in the present lawsuit because none of those issues were "actually
litigated in the Quiet Title Action and they could not have been litigated." (Def. Wildlife
Ridge's Resp. to Pls. Monitor Finance L.C.'s and First Capital L.C.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J.
("Def.'s Resp."), Feb. 6, 2017, 12.) For example, Wildlife Ridge first argues that "[t]he entity
Memorandum Decision and Order
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that appeared in the Quiet Title Action as Monitor Financial L.C. was not a real party in interest
to the transactions that were the subject matter of that action or the present action." (Def. 's Resp.
at 6.) In support of that allegation, the Defendant points to the fact that the Monitor Finance,
L.C. that was named as a party to the Note and Deed of Trust expired on September 17, 2012,
and was never renewed. Instead, " [a] new entity bearing the same name Monitor Financial L.C.
was established on January 23, 2015 nearly two months after the Quiet Title Action was filed on
December 3, 2014." (Id.) Thus, the Defendant argues that one of the plaintiffs in this case,
Monitor Finance, L.C., which entity was named as a defendant in the First Action to quiet title
filed by Wildlife Ridge, was not a real party in interest in that case because it had been
administratively dissolved before the First Action was filed. The Defendant further argues that
its pending counterclaim and affirmative defenses for fraud were not raised and could not have
been litigated in the quiet title action because neither M&S Development, LLC ("M&S"), or
Michael Millward were named parties. 5 (See id.) While the Defendant notes that M&S and Mr.
Millward were referenced in both the initial complaint and the amended complaint to quiet title,
the Defendant argues that neither M&S nor Mr. Millward were named parties in the quiet title
action and "there were no allegations made by any party in the Quiet Title Action that either
M&S or Millward had done anything wrong." (Id.) The Defendant thus argues: "As Millward
and M&S would have been necessary parties to any fraud claim brought against Plaintiffs,

5 "On

December 30, 2005, M&S Development, LLC and Michael Millward signed a promissory note with First
Capital Funding, L.C. and Monitor Finance, L.C. for $244,000.00." (Ex. C, attached to Kerl Aff., Am. Comp!. to
Quite Title ("First Action"), March 16, 20 16, 7; see also Ex. B, attached to Kerl Aff., Comp!. to Quiet Title, Dec. I,
2014, §§7-8.)
Memorandum Decision and Order
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Wildlife Ridge had no duty to bring its claim for fraud against Plaintiffs, Millward and M&S in
association with its Quiet Title Action." (Def. 's Resp. at 8.) Finally, the Defendant argues that
the Modification of Trust Deed Note was never mentioned in the pleadings filed in the quiet title
action. (Id. at 7.) The Defendant argues the Modification is "central" to the foreclosure action
and Wildlife Ridge's counterclaim for fraud, and is another example of a claim that could not
have been brought in the First Action. (Id.)
First, this Court must reject the Defendant's argument that Monitor Finance, L.C. , while a
named defendant in the First Action, was nonetheless not a real party in interest to that lawsuit
because it had been previously administratively dissolved. Dissolution of a corporation does not
prevent the commencement of legal proceedings against that corporation in its corporate name.
Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, NA., 1999 UT 91,

~

14,991 P.2d 584,587; see also

UTAH CODE ANN.§ 16-lOa-1405 (West). 6 Because the debt owed existed prior to any

§ 16-IOa-1405. Effect of dissolution
(I) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any business except that
appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including:
(a) collecting its assets;
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be distributed in kind to its shareholders;
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities;
(d) distributing its remaining property among its shareholders according to their interests; and
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs.
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not:
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property;
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, although the authorizatioQ. to dissolve may provide for closing the
corporation's share transfer records;
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8, Directors and
Officers;
(d) change:
(i) quorum or voting requirements for its board of directors or shareholders;
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal of its directors or officers or both; or
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its articles of incorporation;
(e) prevent commencement of a proceed ing bv or against the corporation in its corporate name;
Memorandum Decision and Order
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dissolution and Monitor Finance was sued during the winding down process to invalidate that
debt, Monitor Finance was a legitimate party in interest and a named defendant in the First
Action.
This Court further rejects the Defendant's argument that M&S and Michael Millward
were indispensable parties for a complete resolution regarding Wildlife Ridge's claim that the
debt due to the Plaintiffs was unenforceable. Whether a party is "indispensable" is governed by
IRCP _19(a)( 1). 7 Under that rule, a party shall be joined if:

(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing
paiiies; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the
interest; or
(ii) leave an existing par1y subjecl to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
Idaho R. Civ. P. l 9(a). In this case, complete relief could have been granted to Wildlife Ridge if
the court in the quiet title action had determined that the debt had been satisfied. If that had been

(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or &gainst the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or

(g) tenninate the authority of the registered agent of the corporation.
UTAH

CODE ANN. § 16-lOa-1405 (West)(emphasis added).

7 Rule 19. Required joinder of parties
(a) Persons Required to be Joined if Feasible.
(I) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party in the action if:
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or
(8) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in
the person's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations because of the interest.
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the outcome, the Plaintiffs' Deed of Trust would have no debt to secure, and title to the premises
could have been quieted in Wildlife Ridge, free and clear of that encumbrance. No matter the
basis for such a finding, that outcome would not have adversely affected either M&S or Mr.
Millward since the debt they were personally liable for would no longer be enforceable. In
addition, there was no risk of double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations since M&S
and Mr. Millward would have been bound by a decree finding that the debt owed was
unenforceable, no matter whether the basis of such a decree was that the debt had been satisfied
or that the debt was unenforceable based on a statute of limitations or fraud argument. As such,
M&S and Mr. Millward were not indispensable parties to Wildlife Ridge's quiet title action
and/or Wildlife Ridge's attempt to have the debt deemed unenforceable.
This Court must also reject the Defendant's arguments regarding the Modification. The
Defendant argued the Modification dated March 3, 2008, was fraudulent and the "statute of
limitations claim is related directly to the validity and effect of the claimed Modification."
(Def.'s Resp. at 10.) The Defendant argued that because the Modification of Trust Deed Note
was "never mentioned" in the pleadings filed in the quiet title action, the issues surrounding the
Modification could not have been litigated and therefore cannot now be barred by res judicata.
However, the record shows the Defendant was aware of the Modification during the First Action,
since the Modification was produced to Wildlife Ridge tlu-ough discovery. (Ex. 2, First Capital
Funding, L.C.'s Resp. to Pl.'s First Set of Discovery, attached to Second Aff. of Ron Kerl in
Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. Filed by Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., ~i4-5,
Feb. 14, 2017.) As such, any claims pertaining to the Modification could have been raised in the
Memorandum Decision and Order

11

Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C
Re: Plaintiffs' Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment
281 of 325

First Action, and this Court has also already determined that M&S and Mr. Millward were not
indispensable parties to the Quiet Title Action necessary to any fraud allegation attempting to
show the debt owed to the Plaintiffs was unenforceable.
Therefore, based on the above findings and the undisputed facts in this case, all of the
Defendant's claims that could have challenged the enforceability of the debt secured by the Deed
of Trust should have been litigated in the quiet title action. There is no dispute that in the First
Action Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title to the property described in Monitor
Finance's and First Capital's Deed of Trust free and clear of that Deed of Trust by claiming there
was no enforceable debt which could be secured because the applicable promissory note had
been satisfied by previous payments made to the Plaintiffs. Thus, the gravamen of the first quiet
title action was that there was no enforceable debt left to be secured by the Plaintiffs'
encumbering the Deed of Trust. Furthermore, there is no question that both the First Action and
this matter involve the same parties and the same Deed of Trust. There is also no question that
the First Action was finally resolved and dismissed with prejudice by entry of a final judgment
rejecting the Defendant's attempt to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the
Modification, and the Deed of Trust. As explained, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not
only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of
any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have

been made. No matter the theory advanced by the Defendant in its original quiet title action, the
dismissal of the First Action serves as a dismissal with prejudice of every matter that was
available in the First Action to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the
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Modification, and the Deed of Trust in this case. A careful reading of Wildlife Ridge's Answer
and Counterclaim show that the affirmative defenses and claim of fraud all challenge the
enforceability of the same Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust Note, Modification and Deed
of Trust at issue in the First Action; therefore, those claims should have been litigated in the First
Action. The Defendant has not demonstrated that it was in any way prevented from presenting
in the First Action any of the claims it has now raised. This Court has found there to be no
question of fact that those claims, including any statute of limitations defense, the equitable
doctrines of laches and unclean hands, and the claim of fraud all relate to and arose prior to the
dismissal of the First Action.
Therefore, because the First Case ended in a final judgment on the merits, because this
case involves the same parties as the First Case, and because all of the claims in this case arise
out of the same transaction or series of transactions as decided in the First Case, the affirmative
defenses and counterclaim now raised by the Defendant are barred_by the doctrine of res

judicata.
CONCLUSION

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. This Court
has determined the Defendant's affirmative defenses and fraud claim are barred by the doctrine
of res judicata. Therefore, all of the affirmative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as
well as the Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud are hereby stricken and dismissed.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this~ day of March 2017.

~ c. I)
ROBERT C. NAFTZ
District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST At£· .. \
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability company,
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs.

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company; M&S
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Defendants.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counterclaimant,
vs.

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,
Counterdefendants,

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This case was initiated by a Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust filed by the
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Monitor Finance, L.C. ("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C.
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("First Capital"). 1 Defendant/Counterclaimant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC 2, filed an Answer
and also brought a counterclaim against Monitor and First Capital for fraud and declaratory and
injunctive relief.
On January 6, 2017, the Plaintiffs submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking dismissal of the affirmative defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer, as well as
dismissal of the Counterclaim. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was
granted, and all of the affinnative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as well as the
Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud were stricken and dismissed. (Mem. Decision and Order,
March 27, 2017, 13.)
On April 13, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, along
with a brief and affidavits. Defendant Wildlife Ridge opposed the Motion for Summary
Judgment by submitting a Motion for Reconsideration, seeking reversal ofthis Court's prior
entry of summary judgment granting the Plaintiffs' request to strike the Defendant's affirmative
defenses and Counterclaim. The Defendant's brief addressed both the Motion for
Reconsideration and opposed the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Defendant did
not submit any affidavits or other evidence.
Oral arguments regarding both motions were heard on May 15, 2017. Having reviewed
the entire file and the relevant law, and after consideration of the arguments made by the parties,
this Court now issues this Memorandum Decision and Order.

Collectively referred to herein as ''the Plaintiffs".
Referred to herein as "Wildlife Ridge" or "the Defendant".
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Wildlife Ridge is the owner in fee simple of certain real prope1ty described in the Deed of
Trnst attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust.
On December 3, 2014, Wildlife Ridge filed a Complaint seeking to quiet title in that property
against the same plaintiffs in this case, Monitor Finance and First Capital ("the First Action"). 3

(See Exs. A and B, attached to Aff. of Ron Kerl in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. Filed by Monitor and
First Capital ("Kerl Aff."), Jan. 6, 2017.) That Complaint was amended on March 12, 2015.
(Exs. A and C, attached to Kerl Aff.) By its Complaint and Amended Complaint, Wildlife Ridge
sought a decree quieting title in its name to the lands described in the Deed of Trust free and
clear of the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the district
court that the sums due under the Deed of Trust Note and the Modification of Trust Deed Note
("the Modification") secured by the Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust had been satisfied.
(Exs. Band C, attached to Kerl Aff.) On June 14, 2016, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, a
Judgment dismissing the First Action with prejudice was entered. (Ex. E, attached to Kerl Aff.)
The dismissal of the First Action was followed by the Plaintiffs' present lawsuit to judicially
foreclose the Deed of Trust.
As explained, this Court previously granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. In seeking partial summary judgment, the Plaintiffs argued that all of the defenses
and claims raised by Wildlife Ridge in response to the current lawsuit were barred by the

Based on stipulation of the parties at oral arguments, this Court takes judicial notice of the filings and outcome of
the First Action.
Memorandum Decision and Order
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doctrine of res judicata based on the dismissal of the First Action. In granting that motion, this
Court determined that the First Action ended in a final judgment on the merits and that the
present case involves the same parties as the First Action. (Mem. Decision and Order, March 27,
2017, 13.) This Court further determined that because all of the claims in this case arise out of
the same transaction or series of transactions as decided in the First Action, the affirmative
defenses and counterclaim raised by the Defendant were barred by res judicata. (Id.) Therefore,
all of the affinnative defenses listed in the Defendant's Answer, as well as the Defendant's
Counterclaim for fraud were stricken and dismissed. (Id.) A Judgment to that effect was entered
on March 27, 2017. Then, on March 30, 2017, Default was entered against Defendant M & S
Development, LLC ("M&S"), for failure to appear or answer the Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Subsequently, Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock County filed a waiver of its right to
respond fw1her to the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and consented to the entry of a Judgment
and Decree of Foreclosure as sought by Monitor and First Capital pursuant to the Amended
Complaint.
The Plaintiffs then filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. By that motion, the
Plaintiffs are seeking a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure against Defendant Wildlife Ridge
on the basis of this Court's prior Memorandum Decision and Order dismissing Wildlife Ridge's
affirmative defenses and counterclaim against the Plaintiffs, as well as the fact that Defendant
Pioneer Title Company waived its right to respond and consented to the entry of a Judgment and
Decree of Foreclosure.
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ISSUES

1.

Whether to grant the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration.

2.

Whether to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
DISCUSSIO

It is necessary for this Court to first address the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration,
as resolution of that motion necessarily resolves the question of summary judgment.
Motion for Reconsideration
a.

Standard of Review

Rule l l .2(b)(1) 4 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP") governs motions for
reconsideration. Under that rule, "[a] motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered
before final judgment may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a
final judgment."
In explaining motions for reconsideration, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: "A
motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the court-when new law is applied to
previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to previously presented law, or any
combination thereof-to reconsider the conectness of an interlocutory order." Johnson v. N

Idaho Coll., 153 Idaho 58, 62, 278 P.3d 928, 932 (2012). "[T]he most important consideration is
the conectness of the interlocutory order." Id. Thus, "[a]fter a final judgment, a party has one
more chance under [Rule 1l.2(b)(l)] to ask the court to decide the law and facts conectly."

Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903,913, 332 P.3d 815, 825 (2014). That rule "allows
4 Prior to 2016, this rule was labeled as Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B).
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the trial court to reconsider facts in light of any new or additional facts that are submitted in
support of the motion. This ensures the district court decides a case on the proper law and facts."

Id. (internal citation omitted.) Therefore, the district court should consider any new facts and
new evidence presented by the moving party bearing on the correctness of the interlocutory
order. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank ofN. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d
1026, 1037 (1990); Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cty., 152 Idaho 207,210,268 P.3d 1159, 1162
(2012). "The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention to the new facts."

Coeur d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 823, 800 P.2d at 1037. A trial court is not required "to
search the record to determine if there is any new information that might change the specification
of facts deemed to be established." Id. However, while Rule 1 l .2(b)(l) ''permits a party to
present new evidence when a motion is brought under lhat rule, [the rule] does not require that
the motion be accompanied by new evidence." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,472, 147
P.3d 100, 104 (Idaho Ct.App. 2006). Thus, this Court is not precluded from reconsidering an
interlocutory decision on the grounds of the initial evidence. Id. at 473, 147 P.3d at 105.
"When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). This
Court is being asked to reconsider the granting of a partial motion for summary judgment.
Therefore, this Court "must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of
material fact to defeat summary judgment." Id.
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b.

Analysis

As explained, this Court previously dismissed the Defendant's affirmative defenses and
collllterclaim on the basis of res judicata. This Court specifically determined that the First
Action between the parties ended in a final judgment on the merits, that case involved the same
patiies as the First Action, and all of the claims in this case arise out of the same transaction or
series of transactions as decided in the First Action. (Mem. Decision and Order at 13.) Because
"the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously
asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which
were actually made or which might have been made", this Court ruled that "[n]o matter the
theory advanced by the Defendant in its original quiet title action, the dismissal of the First
Action serves as a dismissal with prej udice of every matter that was available in the First Action
to challenge the enforceability of the Deed of Trust Note, the Modification, and the Deed of
Trust in this case." (Id. at 12.) This Court further determined that all of the affirmative defenses
and the counterclaim raised by Wildlife Ridge challenged ''the enforceability of the same
Monitor and First Capital Deed of Trust Note, Modification and Deed of Trust at issue in the
First Action; therefore, those claims should have been litigated in the First Action." (Id. at 13.)
This Court found that the Defendant had "not demonstrated that it was in any way prevented
from presenting in the First Action any of the claims it has now raised." (Id.) As such, this
Court folllld there were no questions of fact regarding the Defendant's defenses or counterclaim,
and the defenses and counterclaim were necessarily stricken and dismissed. (Id.)
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Through the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant specifically challenges the
dismissal of the statute of limitations defense, arguing that defense was not available in the First
Action and therefore should not have been barred by this Court under the theory of res judicata.
(Mero. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Swnm. J. and in Supp. ofDef.'s Mot. for Reconsideration
("Mero. in Opp'n"), May 1, 2017, 2.) Wildlife Ridge, the Defendant in this action, was the
Plaintiff in the First Action to quiet title filed against Monitor and First Capital, now the
Plaintiffs in the present case. The Defendant argues that during the time of the First Action,
Wildlife Ridge had no standing to quiet title and raise a claim that the statute of limitations
prohibited Monitor and First Capital from enforcing the debt secured by, and foreclosing, the
Deed of Trust. (See id. at 2-3.) In support of that argument, the Defendant cited to Idaho Code§
5-214A, which provides a five-year slatute of limitations for the commencement of an action for
the foreclosure of a mortgage. The Defendant also cited to one sentence from a 1952 Idaho
Supreme Court case pertaining to that statute of limitations. Quoting from Trusty v. Ray, 73
Idaho 232,249 P.2d 814 (1952), the Defendant argued: "In Idaho, a 'mortgagor or his successor
in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, while the secured debt remains unpaid,
although the statute of limitations has run against the right to foreclose the mortgage."' (Id. at 2.)
The Plaintiffs dispute the Defendant's analysis of Trusty as being too broad. The
Plaintiffs agree that the Idaho Supreme Court in the Trusty case concluded that the "mortgagor or
his successor in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, while the secured debt remains
unpaid, although the statute of limitations has run against the right to foreclose the mortgage."
(Mero. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration and Reply Mem. in Supp. of Surnm. J. Mot. ("Mem.
Memorandum Decision and Order
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Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration"), May 8, 2017, 4.) However, the Plaintiffs argue that
"simple statement" did not prohibit Wildlife Ridge "from bringing all available claims for relief

other than one for quieting title to the property" in the First Action. (Id.) Thus, the Plaintiffs
argue that even if quiet title was not available to Wildlife Ridge in the First Action, there is
nothing about the Trusty case that prevented the Defendant from pursuing other, still available
avenues of relief, such as seeking a permanent injunction stopping any enforcement of the deed
of trust by foreclosure. The Plaintiffs point out, for example, that the Defendant raised different
forms for relief other than quiet title in responding to this action. (See id.) The Plaintiffs argue
that because Wildlife Ridge did not pursue those other avenues of relief in the First Action, the
Defendant is barred under the theory of res judicata from "now rais[ing] additional claims for
relief which could have been raised in the First Quiet Title Action." (Id.) Therefore, the
Plaintiffs maintain that this Court was correct in its decision granting partial summary judgment
because "[rJes judicata 's subparts, issue and claim preclusion, ... cover not only the theory of
recover[y] advanced in the first action (here, 'Quiet Title') but any theory of recovery at law or
inequity [sic) which could have been raised in the first action." (Id.)
Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon
the same claim. "[R)es judicata is an umbrella term for different but related concepts: claim
preclusion and issue preclusion." Steve Wieland, Don't Let the Ttab Decide Your Next

Infringement Dispute, 59 ADVOCATE 38 (2016); see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892,
128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 15 5 (2008). "Separate tests are used to determine whether
Memorandum Decision and Order
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claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies." Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123,
157 P.3d 613,617 (2007)(intemal citation omitted).
Pursuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment bars a party from relitigating that same claim, regardless of whether the subsequent litigation involves new or
different issues. Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892, 128 S. Ct. at 2171. The Idaho Supreme Court further
explained claim preclusion as follows:
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the original action.

Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012) (citations
omitted, emphasis added). Thus, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent
relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating
to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Elliot v.

Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). As such, "in an action
between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim

but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic
Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436- 37, 849 P.2d 107, 109- 10
(1993)(emphasis added); see also Joyce v. 1\1urphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549,553,
208 P. 241, 242-43 (1922) . Similarly, "[i]ssue preclusion ... bars 'successive litigation of an
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issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the
prior judgment,' even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim." Sturgell, 553 U.S. at
892, 128 S. Ct. at 2171 (internal citation omitted). Thus, when a court finally determines an
issue in one case that is essential to that judgment, a litigant is barred from raising the issue again
in another lawsuit.
Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of
judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if th~ same
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho
at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133
(Ct.App.1983 )).
Stanion, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617; see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S . 880,892, 128

S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008).
Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars relitigation between the same pru.iies of
a prior litigation is a question of law upon which this Court exercises free review.
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 319, 78 P.3d 379, 386 (2003). Res judicata is an
affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a
preponderance of the evidence. Foster v. City of St. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883, 890, 841
P.2d 413,420 (1992).
Id. at 122, 157 P.3d at 616.

In its decision granting partial summary judgment, this Court determined that the doctrine
of res judicata applied to not only the theory of recovery advanced by Wildlife Ridge in the First
Action, but to any theory of recovery at law or equity which could have been raised in that First
Action. Thus, Wildlife Ridge should have asserted every legal rule and/or equitable remedy to
establish that the Deed of Trust Note was unenforceable. The Defendant's new reliance on the
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Trusty case does not support the Defendant's argwnent that it was prohibited in the First Action
from bringing all available claims for relief other than a claim for quieting title. Wildlife Ridge
was not required to limit its requested relief to simply seeking a decree quieting title to the land.
However, having selected that solitary claim for relief, the doctrine of resjudicata prohibits
Wildlife Ridge from now adding new or additional claims for relief that were available at the
time of the First Action, which action was indisputably litigated to a final judgment. When the
First Action was dismissed, Wildlife Ridge lost the ability to relitigate any other theories of
recovery arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions which were actually made
or which might have been made in the First Action. Unfortunately, Wildlife Ridge limited itself
by seeking a relief that was too narrow, and this Court can find no error of fact or law in its
previous decision to that effect.
The Defendant additionally argued reconsideration should be granted because the
Plaintiffs are simply barred from "the commencement of a foreclosure action in this matter"
because "[a]n action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on a real property must be commenced
within five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such
mortgage." (Mem. in Opp'n at 3.) Citing to the Trust Deed Note attached to the Plaintiffs'
Complaint, the Defendant argued:
The Deed of Trust being foreclosed is subject to the mandatory maturity date
contained in the Trust Deed Note. The note specifically states that "2. The term of this
Trust Deed Note shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. This Trust Deed Note shall
fully mature on June 28, 2006 (the 'Maturity Date')."
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(Id. at 3.) The Defendant argues there was no stay on the statute of limitations, and the five-year
timeframe for commencing an action for the foreclosure of the subject mortgage has expired
based on the maturity date of June 28, 2006. Therefore, the Defendant claims the Plaintiffs are
now time-barred from enforcing their rights under the Deed of Trust Note and Modification.

(See Mem. in Opp'n at 3.) The Plaintiffs dispute that contention, arguing that ''the record before
the Court and applicable law supports a finding that the subject obligation is not time barred by
any applicable statute of limitations." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 9.)
As mentioned earlier, Idaho Code§ 5-214A provides a five-year statute oflimitations for
the commencement of an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage. That statute states:

An action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property must be commenced within
five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such
mortgage. If the obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage does not state a
maturity date, then the date of the accrual of the cause of action giving rise to the right to
foreclose shall be deemed the date of maturity of such obligation or indebtedness.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-2 l 4A (West). Idaho Code § 45-1515 adopts the same five-year statute of
limitations for the foreclosure of deeds of trust. That statute states:
The foreclosure of a trust deed by advertisement and sale shall be made and the
foreclosure of a trust deed by judicial procedure shall be commenced within the time
limited by the same period and according to the same provisions including extensions as
provided by law for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1515 (West). The Defendant points to the maturity date stated in the
Deed of Trust Note, which is June 28, 2006. (See Ex. A, Trust Deed Note, attached to Compl. to
Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust, Oct. 7, 2016.) That date is not in dispute, and the Complaint
to foreclose the Deed of Trust was not filed until 2016. However, the Plaintiffs argue the statute
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of limitations was restarted by a partial payment made on November 8, 2012, "extending the
maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust, and the right to foreclose that Deed
ofTrnst, to November 8, 2017." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 10.)
In support of the extension argument, the Plaintiffs direct this Court to Idaho Code§ 5238, which pertains to the effect of partial payments. That statute provides:
No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract by
which to take the case out of the operation of this chapter, unless the same is contained in
some writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby; but any payment ofprincipal or
interest is equivalent to a new promise in writing, duly signed, to pay the residue of the
debt.
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 5-238 (West)(emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has found that
payments of interest or principal serve to restart the statute of limitations on all installments on
the note pursuant to IC§ 5-238. Horkley v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 879,881, 173 P.3d 1138, 1140
(2007). There is no dispute in this case that on November 8, 2012, the Plaintiffs "received a
payment on the Deed of Trust Note in the amount of $38,472.24 and applied that payment to the
principal due on the obligation." (Mem. Opposing Mot. for Reconsideration at 10; see also,
Supplemental Aff. in Supp. of Pis.' Foreclosure Decree, May 8, 2017, 13.) As such, the partial
payment made on the Deed ofTrnst in this case on November 8, 2012, restarted the five-year
statute of limitations, extending the maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of
Trust, including the right to foreclose that Deed of Trust, to November 8, 2017. The Complaint
to Judicially Foreclose the Deed of Trust was filed on October 7, 2016, within the five-year limit.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the partial payment extending the maturity date was made
after Wildlife Ridge had acquired the subject property and was therefore made with the
Memorandum Decision and Order
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Defendant's full knowledge and consent. Thus, under the provisions ofIC § 5-238, the partial
payment to the Plaintiffs constituted "a new promise in writing", extending the statute of
limitations found in IC§§ 5-214A and 45-1515 for an additional five years. As such, the
Plaintiffs' action to foreclose the Deed of Trust, filed on October 7, 2016, was timely filed, and
the Plaintiffs are not barred by the statute of limitations from commencing this action.
Therefore, the Defendant's statute of limitation argument does not provide a valid basis for this
Court to reconsider its prior decision granting partial summary judgment in favor of the
Plaintiffs.
Motion for Summary Judgment

The Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment seeking a Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure against Wildlife Ridge. As set forth above, the Plaintiffs' request is supported by
this Court's previous entry of partial summary judgment and the subsequent Default entered
against Defendant M & S Development, LLC, for failure to appear or answer the Plaintiffs'
Complaint. Defendant Pioneer Title Company of Bannock County has also consented to the
ent1y of a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure as sought by Monitor and First Capital pursuant
to the Amended Complaint. Based on that procedural history, the Plaintiffs argue this Court
need now only make a determination that there remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of
Trust, and make a further finding as to the description and reasonable value of the property still
encumbereq by that Deed of Trust. (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. Mot., April 13, 2017, 4.)
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a.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file , together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." IDAHO R. Crv. P.
56(c)(2016). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89,
867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party
opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.

Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). If the evidence
reveals no disputed issues of material fact , then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v.

City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991) .

If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 90,
867 P.2d at 964. Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when the
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case upon
which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P .2d at
1037-38; Bade!! v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The party opposing the
summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set

Memorandum Decision and Order

16

Case No . CV-2016-3588-0C
Re: Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration/Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
302 of 325

I,

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56( e)(2016)

(emphasis added).

b.

Analysis

In opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant argued the amount of the
debt cannot be re litigated because the amount of the debt was already raised and litigated in the
First Action. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Reconsideration at 4.) The Defendant stated: "[T]he
amount of the debt was raised and litigated in the first quiet title action the result was a joint
stipulation dismissing the action." (Id.) Relying on the doctrine of res judicata, the Defendant
contends that the issue of whether a debt was owed was already litigated in the First Action, and
based on the joint stipulation entered there, the Plaintiffs are now barred from relitigating the
debt owed. 5
This Court has already extensively set forth the law regarding res judicata in the
proceeding sections, as well as in its prior Memorandum Decision and Order. There is no need
to repeat that discussion in great depth here. It is sufficient to note that under principles of res
judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an

absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim. A judgment,
"once rendered, is treated as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties
on the same 'claim' or 'cause of action."' Aldape, 105 Idaho at 256,668 P.2d at 132(quoting
Kaspar Wire Works, Inc., 575 F.2d at 535-36).

5 Outside of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendant did not raise any factual issues challenging summary
judgment, and the Defendant did not submit any affidavits or other evidence to challenge sununary judgment.
Memorandum Decision and Order
17
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C
Re: Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration/Plaintiffs' Motion/or Summary Judgment

303 of 325

~ ·

Monitor and First Capital were defendants in the First Action. One defense raised by
Monitor and First Capital was the denial that the obligation owed by Michael Millward and
M&S Development had been satisfied. Mr. Millward and M&S were the makers of the Deed of
Trust Notes. However, Monitor and First Capital did not pursue any claims for relief in the First
Action because they were prohibited from doing so under applicable bankruptcy laws. As
makers of the Deed of Trust Notes, as modified, Mr. Millward and M&S were necessary parties
to any claim to foreclose the Deed of Trust and enforce the Deed of Trust Note and Modification.

See IDAHO R. Crv. P. 20(a)(2)(2016). 6 However, at the time of the First Action, Mr. Millward
had already filed for bankruptcy. Pursuant to Title 11, Section 362 of the United States Code 7,
an automatic stay commenced on September 10, 2012. The Plaintiffs submit they were

Rule 20. Permissive joinder of parties
(a) Persons Who May Join or be Joined.
(!) Plaintiffs. Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if:
(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.
(2) Defendants. Persons may be joined in one action as defendants if:
(A) any right to reliefis asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.

6

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,302, or 303 of this title,
or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities, of-7

(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over
property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a
claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;

11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West).
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prohibited by that bankruptcy stay from taking any action to enforce the Trust Deed Note, as
amended, and foreclose the Deed of Trust securing that Trust Deed Note. According to the
Plaintiffs, the automatic stay existed until the bankruptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016.
Thus, the pending Chapter 7 bankruptcy prevented Monitor and First Capital from asse1iing any
foreclosure claims against Defendants Millward, M&S Development, and Wildlife Ridge in the
First Action, and the amount of Monitor and First Capital's debt still owed was therefore never
actually litigated. In responding to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant offered no
evidence to dispute the fact that Monitor and First Capital could not have actually litigated a
claim for foreclosure in the First Action because they were prohibited from pursuing such a
claim against the makers of the Note based on the bankruptcy stay. As res judicata is only a bar
to the relitigation of claims that have already been decided, and the Plaintiffs made no "claim"
for foreclosure in the First Action, res judicata cannot now prevent the Plaintiffs from pursuing
litigation regarding the amount of debt still owed.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the proceeding discussion regarding res judicata, no
factual issues have been raised by the Defendant in challenging summary judgment. Under the
governing standards, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment must produce
"evidence by way of affidavit or deposition ... to contradict the assertions of the moving party."

Ambrose By & Through Ambrose v. Buhl Joint Sch. Dist. No. 412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d
1088, 1091 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994)(intemal citations omitted). Such evidence must be anchored
in something more than mere speculation. See id. A non-moving party's failure to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which
Memorandum Decision and Order
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that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment. See

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S . 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 295
(1986). "In.such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322- 23, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. Thus, where
the non-moving party has failed to make a showing of proof on any element for which it bears
the burden at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; see
also, Sparks v. St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd., 115 Idaho 505,509, 768 P.2d 768, 772 (1988).
The Defendant here has failed to present any affidavits or evidence to challenge summary
judgment or to support any defense to the foreclosure relief sought by the Plaintiffs. On the
other hand, the Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits in support of summary judgment. Therefore,
based on the governing standards, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment must
necessarily be granted.
CONCLUSlON

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. This Court further
finds there remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of Trust. Pursuant to the affidavit filed
in support of the Plaintiffs' motion, "[a]s of the 1st day of April, 2017, there will be due, owing
and unpaid upon the Trust Deed Note, as modified, the sum of $6,814,076.41, together with
interest thereafter accruing at the default rate of 35% per annum until date of Judgment herein,
together with costs, foreclosure expenses, attorney's fees and expenses necessary to preserve
Plaintiffs' interest in the property heretofore advanced or hereafter accruing." (Aff. in Supp. of
Memorandum Decision and Order
Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C

20

Re: Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration/Plaintiffs' Motion for Summa,y Judgment
306 of 325

.. /

Pls.' Foreclosure Decree at 6:6.) Based on that undisputed affidavit, this Court finds there
remains an unpaid debt secured by the Deed of Trust and owing to the Plaintiffs in the amount of
$6,814,076.41.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs shall submit a proposed Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure
detailing the amount remaining on the unpaid debt and the description and reasonable value of
the property still encumbered by that Deed of Trust for this Court's consideration and signature.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs may also submit an appropriate memorandum detailing the
grounds for any claimed award of litigation costs and attorney fees. However, any decision
regarding costs and fees will be made in a separate order after this Court is provided an
opportunity to review such a request in detail.
Based on the preceding discussion and this Court's findings, no claims remain. As such,
this case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

12>

day of June 2017.

k&~c.f\-~
ROBERT C. NAFTZ
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the14th day of June, 2017, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document upon each of the following in the manner indicated.

Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen
PO Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

(X) E-Mail
( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

A. Bruce Larsen

(X) E-Mail

155 S. 2°d Ave.
Pocatello, ID 83201

( ) Overnight Delivery
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile

ROBERT POLEK.I, Clerk

By: _ _
\lro---'---'._.__PN"'-"'-¥-UA_ __
KERIPOVEY
Deputy Clerk

_

U
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Attorney for Monitor Finance, l. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COU NTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FrNANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPlT AL FUNDING, LC., a
Utah limited liability company,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

VS .

)

)

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an
Idaho limited linbility company;
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; and
PIONEER TITLE COMPANY OF
BANNOCK COUNTY, INC.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)
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)
)

WILDLIFE RlDGE ESTATES, LLC, an lda110
limited liab ility company,

)
)
)

Counter-claimant,
vs.

)
)
)

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L C., a
Utah limited liability company,

)
)
)
)

Counter-defendant,

)

________________ _ __ )
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Thi s maltcr having come on regularly before the Court, the Honorable Robert C. Naftz
presiding, and finding good cause therefore;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
I.

Pursuant to th e parties stipulation and this Court's Stipulated Order Approving

St ipulations Consenting to the Sale of Real Property dated April 28, 2017, Pioneer Title Company
is hereby ordered to turn over to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., in care of
their attorney of record, Ron Kerl of the firm of Cooper & Larsen, Chtd., 151 N. 3'd Ave., Second
Floor, Pocatello, Idaho, the net proceeds from the sale of the below described prope1ty, totaling
$256, 761.67. Said funds are currently deposited in the trust account of Pioneer Title Company. The

net proceeds from the sale of the following property:
Lot 2, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2- $44,195.82
Lot 5, Block 3 WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $44,928.14
Lot 7 & Lot 9, Block 3 WILDLirE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $86,749 .80
Lot 4, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION 2 - $45,433.92
Lot 6, Block 3, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIVISION I - $35,453.99
2.

The Trust Deed, Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated

December 30, 2005 ("Deed of Trust") executed and delivered by M&S Development LLC , to
Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital Funding, L.C., recorded on the 301h day of December, 2005,
under Rccordcr1s instrument No. 20528398 in the records of Bannock County, Idaho, is a valid first
lien on the below described real property securing an indebtedness of $6,828,907 .39, as of June 19,
2017. plus any additional attorney fees and costs awarded by the Court pursuant to l.R.C.P. Ruic 54,

and costs related to the enforcement of this Decree by Sheriff's Foreclosure Sale, plus legal interest
on the entire sum of the aforesaid indebtedness from the date of this Decree io and including the date
of Sheri ft's sale at the highest rate allowed by law;
,Judg~111cnt and Dccrt•c of Foreclosure and Order of Sale - pg. 2
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The real property encumbered by the Deed of Trust is situated in the County of Bannock,
State of Idaho, is more particularly described as follows:
Lot l, I3lock 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTA TES DIVISION 2; and
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION l
3.

The Deed of Trust described in paragraph 2 is foreclosed, and all interests which the

Defendants Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J. Millward, M&S Development LLC, and
Pioneer Title Company have in the above described real property, and any fixtures on the property,
shall be sold by the Sheriff of Bannock County, Idaho, in the manner provided by law, payc1b lc in
cash lawful money oft he United States of America and in accordance with the practice of this Cou rt.
The reasonable value of said property as of the date of this Decree is c1s fo llows:
Lot I, Block 2, WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES DIV ISION 2 - $50,000.00
Lot 2, Block 3, WILDLIFE ESTATES DIVISION I - $50,000
4.

The proceeds of sale shall be applied as fol lows: First, to the costs of sale; second,

towards the satisfaction of the indebtedness owing to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capital
Funding, L.C. as set forth in paragraph 2 above; and third, any surplus thereafter remaining shall be
paid into the District Court for further dctennination regarding priority among those parties to this
litigation whose rights are subordinate to Monitor Finance, L.C. and First Capitc1l Funding, L.C ..
5.

The Ddendants \Vild_l ife Ridge Estates, LLC, Michael J. Millward, M&S

Development LLC, and Pioneer Tit le Company, and all persons claiming through or under them
as purchasers, encumbranccrs, or otherwise and all persons claiming to have acquired any equity or
interest in said premises are foreclosed of all interests, liens, or claims in the real property herein
above described, and evc1y portion thereof, save and except such statutory rights of redemption as
said parties or any of them may have.
J11d~c111cnt und Deuce of Forcdosurc aud Order
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6.

The Plaintiff, with either a cash bid or a credit bid against the sum here in found to be

due it, or any party to thi s suit may become the purchaser at the sale of said properly, and the
purchaser thereof shall be entitled to nil of the rights and privileges of such a purchaser under the
laws of the State of Idaho.
DATED This

1fJ_ day of June, 2017.
Hon. Robert C. Naftz
DISTRICT JUDGE
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY on the~ day of Ju ne , 20 17, l served a true and correct copy of

th e foregoing document as follows :
[x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932- l 083
[ ] Email to: bruce@hwlawpro.com

A. Bruce Larson
Hearn Law, P~LP
. 6( L. ,·
·P:D. Box '7'0. 106 5. 2i'- ·f\
Poca tel lo, ID 8320 I

vU

Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen, Chtd .
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205

[x] U.S . Mai l, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932- 1083
[ ] Email to: ron@cooperlarse n.com
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Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C. , a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

WILDLIFE RIDG E ESTAT ES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; M&S DEVELOPM ENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; and PIONEER TITLE
COMPANY OF BANNOCK COUNTY, INC.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
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JUDGMENT

)

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Counter-claimant,
%.

)

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Counter-defendant,
_ _ _____________
___
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)
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)
)
)
)
)
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Judgment is entered against M & S Development, LLC for the sum of $6,728,907.39, as of
June 19, 2017, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate set by J.C. § 28-22-104, to wit: 5.625%
per annum.
DATED This

day of October, 2017.

Hon. Robert C. Naftz
DISTRICT JUDGE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY on th e

U_ day of October, 20 17, I served a true and correct copy

of the foregoing document as fo llows:

A. Bruce Larson
Hearn & Wood LLP
155 S. 2"J Ave.
Pocatello, ID 83201

[x] U.S. Mail , postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083
[ ] Ema il to : bruce@hwlawpro .com

Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen, Chtd .
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205

[x] U.S . Mail , postage prepaid

[
[
[
[

] Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
] Facsimile - 208-932-1083
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M&S Development, LLC
c/o Michael Millward, Registered Agent
9716 W. Bighorn Drive
Pocatello, ID 83204

[x] U.S . Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083
[ ] Emai l to: ron@cooperlarsen .corn
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited)
Liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL )
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability )

)

~m~~

Plaintiffs/Respondents,

vs.

)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No.

)

)
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an
)
Idaho limited liability company;
)
Defendant/Appellant M&S DEVELOPMENT)
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, )
)
Defendant
)
)
)
)
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an
)
Idaho Limited liability company;
)
)
Counter-Claimant/ Appellant,
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

OF
APPEAL

________

vs.

)

)
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited)
Liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL )
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability )
Company,
)
)
Counter-Defendants/Respondents)
)
)

________

Appealed from: Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County
Honorable Judge Robert C. Naftz presiding
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Bannock County Case No: CV-2016-3588-0C
Order of Judgment Appealed from: Memorandum Decision and Order filed the
2ih day of March, 2017, Memorandum Decision and Order filed the 14th day of
June, 2017, Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale filed the 20th day
of June, 2017 and Judgment filed the 10th day of October, 2017.
Attorney for Appellant: Richard A. Hearn, Attorney HEARN LAW PLC, Pocatello
Attorney for Respondent: Ron Kerl, Attorney COOPER & LARSEN, Chartered,
Pocatello
Appealed by: Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
Defendant/Appellant M&S Development, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
Defendant.
Appealed against: Monitor Finance, LC., a Utah limited liability company; and
First Capital Funding, LC., a Utah limited liability company.
Notice of Appeal filed: October 19, 2017
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: No
Appellate fee paid: Yes
Request for additional records filed: No
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Name of Reporter: N/A
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? No
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ·OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-2016-3588-0C

V

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company, Defendant/Appellant;
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE

Defendants.

WILDLIFE RIDGE EST ATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counter-Claimant;
V

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Counter-defendants.

With respect to the issues determined by the Judgment dated October 10, 2017, and all
prior paiiial Judgments and Orders entered in this action, it is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance
with Rule 54(b ), LR.C.P ., that the court has determined that there is no just reason for delay of
the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby direct that the above
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judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may
be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
r,.

DATED this ~j .r J, day of November, 2017.

Robert C. Naftz
DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the U
day of November, 2017, I served a hue and
c01Tect copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Ron Kerl
COOPER & LARSEN, Chartered
151 North Third Avenue, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
A. Bruce Larson
HEARN LAW, PLC
155 S. 2nd Avenue
P.O. Box 70
Pocatello, ID 83201
Telephone: (208) 904-0004

M
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

n
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail-Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: 208-235-1182
Email: ron@cooper-larsen.com

U.S. Mail - Postage Prepaid
Hand Deli very
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: 208-904-1816
Email: bruce@hearnlawyers.com

Deputy~
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L,

Ron Kerl, Esq. - ISB # 1768
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone:
(208) 23 5-1145
Facsimile:
(208) 235 - 1182
Ema ii: Q.2JJ({ i:co(1p cr- l <1 rscn .co m
Attorney for Monitor Finance, L. C. and First Capital Funding, L. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TH E
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company ; and FIRST CAPJT AL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
vs.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2016-3588-0C

)

Defendant/ Appel Iant,
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; and PIONEER TITLE
COMPANY OF BANNOCK COUNTY, INC.,
Defendants.

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company, Counter-claimant/Appellant,
vs.
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; and FIRST CAPITAL FUNDING, L.C., a
Utah limited liability company,
Counter-defendants/Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

RESPONDENTS'
DESIGNATION OF
ADDITIONAL RECORD ON
APPEAL
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MONITOR FINANCE, LC., a Utah limited)
Liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL )
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability )
Company,
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants,
)
Respondents
v.
)
)
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an
)
)
Idaho limited liability company;
)
Defenda nt-Cou ntercla ima nt-Appel lant, )
)
)
)
)
and
)
)
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho
)
Limited liability company
)
)

Supreme Court No.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE

_________

I, ROBERT POLEK!, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that I
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the
CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

Bruce Larson
Richard A. Hearn
Hearn Law PLC
P.O. Box 70
Pocatello, Idaho 83204

Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4229
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this - ~ -

(Seal)
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